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The thesis understands biodiversity as a complex consisting of a form of environmentalism, 
a mode of governance for the global South, and a set of policy prescriptions all mobilized by 
the guiding idea of ‘genetic gold,’ the belief that biodiversity possesses significant latent 
economic value. The thesis primarily analyses the historical origins of biodiversity and the 
formation of a rationality of governing centred on genetic gold, deploying tools and methods 
from the work of Michel Foucault. It further applies these insights into the examination of 
two specific regulatory mechanisms developed within this project of environmental 
governance: the mechanism for securing access to genetic resources and the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from their utilisation, and local and indigenous 
community participation in biodiversity conservation and utilisation. The aim of this research 
is a dual critique. First, the unpacking of the complexity of the biodiversity concept and its 
integrative rendering of biodiversity loss as a governance problem constitutes a critique of 
environmental law’s enthusiastic acceptance and subsequent regulation of biodiversity as 
genetic gold. Secondly, the conception of a broader governance complex pervaded by non-
legal forms of knowledge, expertise and practices challenges an international environmental 
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THE BLACKMAIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
 
Whatever happened to biodiversity?1 
 
 
I │ THE SPECTRE OF FAILURE AND THE CURSE OF IRRELEVANCY 
The first specialised study of international environmental treaties by Simon Lyster in 19852 
brought the first systematisation of a previously unheard legal field that appeared on the 
verge of its establishment as an accepted field of public international law. Lyster’s account 
also brought an image of the death that awaits all defective environmental treaties with his 
description of the de facto defunct Western Hemisphere Convention as ‘a sleeping treaty’, a 
fate attributed to the complete lack of institutional machinery in support of its 
implementation3. Since that early period, all environmental treaties have been outfitted with 
elaborate institutional and administrative structures (including conferences of the parties, 
secretariats, standing scientific bodies, working groups amongst others) to counteract this 
threat of eternal ‘sleep’, turning them into the complex treaty regimes of the present day. 
 
In 2010, a series of events relating to the United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity 4  (CBD), although outwardly a manifestation of continued operational 
effectiveness if not outright success, have raised the spectre of a different kind of death for 
                                               
1 Title of a press communiqué released by the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2010) 
2 Simon Lyster, International Wildlife Law : An Analysis of International Treaties Concerned with the Conservation of 
Wildlife (Grotius Publications 1985) 
3 Ibid 111 
4 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 31 ILM 818 (1992) 
(entered into force 29 December 1993), (CBD) 
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international environmental law. First, the United Nations declared 2010 as an 
International Year of Biodiversity, a symbolic ‘celebration of the diversity of life on Earth’ 
and ‘homage to incredible biological richness that sustains our health and wellbeing’5. The 
launch of this international year attempted to move environmental discourse on from the 
excessive focus on climate change culminating in the perceived failure of Copenhagen 
conference the year before. Secondly, the 10th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the CBD 
was held at Nagoya in October 2010. COP-10 produced two concrete legally recognisable 
outcomes as part of the well-received ‘Nagoya package’ 6  of negotiations: the hard law 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing (ABS), 7  a 
culmination of roughly eight years of negotiations, and a new Strategic Plan for the period 
2011-2020, titled ‘Living in Harmony with Nature’, complete with biodiversity policy 
targets8. This represented the culmination of work undertaken within the very active CBD, 
a complex regime that contains a sprawling collection of mechanisms, working groups, 
institutions, partnerships9, and –after Nagoya – two binding protocols10 in support of its 
objectives. Yet, despite the enthusiasm and optimism of these achievements, these events 
cannot seem to lift the atmosphere of failure and irrelevancy that permeates. 
 
Failure here can refer to the lack of direct impact in terms of affecting the decline of 
biodiversity. In 2002, nine years after its entry into force, the CBD operation had been 
                                               
5 Statement by Ahmed Djoghhlaf, The Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, On 
The Occasion of the Official Launch of the International Year of Biodiversity, 11 January 2010 
6 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity: 
18-29 October 2010 (IISD, 2010) 
7 The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity, see 
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/Decision X.1 (2010), Annex 
8 The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets ‘Living in Harmony with 
Nature’, see UNEP/CBD/COP/10/Decision X.2 (2010), Annex  
9 These elements of the regime will be examined throughout the thesis. The pace and complexity of 
institutional change is such that a updated complete outline is only available at: http://www.cbd.int/ 
10 Including the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, see 
UNEP/CBD/EXCOP 1/Decision EM-I.3 (2000), Annex 
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organized for the first time through a strategic plan structured around the following 
primary objective: 
 
‘...to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss 
at the global, regional and national level as a contribution to poverty alleviation and 
to the benefit of all life on earth’11. 
 
This establishment of a relatively concrete target was very well-received at the ensuing 
World Summit of Sustainable Development (WSSD) at Johannesburg in 2002 and 
subsequently incorporated into the high-profile and wide-ranging Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs)12, within the subsidiary goal of improving the effectiveness of 
global environmental regimes. 
 
The adoption of the strategic plan followed on from a near-decade of continuing 
biodiversity degradation despite the full operation of the CBD, but the plan did not alter 
this trajectory in any appreciable form. In 2005, the UN’s report on progress towards the 
MDGs had stressed that ‘sustainability will not be achieved with current patterns of 
resource consumption and use’13. The publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 
the same year further confirmed the general decline of all ecosystems14, partly masking its 
bleak assessment by employing a more neutral terminology of ecosystem transformation 
and change. Nevertheless, one of the key messages of this assessment’s Synthesis Report 
was that ‘an unprecedented effort would be needed to achieve by 2010 a significant 
                                               
11 Strategic Plan for The Convention on Biological Diversity, see UNEP/CBD/COP 6/Decision VI.26 
(2002), Annex 
12 Target 7.B of the seventh, Environmental Sustainability, goal, see 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml  
13 See The MDGs Report 2005, 30 available at 
http://www.unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/pdf/MDG%20Book.pdf  
14 See MA Synthesis Report on Biodiversity (2005), 2-5 available at http://www.maweb.org/   
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reduction in the loss of biodiversity at all levels’ 15 . This unprecedented effort never 
materialised. In May 2010, the publication of the third Global Biodiversity Outlook16 confirmed 
that the 2010 objective had simply not been met to any appreciable degree, while most 
indications pointed towards a continuing decline of genes, species and ecosystems 
diversity17. Acknowledging this trajectory of failure18, the new 2010 strategic plan instead 
proposes a grand vision of a future ‘living in harmony with nature’, defined as a future 
‘where by 2050, biodiversity is valued, conserved, restored, and wisely used, maintaining 
ecosystem services, sustaining a healthy planet and delivering benefits essential for all 
people’19. 
 
The sudden emergence of this grand vision is related to the fear of irrelevancy, the second 
element of the spectre haunting the CBD, as indicated above. The adoption of the Nagoya 
package was hailed as a great success for international environmental law, particularly 
coming soon after the disappointment of Copenhagen. A certain confidence, if not 
triumphalism, observed in the title and language of the new strategic plan, appears vacuous, 
not only in light of the clearly measurable failure of the first strategic plan, but also the 
declining status of the CBD itself within the international community. Despite being a top-
level environmental summit, the Nagoya COP was attended by the heads of state from 
Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Yemen, Monaco and Japan as the host, while a significant number 
of states did not even send ministerial-level representation20. Biodiversity simply does not 
command a place in the global agenda in the same way climate change has achieved in 
recent years. 
 
                                               
15 Ibid. 
16 An overview of CBD efforts, published by the Secretariat of the CBD. See http://gbo3.cbd.int/  
17 See Executive summary, http://gbo3.cbd.int/the-outlook/gbo3/executive-summary.aspx  
18 See ‘Living in Harmony with Nature’, see note 8 above, par. 7 
19 Ibid par. 11 
20 George Monbiot, ‘A Ghost Agreement’ The Guardian (London 2 November 2010) 
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This is certainly worrying for environmentalism considering the established importance of 
biodiversity as the support system for all life on the planet, but for international 
environmental law it is the combination of absent interest with a streamlined production of 
legal output that appears to usher in a new type of ‘sleeping treaty’. This is no longer a 
treaty abandoned due to lack of institutional machinery, but a treaty that festers because the 
institutional structure does not produce purpose or impact; not dead and buried in the 
graveyard of failed environmental initiatives, but allowed to exist as an undead zombie 
chained inside a cage and forgotten by everyone. Truly, whatever happened to biodiversity? 
 
The search for an answer to this question constitutes the main task of this thesis. It is 
approached largely as a question of evaluation and assessment, primarily but not exclusively 
of the CBD itself. This in turn raises issues of the criteria and methods by which such an 
analysis of the CBD is to proceed. For example, the intentionally scaremongering depiction 
of the CBD as a ‘zombie treaty’ immediately above is derived from largely formalist criteria, 
such as evaluating the performance of the environmental regime through the decisions of 
its COP or measuring its influence by the number of heads of state appearing in it. These 
are assumptions that factor into the analysis, often resulting in simplistic dismissals or 
enthusiastic embraces. In order to begin the process of answering the above question at the 
very least without falling into the trap of abstract formalism, one needs analytical tools that 
can venture beyond these assumptions. Before going into further detail into these 
theoretical and methodological points of the analysis proposed in this thesis, a more 
detailed presentation of the themes and framework of the CBD, as well as the deficiencies 
of existing methods for evaluating its operation, is required.  
II | THE UN CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 
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In this section, an outline of the basic themes and features of the Biodiversity Convention 
and relevant literature on biodiversity is presented. This survey helps clarify the main issues 
in the relation between law and biodiversity. 
MAJOR THEMES AND LEGAL STRUCTURE 
Biodiversity was declared dead in 199721. For the conservation expert making that claim, 
the general definition of the concept as the variability of life, its processes and ecosystems, 
the ‘catch-all term of everything biotic’ 22 , was ‘so all-inclusive that it has become 
meaningless’23. While indisputable as a deontological environmental ethic calling for the 
protection of diversity at all levels, the lack of specific guidance and economic utility made 
it unsuitable as a guide to conservation practice. During the exact same period in the late 
1990s, biodiversity was also described in completely opposite terms as ‘a metaphorical 
magnate that currently galvanizes the conservation, scientific and funding communities’24. 
Within a different schema of geopolitical exchange, a North-South ‘grand bargain’ 25 , 
biodiversity was defined as a genetic resource held by Southern states and sought by 
Northern states. The - at the time - influential negotiating Group of Like-Minded 
Megadiversity Countries26 (LMMC) stressed that: 
 
‘The resources of biological diversity and the environmental services that depend 
on them have an immense strategic, economic and social value, and offer 
                                               
21 R.A. Lautenschlager, ‘Biodiversity is Dead’ (1997) 25 Wildlife Society Bulletin 679 
22 Ibid 683 
23 Ibid 679 
24 Charles Zerner quoted in Michael  Goldman (ed) Privatizing Nature: Political Struggles for the Global Commons 
(Pluto Press 1998) 145 
25 Walter V. Reid and others, Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Genetic Resources for Sustainable Development (World 
Resources Institute, USA 1993); Kerry ten Kate and Sarah A Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity 
(Earthscan 1999); Kerry ten Kate, ‘Biodiversity and Business: Coming to Terms with the 'Grand Bargain'’ 
(2000) 76 International Affairs 241 
26 The core consisted of Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Philippines, Mexico, 
Peru, South Africa and Venezuela before expanding to include more Southern states. Currently disbanded. 
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development opportunities to our populations and to the international 
community’27. 
 
For the environmental economist, some form of transaction was the next logical step, but 
this commodification of biodiversity was also deplored on environmental and social justice 
grounds28. While it invested biodiversity with a specific economic utility, this reduction of 
biodiversity was seen as devaluing the ecological complexity of the term, redirecting 
conservation funds away from endangered regions towards solely profitable ventures, and 
ignoring the multiple social benefits derived from biodiversity as ‘the biophysical context of 
cultures’29. Therefore within the same time frame, the same environmental concept was 
concurrently understood in different ways, as both a lofty, universal environmental ethic 
with little practical application, as well as a pragmatic utilitarian ethic of little value to 
traditional environmentalist concerns and practices. 
 
Although a miniscule snapshot of the multiple debates and conflicts over the concept of 
biological diversity that have raged since its inception 30 , the above juxtaposition is 
illustrative of the main themes, issues and questions that the CBD has had to grapple with 
since the first negotiating session. These dominant themes mainly revolve around binaries, 
such as concept and reality, environmental ethic and applied science, conservation and 
utilisation, global commons and private property, and of course the North-South divide. 
The legal framework of the CBD emerged as a proposed response, operationalization or 
even resolution to some of these binaries. 
                                               
27 Cancun Declaration of Like-Minded Megadiversity Countries (signed 18 February 2002) Available at: 
http://www.weltvertrag.org/e375/e719/e1045/CancunDeclarationonLikeMindedMegadiversityCountries_2
002_ger.pdf 
28 For some critiques see indicatively Kathleen McAfee, ‘Selling Nature to Save it? Biodiversity and Green 
Developmentalism’ (1999) 17 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 133; Chapter 6 in 
Ramachandra Guha and J. Martinez-Alier, Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South (Earthscan 1997) 
29 McAfee 144, note 28 above 




As a correlation of these themes, the idea of a trade-off between conservation and 
development is often presented as the underlying rationale that dominates the CBD 
framework 31 . This is evident in the treaty’s three objectives, which are the (linked) 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, as well as the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources32. Biological diversity is formally 
defined as: 
 
‘The variability among living organisms from all sources […] and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between 
species and of ecosystems’33. 
 
The conservation of this biodiversity is divided into two categories of in situ34 and ex situ35 
measures. Sustainable use36 is directly linked to the practice of sustainable development37. It 
is defined as: 
 
‘The use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not 
lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its 
potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations’38. 
 
                                               
31  See Alan E. Boyle, ‘The Rio Convention on Biological Diversity’ in Catherine Redgwell and Michael 
Bowman (eds), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law International 1995) 38; 
Clare Shine and Palitha T.B. Kohona, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity: Bridging the Gap Between 
Conservation and Development’ (1992) 1 Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law 278; Catherine Tinker, ‘A "New Breed" of Treaty: The United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity’ (1995) 13 Pace Environmental Law Review 191; and Chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis 
32 CBD, Art. 1 
33 CBD, Art. 2 
34 I.e. in its natural surroundings. CBD, Art 2 and 8 
35 I.e. outside natural habitats, in botanical gardens, seed banks and other collections. CBD, Art.2 and 9 
36 CBD, Art. 6 and 10 
37 Further discussed in Chapter 4. 
38 CBD, Art. 2 
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The third objective of fair and equitable sharing (ABS)39 was initially given far less attention 
and prominence compared to the other two40. Genetic resources were defined as ‘genetic 
material of actual or potential value’41; genetic material ‘means any material of plant, animal, 
microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity’ 42 . The increasing 
importance of ABS, which eventually led to the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol on the 
topic, has also widened this definition to include ‘derivatives’ 43 , i.e. naturally occurring 
biochemical compounds without functional units of heredity44. Utilization (as opposed to 
use) is also defined in the protocol as ‘to conduct research and development on the genetic 
and/or biochemical composition of genetic resources’45. 
 
The implementation methods set out in the treaty text, by which the three objectives are to 
be achieved, predominantly refer to national environmental law and policy. The CBD 
formally recognises the principle of national sovereignty over all natural resources46, and by 
extension the majority of biodiversity is placed within national jurisdiction47. Thus, the 
objectives of the CBD are to be accomplished through ‘national strategies, plans and 
programmes’48. Any form of international governance of biodiversity, including global lists 
of protected areas and endangered species following the existing model of other 
environmental treaties 49 , is absent. The recognition of biodiversity conservation as a 
‘common concern of humankind’ only in the preamble further illustrates that biodiversity 
                                               
39 CBD, Art. 1 and 15, abbreviated to ABS in the early years of the CBD’s operation 
40 Note for example its envelopment within financial mechanisms/support for conservation activities in early 
studies such as Simone Bilderbeek (ed) Biodiversity and International Law: The Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Law (IOS Press 1992) and during treaty negotiations themselves as indicated in Fiona 
McConnell, The Biodiversity Convention: A Negotiating History (Kluwer Law International 1996) 
41 CBD, Art. 2 
42 CBD, Art. 2 
43 Nagoya Protocol, Art. 2 
44 Such as scents, colourings etc. 
45 Nagoya Protocol, Art. 2 
46 CBD, Art. 3 
47 CBD, Art. 4 
48 CBD, Art. 6 
49 These lists did make the draft treaty, but not the final text. See Boyle, note 31 above, 37  
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loss was not considered a transboundary or global environmental problem in the same 
fashion as for example climate change. 
 
The CBD does propose a number of measures to be adopted for each objective50, such as 
the establishment of a system of protected areas for in situ conservation, or the 
establishment of research facilities and the organisation of collections for ex situ 
conservation, but these constitute policy options, always pre-empted with the ‘as far as 
possible and as appropriate’ proviso. By choosing some of these measures in their 
‘strategies, plans or programmes’, states articulate their own adaptations of biodiversity law 
and policy, which are known in CBD terminology as National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plans (NBSAPs)51. 
 
 
The unique complexity and comprehensiveness of the biodiversity concept52 has turned the 
accumulation of scientific knowledge into an almost Sisyphean effort and an expansive 
function and aspect of the CBD. States are explicitly tasked with building up their own 
biodiversity knowledge53, in addition to the standard national reporting requirements54. The 
national – or more precisely non-international - focus of the whole endeavour is further 
evidenced by the relegation of the precautionary principle to the preamble of the 
convention. In similar fashion to the ejection of global lists, this choice prevents the 
accumulated biodiversity knowledge from being used as an instrument of international 
intervention upon national sovereignty. 
 
                                               
50 CBD, Art. 8 for in situ conservation, Art. 9 for ex situ conservation, and Art. 15 for ABS 
51 CBD, Art. 6 
52 This will be further analysed in Chapters 2 and 3 
53 CBD, Art. 7 
54 CBD, Art. 26 
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Despite the clear rejection of the inter-state/international aspect in such a key area, a 
number of transnational mechanisms and initiatives have been added as the CBD 
expanded, specifically in relation to these knowledge functions. Some of these initiatives 
began life as formal treaty mechanisms only to expand into collaborative transnational 
networks of cooperation without state involvement. This is the case of the Clearing House 
Mechanism55  (CHM) established to collect information and reports, only to become a 
currently hybrid, public/private ‘network of Parties and partners’ facilitating ‘scientific and 
technical cooperation, knowledge sharing, and information exchange’ 56  across multiple 
levels. 
 
An important consideration within the theme of a compromise or a North-South bargain 
was the funding for biodiversity conservation, as well as for all the subsidiary measures and 
the CBD operation itself. An essential guiding idea for the drafting of the CBD was that 
the South possessed biodiversity and the North financial resources and the willingness to 
pay for access. This exchange was initially projected upon the international/inter-state 
system, which resulted in tortuous negotiations57 that resulted in the South obtaining the 
commitment to provide ‘new and additional financial resources’ from the North to meet 
the cost of the above discussed implementing measures58. The importance of the financial 
mechanism has progressively receded due to the commercialisation and commodification 
of biological and genetic resources and the actual lack of available public funding59. 
 
This section sought to flesh out some of the overarching themes and important features of 
the CBD. The Treaty has existed largely in a context of overlapping binaries, with the most 
                                               
55 CBD, Art. 18(3) 
56 UNEP/CBD/COP/10/Decision X.15 (2010), Annex 
57 Detailed from an insider’s perspective in McConnell, see note 40 above 
58 CBD, Art. 20 
59 Michael C. Rubino, ‘Biodiversity Finance’ (2000) 76 International Affairs 223 
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prominent being the trade-off between conservation and development. It was conceived 
largely as a ‘grand bargain’ between the North and the South, but it confirmed the principle 
of national sovereignty and rejected all notions of common or shared natural resources. It 
was drafted as a framework treaty of legal and policy options, with emphasis on national 
implementation and no option to internationalize biodiversity conservation. The near-
twenty years of operation of the treaty regime have resulted in considerable reorientations 
and institutional reconfigurations, which will be highlighted throughout the thesis. The 
crucial role of biodiversity knowledge is also a feature of the regime to be further 
examined. This importance is partly due to the characteristics and complexity of the 
biodiversity concept itself, but also accentuated by an emerging transnational character in 
biodiversity governance. 
 
There are multiple perspectives through which one can presently ‘enter’ biodiversity 
discourse in general. Some helpful categorizations of existing approaches are presented 
below. These approaches arguably fail to grasp the unusual elements of both the concept 
and the legal regime, and thus are unsuited to fully engaging with the question of 
biodiversity’s current fate. 
VARIETIES OF BIODIVERSITY LITERATURE AND THE STANDARD NORMATIVE 
MODEL 
An authoritative study of biodiversity begins with the weight of scientific fact and 
prediction. In order to impress upon its audience the gravity of the ‘constant crisis’ of 
multi-level biotic degradation60 , rising numbers of endangered species are compared to 
estimates of the total number of species on Earth61; rates of extinction are paired with 
                                               
60 Michael E. Soule, ‘Tactics for a Constant Crisis’ (1991) 253 Science 744 
61 Approximately 12 million (including insects and microorganisms) quoted in Patricia Birnie and Alan E. 
Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2nd ed edn, Oxford University Press 2002), figure taken from 
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dismal predictions regarding the uncontrollable growth of human population and 
concomitant overexploitation of resources. The linked ecological phenomena of habitat 
erosion and ecosystem degradation signal the entry into the complex conceptual milieu and 
alarming reality of biodiversity, often symbolised by the declining Amazon rainforest. 
 
This standard opening motif contributes to a largely anthropocentric articulation of 
biodiversity as the planet’s life support system and a repository providing a vast array of 
necessary natural resources and ecosystem services that humanity requires62. The associated 
populist identification of biodiversity as the ‘web of life’, despite actually differing 
significantly from legal definitions and scientific understandings of the term, is now widely 
used in making the concept more accessible63 . The immediacy and accessibility of this 
construction has also led to its infiltration within biodiversity scholarship. Building on this 
perception, biodiversity studies usually take one of three different directions. These 
categorizations are of course brief and broad generalizations, but nevertheless they do offer 
an overview of existing approaches. This overview will then be used as the basis for 
distinguishing a different, historical approach taken by the thesis. 
 
First, the transboundary aspect and the global concern for biodiversity leads to a type of 
scholarship, where environmental law is viewed strictly through the traditions, perspectives 
and theories of public international and treaty law64. In this approach, states - and not 
regimes - become the key agents and the fundamental units of analysis. Closer to classical 
                                                                                                                                         
Timothy Swanson, Global Action for Biodiversity (Earthscan 1997). Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life 
(Penguin 2001)uses the Vernon H. Heywood and UNEP, Global Biodiversity Assessment (1995) estimate of 
13,62 million 
62 Timothy J. Farnham, Saving Nature's Legacy : Origins of The Idea of Biological Diversity (Yale University Press 
2007) 2-4 
63  Note for example the language surrounding the declarations regarding the International Year of 
Biodiversity in 2010 
64 Notable examples of this approach include Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford 
handbook of international environmental law (Oxford University Press 2007); Michael Bowman and Catherine 
Redgwell (eds), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law International 1996) 
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international law, this literature is still anchored in a doctrinal analysis of the traditional 
sources of public international law (custom, treaties, general principles etc.). The objective 
is to comparatively locate the CBD within the continuum of international environmental 
law and evaluate its operation by comparing it to the formal model of the ideal 
environmental treaty as handed down by legal doctrine and history. This approach is 
employed in the opening section of this chapter. As indicated above, the result of the 
application of this approach in the area of biodiversity is often a lament for the lack of 
coercion (no ‘law with teeth’) and an aspiration for environmental treaties or organizations 
to mimic the sovereign authority of the state. Subsequently, the CBD’s obvious lack of 
strict enforcement rules at the international level is identified as the major deficiency to be 
remedied. The solution to CBD’s problems is always located in some form of replication or 
transplantation from other - international or domestic - legal systems65. 
 
Secondly, biodiversity studies can be policy-oriented and prescriptive in the sense of 
seeking to improve upon the role and functions of the global regime understood to be 
charged with managing biodiversity as a resource system66. The CBD is described as a 
regime, as opposed to just a legal text, meaning ‘a set of norms, rules and procedures that 
structure the behaviour and relations of international actors so as to reduce the 
uncertainties they face and facilitate the pursuit of a common goal’67. These norms, rules 
                                               
65 Daniel M. Bodansky, ‘International Law and the Protection of Biological Diversity’ (1995) 28 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 623; Michael D. Jr Coughlin, ‘Using the Merck-INBio Agreement to Clarify the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’ (1993) 31 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 337; Lyle Glowka, 
‘Emerging Legislative Approaches to Implement Article 15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (1997) 
6 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 249; D. Hurlbut, ‘Fixing the 
Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special Protocol for Related Intellectual Property’ (1994) 34 Natural 
Resources Journal 379; S. Johnston, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity: The Next Phase’ (1997) 6 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 219; Catherine Tinker, 
‘Responsibility for Biological Diversity: Conservation under International Law’ (1995) 28 Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 777 
66 Although this explicitly top-down perspective has receded in recent years. For some notable examples see 
Philippe G. Le Prestre (ed) Governing Global Biodiversity : The Evolution and Implementation of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (Ashgate 2002); Timothy Swanson, ‘Why is There a Biodiversity Convention? The 
International Interest in Centralized Development Planning’ (1999) 75 International Affairs 307 
67 Le Prestre 5 
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and procedures are then examined as regulatory instruments. Under this conception, the 
biodiversity regime is recognised as an amalgam of ecological knowledge and economic 
pragmatism guided by the tenets of sustainable development. The study of biodiversity 
through a law and economics approach 68  also fits under this category of what can be 
generally termed as ‘policy reform’. 
 
The third category of biodiversity analysis is derived from the realist trend in international 
relations. This approach attempts to make sense of the interplay of the inter-state system as 
the ‘international community’. The North-South divide and the national interests that drive 
(or derail) international agreements are the primary focus in this approach69 . This can 
become a purely descriptive exercise, obsessively focusing on the mapping of the 
groupings, their positions and shifts in alliances during the various stages of international 
negotiations. 
 
This is not meant to indicate three bodies of literature evolving in isolation from each 
other. In fact, there is considerable overlap between these three approaches. Most 
importantly, and despite their divergent influences and emphases, the common element 
appears to be the introduction of only a severely restricted analytical frame and 
interdisciplinarity as a means to ‘grapple’ with the complexity biodiversity. They infuse 
environmental law with, respectively, the traditions of public international law, the values 
of economics and the relations of force of international relations. They aim to cover the 
gaps and deficiencies of law with politics, the idealism of ecology (in the sense of both 
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environmental science and politics i.e. environmentalism) with the pragmatism of 
economics, and the vast scope of global governance with the firm hand of sovereignty; or 
to combine these fixes in varied ways.  
 
These approaches then ultimately coalesce into what can be termed as a standard 
normative model, based on a restrained interdisciplinarity so widely ingrained, that it has 
become simply another type of orthodoxy and tradition, another kind of legal doctrine. Its 
pattern is already fully formed, with the international environmental lawyer cast into the 
role of the problem-solving expert-consultant, diagnosing and understanding the causes of 
an environmental problem, employing a variety of available methods in order to prescribe 
the ‘cure’ in the shape of the appropriate regulatory reform70. 
 
This problem-solving exercise has been distilled into a simple three-stage process: first, 
identify the environmental problem in question by briefly outlining its cause and adverse 
effects. For example, in Governing Global Biodiversity, the editor pre-emptively enunciates that 
‘we start from the premise that such a threat exists, even though the exact magnitude, the 
underlying causes of biodiversity loss, and the nature of its impact, may be subject to 
debate’71. Secondly, place the problem on the appropriate niche of the overall policy agenda 
by setting out the goals that regulation is expected to achieve. Thirdly, address the problem 
by locating the best choice out of all the available instruments72. In conditions of a total 
blurring of the line between law and policy, and dominance of the practitioner’s 
perspective, legal scholarship is forced to address only these three stages with the requisite 
environmentalist and normative bias. Writing within this model, Daniel Bodansky has 
                                               
70 Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 2010) 37 
71 Le Prestre 3 
72 It is worthwhile to note than in this model the complete ‘policy toolkit’ of instruments for addressing 
environmental problems includes both strictly legal and non-legal (economic) measures under the umbrella 
term of regulation. See Bodansky 
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employed the analogy of the environmental lawyer as a doctor 73 . This is perhaps too 
dignified for such form of environmental law; here there is only a surgeon only interested 
in fixing a specific problem without affording too much attention to the intricacies of 
diagnosis, the overall health of the patient or the dangers of surgery itself. 
 
The interesting twist is that, despite the best efforts of the literature, biodiversity cannot be 
contained by this specific mixture of pragmatism and limited interdisciplinarity that 
characterises this simplified three-stage problem-solving exercise. The specification and 
compartmentalization into the mould of the environmental problem is impossible; the 
CBD’s three formal goals of conservation, sustainable use and fair and equitable benefit 
sharing in effect cover the majority of environmental discourse. Given the additional 
multiple variations proliferating in the social and natural sciences - of biodiversity as idea, 
concept, ethic or practice - the erection of these boundaries is an empty gesture. The 
phrase ‘we are now only discussing biodiversity’ is not significantly different from ‘we are 
now discussing the environment’. There is no ‘here’ from which to observe and analyse the 
‘there’ of biodiversity. 
 
Aside from this biodiversity-specific difficulty, there are wider issues with this standard 
normative model. It is an ingredient of the characteristically confident assessments of the 
evolution of international environmental law still largely based on the accumulated mass of 
legal agreements and texts. There is a perception of effectiveness and a sense of 
achievement when each neatly defined and formally recognised environmental problem is 
assigned its legal box in the shape of a multilateral environmental treaty. That particular 
environmental issue is being taken care of; now we can move on to the next struggle. Until 
the late 1990s, one could indeed still argue that ‘the provisions in the new agreements are 




generally more stringent and detailed than in the previous ones, the range of subject matter 
broader, and the provisions for implementation and adjustment for sophisticated’74. This is 
no longer the case. Now there is ‘ossification’75 in the regimes and ‘dissonance’76 in the 
international community. There are no more environmental niches and legal boxes to hide 
in. 
 
Yet according to Daniel Bodansky, this last decade is simply a period of ‘retrenchment and 
consolidation’ for international environmental law 77 . He further identifies a switch in 
emphasis from rule creation to the issue of effectiveness as a sign of ‘maturation’ of the 
legal field 78 . Peter Sand concludes in his study of the evolution of the field that 
‘international law for the environment has coped rather well with the challenges of global 
change’79; and it is only due to the overwhelming success of this process that the author 
expresses concern that the pluralism and dynamism of sustainable development is eroding 
‘the more resilient foundations of environmental law as part of a formalist culture of 
international legal process’80. This is a valid observation. For example, note the following 
evaluation of the climate change regime by Michael Grubb, from the perspective of an 
economist evaluating the outcome of a recent COP: 
 
‘But that does not mean that we all have to be in the same legal (or not) structure. 
To suggest that the USA and China need to assume commitments on the same 
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75 Joanna Depledge, ‘The Opposite of Learning: Ossification in the Climate Change Regime’ (2006) 6 Global 
Environmental Politics 1 
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legal basis as Norway, Singapore or Burkina Faso is a fundamental fallacy laid bare by 
Copenhagen’81. 
 
It should be noted that law is not challenged above by reference to the economic language 
of efficiency and effectiveness or by calling on realist or pragmatist exigencies demanding 
the setting aside of legal principles, but by brutally exposing the whole construct and 
principle as a ‘fundamental fallacy’. 
 
While Sand’s observation is then valid as an observation, the negative reception attached to 
this observation, borne out of the inherent attribution of a privileged position afforded to 
‘the formalist culture of the international legal process’, may not be as valid. If the 
privileged instrumentalism of law is removed from its perch, it becomes unclear why such 
views, even as blunt as those expressed by Grubb, constitute an erosion as opposed to 
simply a coming transformation of international environmental law. 
 
The standard normative model of the three stages of problem-solving presented above can 
then be seen as part of a broader mainstream environmental legal scholarship that exhibits 
significant historical and legal closure. In the rush to defend the legal fortress (‘the formalist 
culture of the international legal process’) at all costs, this model for conceptualizing 
environmental problems and associated regimes has become static; separated from the rest 
of environmentalism, safe in the lulled embrace of legal doctrine. The narrow problem-
solving approach that the model espouses is especially unsuited to the particularities of the 
concept of biodiversity. 
 
                                               
81 Emphasis added. Michael Grubb, ‘Copenhagen: Back to the Future?’ (2010) 10 Climate Policy 127, 129 
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International environmental law has reached the crossroads of a bizarre hysteron proteron. 
The legal discourse forges ahead unheeded, while the materiality of environmental 
destruction is left behind. The declensionist narrative is reserved exclusively for nature, 
while progress, however tiny, is always attached to law. The environment declines, but law 
improves through the three stages of problem-solving. It has become a discussion between 
inside observers, feeling secure and authoritative under the shadow of the ivory towers of 
international environmental law, musing on whether they are witnessing consolidation, 
congestion or regression, and navel-gaze over the level of the maturity of the field 82 . 
Outsiders can all too easily spot the fixations, deficiencies and dead ends of the field, but 
the wall is high enough to keep enemies and detractors out. This direction attempts to hide 
a certain ontological vulnerability83 behind the formalism of international environmental 
law, safe in the belief that meaning can be found in the discovery and clarification of the 
essence and structure of environmental law. 
 
This section presented an overview of the CBD and associated biodiversity literature as a 
starting point for engaging with the question of biodiversity. As stated in the first section, 
from the perspective of international environmental law this is a question of evaluation of 
the operation of the CBD. However, the survey of existing methods of evaluation in the 
field of biodiversity indicates significant deficiencies, particularly their ultimate fusion in a 
single, static model closed off to the different layers of environmental discourse and 
incapable of utilising the unusual, if not unique, features of both the concept and the 
regime of biodiversity. 
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83 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘"...The Sound of Breaking String": Critical Environmental Law and 
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By consequence, the next section will posit an alternative approach that critically engages 
with biodiversity in its entirety, without delineating and privileging the legal jurisdiction. 
This approach is driven by the realisation that the question of whatever happened to 
biodiversity is only part of a far more broad and paralysing query - especially for the very 
costly edifice of international environmental law - that environmental law flatly refuses to 
engage with: what if the amassed legal arsenal (of practice and scholarship) has not actually 
contributed to the goal of environmental protection? This query transposes the spectre of 
failure and the curse of irrelevancy that haunts the legal field to a different conceptual 
milieu of goals, effects, and impacts; away from the preoccupation with structure, form and 
institutions. Thus, it will be beneficial for any evaluation of the concept of biodiversity or 
assessment of the CBD to entertain the contours of this possibility, in order to avoid 
belonging to the standard normative model. 
III │ THE BLACKMAIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
This emplacement of the question of biodiversity within a broader problematic regarding 
the methods and future directions of environmental law prevents a stereotypical response 
to that question; an analysis leading to inevitable reform proposals derived from going 
through the three stages of problem-solving in sequence – ‘this then needs to be done’. 
The hypothetical question at the end of the previous section is meant to illustrate that 
before we can answer whether the CBD ‘works’, we have to be ready for the possibility 
that the system has failed strategically, irrespective of whether it presents as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
legal form; or more precisely in the process of investigating the operation of the CBD, we 
have to confront a series of questions about environmental legal method in its current 
state, and in particular its tendency towards compartmentalization and incrementalism. 
This series of questions can then be condensed into what is termed the ‘blackmail of 
environmental law’. In the following section this blackmail is presented, along with the 
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proposed theoretical and methodological framework in order to overcome it in the process 
of engaging with the question of the fate of biodiversity. 
ELEMENTS OF THE BLACKMAIL 
The possibility of a decline of international environmental law is clearly a very sensitive 
topic84. Even when weaknesses are uncovered, their reach is a priori restricted and their 
extent narrowed in an additional round of compartmentalization. For example, Dan 
Tarlock returns to the ‘largely neglected questions of content and legitimacy... that need to 
be addressed if the area is to sustain itself’ 85 . He accepts that environmental law will 
inevitably fail the ontological test of formalism regarding what constitutes ‘real law’, i.e. the 
closed legal system of formal rules articulated by Hart, and that this system ‘remains the 
dominant vision of what a legal system should look like’86. For this reason, he argues the 
need for a principle-based environmental jurisprudence, but all the proposed principles 
relate to the legislative procedure87, such as that allowing environmental degradation should 
be a last resort or a rehash of the precautionary principle into an edict to ‘minimize 
uncertainty before and as you act’88. Thus in effect the analysis ends up simply articulating 
another process-based regulatory model89. Elizabeth Fisher and her co-authors argue for a 
more inward, epistemological turn, locating the spectre of failure in the fact that the 
‘maturity of [environmental law] as a scholarly enterprise has been eagerly awaited and 
predicted but adulthood has never arrived’90. The authors present a map of methodological 
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challenges to be faced, transferring the perspective from the outside of environmental law 
to an inside of the environmental lawyer. The immaturity and intellectual incoherence of 
environmental law ‘as a scholarly enterprise’ is thus used to transform the spectre of failure 
into a manageable set of methodological challenges for esoteric study91; never constituting a 
point of departure for questioning the content, substance or aims of environmental law as 
the extension of the political and social project of environmentalism. These analytical paths 
are not different from the similar paths followed in substantive international environmental 
law, where reassurance is gained through the retreat into the origins of international 
environmental law, when each treaty regime was assigned to one environmental problem; 
migratory birds not endangered species, whale stocks not fisheries, freshwater resources 
not protected areas, and so on. 
 
Therefore, there is more than one type of compartmentalization at work in environmental 
law. The compartmentalized way that co-opts the possibility of change or failure has also 
led to a tendency to prefer repetition with small incremental changes as the standard 
method of improvement. For example, as indicated above, the CBD addressed the failed 
rationalization of the first strategic plan by agreeing a similar one, but with more detailed 
targets, for the next ten years. The dominance of this form of incrementalism stems from 
the ontological poverty and vulnerability of the field. They mandate that conclusions and 
reform proposals are always to be built on pre-existing arrangements without 
fundamentally bringing them into question – lest the enemies at the gate invade the legal 
fortress. 
 
Both compartmentalization and incrementalism constitute atavistic responses to the 
present challenges posed to the environmental legal field. We either move sideways or go 




back to the beginning. The analysis produces a technical proposal that says ‘this has to be 
improved slightly’ or ‘this has to be partitioned off and dealt separately’; in any case always 
‘distinguishing between the here and there, that is, positioning oneself in such a way as to 
observe a chunk of it while leaving another chunk as a blind spot behind’92. Both regimes 
and scholarship itself have morphed into conveyor belts of proposals for environmental 
action, under the constant urgency and pressure of an environmental crisis. It almost 
appears as simply flicking switches in the cockpit of an aeroplane in order to avert the 
inevitable crash, with no presence of mind or ability to recollect which switches have 
already been pressed, and which combinations have worked. 
 
For international environmental law, this particular positioning produces a significant 
narrowing of the horizons of enquiry. The insistent - almost Don-Quixotic - demand for 
more effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy - a demand that in no way questions the 
meaning of these terms – coupled with the limiting of methods and options has produced a 
sort of blind hyper-pragmatism. The focus becomes fixed on the normative aspect and the 
enquiry only ever consists of two questions: Will the proposed legal instrument/reform 
solve the environmental problem at hand? Does it strengthen environmental law’s 
distinctiveness as a field of legal enquiry? These two questions, despite their obviously 
different focus, have become irrevocably bound to the point that they have become 
indistinguishable, in the sense that problem-solving analysis, based on the three-stage 
process presented above, has become the only recognised method of contributing to 
international environmental law. 
 
By inverse deduction, an approach that does not directly contribute to problem-solving 
through some form of compartmentalization or incremental improvement - for example a 
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critical or theoretical approach - is also a rejection of the project of international 
environmental law. This promulgates a simplistic division of tasks. The analysis has to 
either accept environmental law and remain within an already formulated tradition of legal 
doctrine and normativity; or if it chooses to criticize environmental law, step outside the 
confines of recognised scholarship. The latter choice, seen from the perspective of a refusal 
to contribute to the solution of environmental problems, also leads to unsavoury 
denunciations as a denier of ecological truths and principles, or at least the placing into the 
category of the proponents of an anthropocentric model of the socio-natural world. Any 
critique of specific measures, institutions or regimes is conflated with an ontological assault 
on the existence of the entirety of the field. Form has become indistinguishable from 
substance. Quite simply, one is forced to be either ‘for’ or ‘against’ environmental law. 
There are no grey areas for scholars submitting to the blackmail of environmental law. 
 
This may be partly explained by the fact that the sub-field of international environmental 
law has had a long history of attempting to establish itself as a distinct area of legal practice 
and scholarship. This desire and drive to become a recognised part of legal discourse, to 
belong to the grand legal establishment, can be observed in all forms of environmental law, 
a field of law now proudly certified as ‘embedded in the legal landscape’93 after a short –
compared to other legal fields - history of roughly four decades. However, the fight of 
international environmental law for recognition has been consistently harder94. In any case, 
this drive has now become an obstacle, an uncontrolled anxiety that frantically hides away 
all traces of ontological vulnerability and regards critique as betrayal of legal principles and 
environmental ethics. This anxiety is magnified in the global arena, where the field appears 
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as an eager little brother constantly looking for the approval of his big brother, public 
international law.  
 
Under such constraints and pressures, the blackmail of environmental law twists all analysis 
into a stringent, polarised and defensive form, where only tentative and caveat-strewn 
probing is allowed. As underlined earlier, while the growing spectre of failure demands a 
thorough and consistent investigation into the niches and comfort spaces of international 
environmental law, this is not possible under the blackmail. In particular for this field, this 
is supremely counter-productive; refusing to ask these questions invariably brings into 
question the role and the utility of the complicated, tortuous and expensive negotiations 
and bargaining that accompany the life of necessary state consensus building of all global 
environmental regimes, thus bringing into life the very ontological fear that precludes the 
asking of the questions in the first place. 
IV │ PREPARING FOR A CONFRONTATION 
The point of departure for this thesis was the examination of ‘what happened to 
biodiversity’ in light of recent developments within the global biodiversity regime of the 
CBD. In the process of situating the CBD within international environmental law, it has 
become clear that the above question has to be approached within the context of broader 
issues and obstacles affecting the field of environmental law. The delimiting perspective to 
overcome, in terms of both methods and conclusions to be drawn, has been presented 
under the heading of the blackmail of environmental law in the preceding section. For this 
reason, what began as an initial investigation into the predicament of biodiversity as 
environmental discourse has now assumed a dual dimension. In order for the analysis to 
shed light on biodiversity and the CBD without repeating the predictable conclusions 
already lined up within the existing scholarship (which would mean choosing between the 
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following: disappointing law with no teeth or encouraging legal framework based on soft 
law), it also has to confront this blackmail of environmental law. 
 
Therefore, this confrontation underpins the theoretical framework and the choice of 
methodological instruments by which the analysis of the CBD is to proceed. The general 
onus will be on transcending the ‘unadventurous normativity which, because of its goal-
oriented attitude, rejects at the outset any theoretical links whose relevance to the existing 
law is not immediately evident’95. This task is undertaken on a platform of anti-essentialism 
regarding both law and biodiversity. In general terms, this anti-essentialism sets out two 
theoretical edicts: (i) the CBD has no legal essence to be discovered but is understood as an 
arrangement for governing, and (ii) biodiversity has no origin to be unearthed in order to 
guide interpretative efforts and has no meaning other than as a set of practices – initially 
for conservation, but progressively more involved in environmental governance. 
 
This direction of study is unrelated to the discussion of the specifics or the reality of the 
problem of biodiversity loss, i.e. the pieces tacked on the introduction to legal analysis, but 
understands biodiversity as a social construction, ‘simultaneously real, collective and 
discursive - fact, power and discourse’96. The theoretical framework is based on the work of 
Michel Foucault. Specifically, the analysis of biodiversity governance is influenced by his 
work on power and government, while the historical approach to biodiversity is derived 
from Foucault’s work on the ‘history of the present’ and genealogy. 
LOCATING POWER 
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The main goal of approaching the CBD as a Foucaultian arrangement for governing is that 
it enables a direct analysis of the power relations at play. The advantage of this approach is 
the ‘privileged position of the question of “how”’97. Under the rubric of institutional or 
structural legal analyses, the question of biodiversity is automatically translated into the 
question of the essence and the institution of the CBD. What is happening to biodiversity 
is equal to what is the CBD or why is the CBD not effective. Under this different rubric, 
the analysis moves on the question of how is power exercised within the CBD? The object 
of analysis becomes power relations themselves98. 
 
This shift in focus is based on the Foucaultian idea of power as ‘a set of actions on other 
actions’99. This different conception of power as a relation, as opposed to an entity held or 
lost, is useful not just for international environmental law, but for international studies in 
general, because it represents a move away from state sovereignty-based models and their 
understanding of power as a zero-sum game100. Power is not held by states, or institutions 
with the consent of states as the sources of authority. Instead, it only ‘exists […] when it is 
put into action’101. This operation of power is described in relational terms and by focusing 
on the notion of the acting subject: 
 
‘It operates on the field of possibilities in which the behaviour of active subjects is 
able to inscribe itself. It is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites; it induces, 
it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more 
probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is always a 
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way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being 
capable of action’102. 
 
This formulation is linked to the more well-known (and more utilised in subsequent 
literature) formulation of ‘government’ as the ‘conduct of conduct(s)’ 103 . The term 
government is understood here as the process of governing in general, i.e. what may be 
termed today governance. The dual meaning of the word ‘conduct’ is used by Foucault to 
illustrate the multiplicity and diffusion of this activity of governing as a form of power. 
‘Conduct’ can refer to the conduct others, i.e. the activity of managing or governing; it can 
also refer to the practices of conducting oneself or being conducted, i.e. how one behaves 
according to the outlined ‘field of possibilities’104. This notion of ‘conduct of conduct’ 
forms the basis of the broader notion of government as a form of power defined as ‘the 
right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end’105. Foucault sets out four 
differences that distinguish this form of power from sovereignty, which represents the 
classical conception of power much favoured in international law. 
 
First, its object is ‘not related to territory, but to a short of a complex of men and things’106. 
This complex brings into the analysis of power the problem of population 107  to 
complement the focus on territory of sovereignty. The crucial element in this transition is 
that population is not simply included in the agenda of government as another passive 
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object to be regulated, but also considered as an active collection of rational individuals 
able to in turn govern themselves and others according to self-produced identities, norms 
and actions, i.e. it signifies a point when the society becomes distinct from the state that 
sovereignty ‘sees’. 
 
Secondly, it is a form of governing that makes no reference to any universal ‘common or 
public good’ usually associated with either the law or the sovereign, but to a ‘suitable end’, 
defined ‘as an end suitable for each of the things to be governed’108. This implies a plurality 
of goals to be pursued through the practice of governing. According to Foucault, the end 
of sovereignty, through the notion of the common or public good, is ultimately nothing 
more than submission to the law of the sovereign, and is thus circular and self-referential: 
‘the good is obedience to the law, so that the good proposed by sovereignty is that people 
obey it’109. Since such an end is internal to sovereignty itself, it relies, as a form of power, 
on state law to achieve it110. In contrast, the ends of government are internal not to itself, 
but to the objects being governed; these ends are associated with ‘the perfection, 
maximisation, or intensification of the processes it directs’111. 
 
Thirdly, governing is described as a ‘disposition’ or an arrangement as opposed to an 
imposition of law, as in the case of sovereignty112. This can be as simple as the realisation 
that since the objects and the goals are different, the means or instruments of governing are 
also different. ‘The disposition of things’ is associated by Foucault with ‘employing tactics 
rather than laws; or as far as possible employing laws as tactics’113. The meaning of ‘tactics’ 
in this formulation has been much debated, particularly in the context of Foucault’s 
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presumed ‘expulsion’ of law114. For the purposes of the theoretical framework presented in 
this section, it suffices to state that ‘employing laws as tactics’ indicates ‘the assimilation of 
law into governmental or administrative imperatives’115; a folding of law, along with other 
elements and techniques, within a ‘hybrid legal complex’ 116  or, more precisely, the 
heterogeneous governance arrangement identified by Foucault as a strategic dispositif or 
apparatus for governing117. 
 
Finally, this form of power is intrinsically bound with and derived from the knowledge of 
the objects it governs. In place of the knowledge of human and divine laws of morality and 
justice, the knowledge associated with government is a more technical, detailed knowledge 
of the object itself, the plurality of suitable ends to be achieved and the methods of 
disposition to be employed118. 
 
There may be some affinity between this process-based understanding of government as a 
form of power and the notion of decentring the state119 ‘as the author of norms’120, which 
can also be found within international environmental law121. In particular the idea of ‘new 
environmental governance’122, which unearths hybrid modes of collaborative and multi-
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layered forms of decision-making by a combination of private and public stakeholders, is 
fairly close from a theoretical standpoint. Such forms of decision-making are indeed argued 
to be characterised by flexibility, inclusiveness, transparency, preferring devolution to 
localities as opposed to large-scale consensus-building. 
 
The most obvious difference between the two descriptive terms ‘government’ and 
‘governance’ employed here is that the primary goals and procedural principles of 
governance are still set out hierarchically before flexible mechanisms are allowed to 
operate, whereas the understanding of power as government outlined immediately above 
suggests a more self-constituted and self-reflexive process of rule and norm creation. 
Furthermore, specifically in international environmental law, governance approaches can 
perceive the widening scope of cooperation between state and non-state actors and link 
their coexistence to an increasing institutional and normative hybridization123. However, 
this cooperation is still largely interpreted through the binary of hard and soft law124 and the 
preoccupation with positioning the state within the legal theory and practice 125 . As a 
privileged source of power and authority, the state becomes a behemoth that one cannot 
dismiss as simply another actor. Irrespective of the innovation sought, it is still 
‘collaboration in the shadow of hierarchy’126. As the state remains the foundational unit of 
analysis and reference point, the legal emphasis remains on institutions beyond the state 
and the legitimating processes by which the state grants them power, understood as the 
capacity to produce rules and norms127. 
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These Foucaultian analytics of power outlined in this section completely obviate the need 
for the sovereign state as the primary reference point and source of power, authority and 
legitimacy. Instead, an analytical grid for detecting and analysing governance as 
government, i.e. as the exercise of power and the effect of power relations, can be posited, 
with four interlinked thematic areas (as underlined above in the discussion of Foucault’s 
government): (i) objects and targets, (ii) ends and goals, (iii) modes and forms, and (iv) 
knowledge. This is not meant to excise the state and erase institutions from the activity of 
governing, but to point towards an arrangement (the apparatus) that constitutes a collection 
of strategic goals, mechanisms and rationalities (legal, scientific, economic etc.), a complex 
‘welded to substantive, normalizing, disciplinary and biopolitical objectives having to do 
with the re-shaping of individual and collective conduct in relation to particular substantive 
conceptions of desirable ends’128. 
COLLECTING ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 
To argue then that biodiversity does have a history of its own, as the thesis proceeds to do 
in the next chapters, is to argue for examining the conditions of emergence of precisely the 
above complex, this grid of objects, goals, modes and knowledge that constitutes an 
governmental arrangement. It is not a search for the origin or the essence of biodiversity to 
be found in the beginning of its conception. In this way, the historical method is again 
adapted from Foucault’s influential histories129, and in particular his genealogy or ‘history of 
the present’. These histories provide the necessary hypotheses and tools, analysed 
immediately below, for writing this altered history of biodiversity.  
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Genealogy starts from a value -neutral conception of the present as simply ‘a set of limits 
and possibilities’ 130 . Before elaborating on the impact of this statement specifically for 
biodiversity, it is worthwhile to point out that this view of the present is crucial for all 
environmental analyses in general. Since this form of history ‘is elaborated neither as a 
semiology of catastrophe nor as a dialectics of salvation’131, it rejects both prophesies of 
imminent collapse, as well as grand narratives of progress. In this format, genealogy is 
characterised by Giles Deleuze as a ‘diagnostic’ method132. This diagnosis consists of an 
analysis of ‘what we take to be necessary and contingent in the ways in which we think and 
act in regard to the ‘conducting’ of our lives and those of others’133. In other words, it is an 
investigation into the fabrication of our present conditions and possibilities, but: 
 
‘With the proviso that we do not allow ourselves the facile, rather theatrical 
declaration that this moment in which we exist is one of total perdition, in the 
abyss of darkness, or a triumphant daybreak etc. It is a time like any other, or 
rather, a time which is never quite like any other’134. 
 
The above call resonates as if directed to environmental discourse itself and its singular 
perception of history, which of course was never Foucault’s intention. Nevertheless, he 
appears to articulate a grounded ethico-political attitude, seemingly in direct opposition to 
the stringency and urgency that characterizes the blind hyper-pragmatism of the blackmail 
of environmental law. This attitude consists of simply having ‘the modesty to say to 
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ourselves that [...] the time we live in is not the unique or fundamental or irruptive point in 
history where everything is completed and begun again’135. 
 
The critical aspect of this history can be further elaborated by way of Foucault’s reading of 
Kant’s answer of the question of What is Enlightenment?136 In this text, Foucault argues that 
the Kantian answer to that important question fundamentally redirected historical enquiry 
towards an analysis of the present and the abandonment of the Cartesian question of who 
am I? In its place, the Kantian question became: what are we? More specifically, ‘what is 
this period, this period, this precise moment in which we are living?’137 This initial form of 
historical enquiry thus can assume the broader form of a ‘philosophical ethos consisting in 
a critique of what we are saying, thinking and doing, through a historical ontology of 
ourselves’138. This ‘historico-critical attitude’ acknowledges that: 
 
‘Criticism is no longer going to be practised in the search for formal structures with 
universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led 
us to constitute ourselves and to recognise ourselves as subjects of what we are 
doing, thinking and saying’139. 
 
Additional – perhaps more radical - aspects of this genealogical/historical approach are 
distinctly Nietzschean. In this guise, genealogy rejects the conception of history as linear 
progress towards the inevitable present condition and – following Nietzsche - challenges 
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the pursuit of origins as sites where the essence of things and the immovable foundations 
of truth can be found140. 
 
‘[Genealogy] is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what 
was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it 
shows the heterogeneity of what was consistent with itself’141. 
 
Genealogy replaces the metaphysical search for origin with a search for descent, for the 
emergence142 of the present as merely an episode in a series of disparate events, contingent 
relations and discontinuous practices. ‘What is found in the historical beginning of things is 
not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is 
disparity’143. 
 
This Nietzschean rejection of origin gives expression to a challenge of the idea of truth, 
arguing that it cannot be found in the beginning, but has a history in itself, which is the 
history of ‘an error that cannot be refuted because it was hardened into an unalterable form 
in the long baking process of history [...] a history of an error we call truth’144. Paul Veyne 
generalises this further by stating that ‘history has become the story of what men have 
called truths and their struggles over those truths’145. 
 
This conception of truth as something that emerges out of conflict and struggle also shines 
a different light on the notion of interpretation. Instead of a series of formulations and 
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clarifications leading to the careful unveiling of historical meaning hidden in the origin, 
there is systematic appropriation and successful subjugation, violence and conflict. The role 
of genealogy then becomes to ‘record’ this painful and violent emergence146. In this latter 
guise, genealogy is described as ‘anti-anachronistic’ 147 , because it seeks to reduce the 
tendency to read the past as a necessary step towards the establishment of the inevitable 
character of the present, leading to post facto rationalisations of events and decisions. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, both variations of genealogy can be deployed in interesting 
ways. The Kantian aspect induces a shift in the questions being asked. In this thesis, it 
promotes an analysis that is not initiated by a fixed conception of the nature of biodiversity 
or environmental law fabricated by way of discovering their origins. The question is no 
longer what is biodiversity/environmental law? Instead, one is able to ask how 
environmental law and biodiversity are operating today; what are the conditions that have 
led to their present forms? In this way, the analysis at the very least avoids being bogged 
down in the repetitive debates about the distinctiveness and character of environmental law 
as ‘real’ law 148  or the distinctiveness and character of biodiversity in service to the 
environmentalist project149. 
 
Furthermore, the Nietzschean aspect warns against the sanctification of treaties as the 
grand texts of international environmental law as holders of the essence or truth of the 
environmental problem at hand. Disputes over the truth of environmental arguments, such 
as in the case of climate change, are often played out at the level of a distinction between 
facts and values, i.e. between choosing scientific truth or moral bias as guide for 
environmental policy. In the context of these conflicts, law is only ever afforded the two 
                                               
146 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ 86 





remotest spots in the discursive continuum, either at the very beginning or at the very end. 
It can either be the origin of truth, found for example in a definition of the environmental 
problem cemented in the text of the treaty, or the final arbiter, the procurer of legitimacy 
and the lender of authority through a tired consensus after the fact, once all the political 
conflicts have been played out and worked through. In this way, law represents either a 
glorious past lost (the grand Rio Earth Summit) or the glorious future to be had; never a 
messy present of faults and failures. These constitute limits that can be overcome by the 
historico-critical approach outlined in this section. 
 
In line with these initial insights on power and history, to approach environmental 
problems as being formulated out of ‘substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, 
and systematic reversals’150, infers that any primacy afforded to ecological-scientific truth 
over ethics, morals and politics is simply obscuring the tactical conflict over the 
interpretation of the disparate points that have coalesced for the particular environmental 
problem to emerge. This should not be read as a radical or nihilist attack on science 
stemming from some form of ‘postmodern’ pluralism of knowledge. It is instead an effort, 
following Escobar, ‘to read history back onto the seemingly natural text of nature’151. It is a 
modified environmental history of the succession of tactical battles over environmental 
truth, within which the treaty is simply another episode in the process of constant 
(re)invention of the environmental problem through substitutions, displacements and 
reversals. The authority of international environmental law is provisional; not the final 
universal step in a rational and inevitable process. Environmental history becomes what is 
termed an ‘effective history’ 152 , dealing with ‘events in terms of their most unique 
                                               
150 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ 86 
151 Escobar, 1 
152 Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault's Methods and Historical Sociology (Routledge 1994) 
49 
 
characteristics, their most acute manifestations’153. In this formulation, an ‘event’ is ‘the 
reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a 
vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble domination that poisons 
itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked “other”’154. 
 
This historicization of biodiversity is not an end in itself, but the second (after the analytical 
grid of government as power) critical manoeuvre required to confront the blackmail of 
environmental law. It is precisely the act of not starting the analysis with a token rundown 
of facts regarding the environmental problem of biodiversity loss155 that separates the thesis 
from existing biodiversity literature. This Foucaultian-inspired history of biodiversity 
focuses on the conditions of possibility that have enabled a present complex or apparatus 
to be constructed around biodiversity. The meaning of biodiversity can only be located by 
stitching together the discourses, knowledges and rationalities that have at times to co-opt, 
alter and manipulate biodiversity towards different strategic goals and regulatory targets. 
THESIS OUTLINE 
The thesis examines biodiversity without falling in the trap of having to choose between a 
muted apologia for strangeness of the CBD or an demoralizing introspective into the 
irrelevance of the CBD as an non-essential part of environmental law. Biodiversity has 
been a concept with no discernible centre or core; an idea that constantly intimates a 
project of global significance while rarely delivering on it, at least not in the manner 
envisaged by its proponents. Most importantly, it has been a site of multi-level conflict 
across borders and decades, with no sign of abatement on the horizon. The governance 
arrangements associated with it are bound to reflect this multiplicity, futility and conflict. 
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Emulating the dual focus of the theoretical and methodological framework outlined in the 
preceding section, the thesis is divided into two parts: (i) a history of the invention of 
biodiversity, and (ii) an analysis of the practices of governing and power relations at work 
within a broader biodiversity complex that has arisen out of this invention. Thus, Part I of 
the thesis consists of a detailed history of the struggles over the meaning of biodiversity in 
the early years of the concept’s life, roughly up to the mid-1990s. In this initial period, 
emphasis is placed on the role of natural sciences, and in particular strands of biology, in 
constructing biodiversity as an object to be governed. Starting from conservation biology’s 
search for a new conservation practice, biodiversity is further traced through a series of 
encounters; sociobiology brought biodiversity to the social sphere and employed it in the 
articulation of social models; demography took biodiversity on a global tour, and 
discovered the unstoppable pathogen that threatens it, human population in the South. Just 
before the adoption of the CBD, biodiversity became thoroughly entangled with 
sustainable development, and the objects and goals of biodiversity governance were altered 
again. Part II of the thesis moves to the present, highlighting the governance arrangements 
of a biodiversity complex enveloping the CBD, still driven by the vacuous idea and strategy 
of genetic gold. Irrespective of the economic failure of the model of biodiversity as a 
valuable genetic resource, the biocomplex continues to operate along the lines of 
government as the ‘conduct of conduct’. The four aspects of the analytics of power 
outlined above are traced by recourse to the idea of genetic gold and its role in the 
establishment of biodiversity as this arrangement or apparatus for governing termed the 
biocomplex. Two case studies of this form of power within the biocomplex are presented, 
from the areas of ABS and community participation. The thesis concludes by offering a full 
reassessment of the CBD based on criteria derived from the thesis’ historical findings and 
















THE INVENTION OF BIODIVERSITY: 
BIOLOGICAL PROGRAMMES FOR 
RATIONALIZING NATURE AND SOCIETY 
 
 
The toxic event had released a spirit of imagination. 
People spun tales, others listened spellbound. There 
was a growing respect for the vivid rumour, the most 
chilling tale. We were no closer to believing or 
disbelieving a given story than we had been earlier. 
But there was a greater appreciation. We began to 
marvel at our own ability to manufacture awe.1 
 
 
As a relatively recent addition to the environmental vocabulary, the term ‘biological 
diversity’ and its widely used contraction into ‘biodiversity’ experienced a meteoric rise 
onto the forefront of environmental discourse in the short span of ten years, between the 
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. David Takacs highlighted in 1996 that: 
 
‘It has been transformed from a bit of scientific esoterica into a buzzword of 
popular culture. In 1988, biodiversity did not appear as a keyword in Biological 
Abstracts, and biological diversity appeared once. In 1993, biodiversity appeared 
seventy-two times, and biological diversity nineteen times’2.  
 
The continuing rise during the 1990s is further chartered by Timothy Farnham in a more 
detailed measurement of the geometric growth in the use of biodiversity as a keyword on 
journal article abstracts and citation indexes 3 . Both authors agree that biodiversity has 
become much more than simply a temporary buzzword, a populist contraction of a 
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scientific term or a hip alternative name for ‘old’ nature. However, it is still difficult for 
them to agree on what it has actually become; the current status of biodiversity. Despite its 
short history, it has become a leading issue and a ubiquitous concern of the environmental 
movement, although its complete set of trajectories has remained elusive. 
 
Even if it remains unclear what constitutes biodiversity, it appears self-evident that it 
should at the very least be constantly measured and protected as the general collection of 
natural resources and services humanity receives from a healthy environment. Indeed it is 
near-impossible to articulate an environmental argument without referring to biodiversity 
to some extent. The shift from nature conservation to biodiversity conservation is not a 
necessary change in terminology as environmental knowledge increased, nor a convenient 
adoption of a more ‘media-friendly’ buzzword, although there was an element of public 
relations-driven popularisation in early efforts at articulating biodiversity. The shift instead 
signified a broader transformation in conservation practices, eventually leading to the 
articulation of new, integrative, but multi-threaded environmental discourses that globalised 
and connected previously separate ecological problems. This chapter examines a first group 
of historical processes and events from the biological field that have contributed to the 
present understanding of biodiversity. 
 
Starting from biodiversity’s descend within biological science, one first notices the 
emergence of a new science-based programme, i.e. ‘a set of calculated, reasoned 
prescriptions in terms of which institutions are meant to be recognised, spaces arranged, 
and behaviours regulated’4. In general terms, under the sign of a new way of understanding 
nature, new sets of practices were being constructed. The use of the terms ‘invention’ and 
‘inventors’ points towards a historical analysis of biodiversity as scientific thought being put 
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to ‘work’ in the service of environmentalism. It is not meant as a relativist slight on the 
reality of biodiversity or the problem of its continuing and alarming decline, but as a 
targeting of the essentialism of biodiversity, of this process of addition of another 
‘independent domain of intrinsic value, truth or authenticity’ 5  to the corpus of 
environmentalism. 
 
The following section presents the beginnings of biodiversity as a specific conservation 
mentality driven by biological thought, before the second section proceeds to underline the 
crucial contribution of sociobiological thought in particular, through one of its more 
prestigious proponents, Edward O. Wilson. The last part of the chapter investigates this 
novel kaleidoscopic lens through which biodiversity advanced a biological view of the 
socionatural world. 
I | BIODIVERSITY AS CONSERVATION MENTALITY 
Before its current diffusion across the environmental domain, the concept of an inherent 
natural or biological diversity in need of protection was first discussed in the work of 
certain by American biologists and conservationists. As precursor to its invention, the first 
use of the term approximating the present meanings of biodiversity can be found in the 
British journal Biological Conservation. In a 1969 article, N.W. Moore argued for a 
conservation practice centred on a general principle of protecting diversity, as opposed to 
the more traditional focus on specific species. The article’s author also argued for widening 
the types of habitats protected within natural reserves as a method for achieving this goal 
of protecting the widest possible diversity6.  
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However, it was American conservation biology that first appeared to apprehend the full 
strategic potential of gathering all the disparate strands of ecological thought and 
conservation practice under the umbrella of a single programme seeking to re-formulate 
the reality of life and nature. Thus, the invention of biodiversity manifested itself initially as 
a rallying environmentalist cry by a specific group of biologists that had accepted their 
ecological bias and their belonging to a ‘mission-oriented discipline comprising both pure 
and applied science’7. 
EARLY PROPOSITIONS OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 
This activist and tactical school of thought was consolidated and named for the first time in 
1980 by Michael Soule and Bruce Wilcox in their Conservation Biology. In the foreword, they 
present themselves as ‘alert and concerned citizens and scientists’, who exercise their ‘finely 
honed scientific abilities in a large societal context’. The aim is to ‘promote biological 
literacy’ by revealing and highlighting ‘Man’s place in nature’ so that the ‘populace and 
politicians are aware that all decisions have a biological component, and that biology is 
intrinsically interwoven with sociology and economics’ 8 . It is easily noticeable that 
references to ecology or environmentalism are noticeably absent from these programmatic 
statements. At the time, the concept of biological diversity was not yet articulated, but the 
objective of this emerging field was to focus the ‘tools of all biological disciplines to nature 
conservation’9 by creating a ‘new community of interest and concern’. As a result of this 
initiative, biodiversity would in a very short time assume the role of conceptual framework 
and of a set of novel conservation principles guiding practice; its early descent lies within 
this politically active, conservation-minded sub-field of biology. 
 
                                               
7 Michael E. Soule and Bruce A. Wilcox (eds), Conservation Biology: An Evolutionary- Ecological Perspective (Sinauer 
1980) 
8 Ibid Foreword 
9 Ibid Chap. 1 
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In the setting out of such strategic objectives for this proposed new domain of applied 
science, and perhaps perversely for scientists claiming a heightened awareness and strong 
ethical attachment to nature, conservation biologists aspired to influence practice, ‘the real 
worlds of institutions, government, and management’ 10 . It was flatly stated that ‘the 
ultimate test of conservation biology is the application of its theories in actual management 
situations’11. Thus, this emergent ‘community of interest and concern’ had put itself under 
immediate pressure to address the faults in the articulation of both ecological concern and 
conservation policy, to restate its self-admitted environmentalist bias in a clearer and more 
targeted way in order for it to be better embraced by the environmentally uneducated 
‘populace and politicians.’ 
 
Two types of obstacles to what the nascent field of conservation biology considered 
effective conservation were targeted in the early 1980s. First, conservation practices until 
that point in time proceeded in a piecemeal fashion and with a scattered focus, guided by 
the existing conservation concepts of wilderness (especially in North America), the natural 
reserve and endangered species. Fragments of natural landscapes were designated as 
protected areas based on their aesthetic valued as landmarks, political expediency (i.e. to be 
‘seen’ as taking environmental action) or for economic reasons (i.e. it was land that could 
not be put to other productive use). Only certain animals, mostly mammals possessing a 
certain aesthetic or spiritual value for Western urban populations, were stringently 
protected from indiscriminate hunting and general exploitation, while plants and other 
organisms of crucial importance to ecosystems were largely ignored. In addition, there was 
an increasing disparity between the above long-established practical conservation traditions 
and the more recent ecological concepts, most importantly that of the ecosystem, which 
were absent from conservation thinking at the time of the emergence of conservation 
                                               
10 Michael E. Soule (ed) Conservation Biology : the Science of Scarcity and Diversity (Sinauer 1986) 6 
11 Ibid 2 
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biology. To overcome this first obstacle, conservation biology was thus seeking to 
synthesise the previously fragmented character of conservation traditions and practices, 
based on the ‘holistic assumption’ that ‘the proper objective of conservation is the 
protection and continuity of entire communities and ecosystems’12 . In the process of 
reducing the gap between applied conservation traditions and theoretical ecology as the 
science of studying natural systems, conservation biology was proposing ‘a new stage in the 
application of science to conservation problems’13. 
 
Secondly, the prevailing environmentalist sentiment of the decade, as expressed in the 
passing of the first ‘modern’ domestic environmental legislation - such as the US 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 or the UK Control of Pollution Act 1974 - was 
protectionist. Furthermore, the influence of the ‘limits to growth’ school of thought 
disseminated the idea that economic growth was fundamentally incompatible with 
environmental protection, casting environmentalism in oppositional and adversarial terms, 
with the rapprochement of sustainable development still more than a decade away. In that 
light, conservation was liable to be easily depicted as a profoundly negative activity, 
‘stopping everything cold’14, and challenged as an ethical choice that prioritized the value of 
obscure organisms and ‘invisible’ ecosystems over human welfare. This adversarial stance 
of conservation and the whole environmental movement was becoming particularly 
disadvantageous in a period of profound changes in socioeconomic realities initiated by the 
rise of neoliberalism15. 
 
In terms of addressing the two obstacles of fragmentation and negativity, the general 
solution espoused by conservation biology was the integrative directive of general 
                                               
12 Michael E. Soule, ‘What is Conservation Biology?’ (1985) 35 Bioscience 727, 728 
13 Ibid 727  
14 Soule and Wilcox, Conservation Biology: An Evolutionary- Ecological Perspective 
15 This encounter with economic thought is further analysed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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synthesis, both in terms of the scientific study of natural processes and ecosystems, as well 
as in the application of these scientific theories and principles to conservation practice. In 
the 1980 study titled Conservation Biology, considered a landmark in the field, this integrative 
directive is distilled into some key propositions: 
(i) The tropical forests are essential loci of environmental protection. The book’s first part 
is generally titled Ecological Principles of Conservation, but these principles are all derived from 
research of Latin American tropical forests, laying the groundwork for the concept of 
‘biodiversity hotspots’16. 
(ii) The fragmented environmental protection of dispersed, small nature enclaves or 
reserves has no measurable effect on preserving the habitats of key species, especially if the 
designation of these areas relies on aesthetic or political reasons and is not supported by 
what would subsequently become known as the ecosystem approach. 
(iii) Nature reserves and protected areas should not be left in a state of ‘benign neglect’; 
active monitoring and management are essential. 
(iv) Ex situ conservation (zoos, botanical gardens, seed banks, gene collections etc.) will 
never be able to hold a significant amount of the world’s biodiversity. Emphasis must be 
placed on in situ conservation, especially since knowledge of the precise number of species 
and the interaction between species, organisms and ecosystems is constantly evolving and 
uncertain. 
(v) Finally, ‘Man is an integral variable’17 affecting biodiversity nature as a ‘user’ and a 
‘steward’. Any discussion of conservation is incomplete without consideration of issues of 
exploitation/utilisation (which forms the last part of the study). 
 
                                               
16 Remaining areas of high biological diversity mainly due to lack of or low-level human encroachment on 
local ecosystems.  At present, there are 25 identified ‘hotspots’, only one of which is located in the developed 
world (California). For more information on all biodiversity hotspots see: 
http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org/ 
17 Soule and Wilcox, Conservation Biology: An Evolutionary- Ecological Perspective 
59 
 
These propositions predate the invention of biodiversity, but the basics of what would 
eventually become the concept can already be detected in them. They were the basics of 
the manual of conservation practices eventually introduced into the core of 
environmentalism by conservation biology through the medium of biodiversity. 
 
Armed with these new ideas and with demonstrably defective environmental action in their 
sights, conservation biologists believed themselves forging ahead at the forefront of 
forward-thinking (if not radical) environmentalism: ‘[conservation biology’s] relation to 
biology, particularly ecology, is analogous to that of surgery to physiology and war to 
political science’18. They had indeed begun to marvel at their ability to manufacture awe.  
 
However, while the key propositions made sense from an ecological/environmental 
perspective, the stated aim of conservation biology was to turn them into environmental 
law and policy. Therefore to cement this mission, the programme of conservation biology 
found a symbol condensing this form of thought in the concept of biological diversity, 
which ‘is a revolutionary term: its makers and promoters aim to foment radical changes on 
several fronts’ 19 . David Takacs, in his qualitative, interview-based study of different 
perceptions of biodiversity in the natural sciences, phrased the strategic objectives of the 
new experts and advocates of biodiversity experts in the following way: 
 
‘Conservation biologists have generated and disseminated the term biodiversity 
specifically to change the terrain of your mental map, reasoning that if you were to 
conceive of nature differently, you would view and value it differently’20. 
 
                                               
18 Soule, ‘What is Conservation Biology?’ 727 
19 Takacs 309 
20 Ibid 1 
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The next section traces the subsequent emergence of biodiversity, focusing on the 
establishment of a generally accepted three-tiered definition (genes-species-ecosystems), 
intermixed with the concept’s first steps in the labyrinth of the national and global policy 
agenda. 
PATHS TO ACCEPTANCE 
It is important to underline again that biodiversity did not emerge in a neutral vacuum or 
fully-fledged within the academic mind. It was a tactical offshoot of this particular activist 
school of thought known as conservation biology, repeatedly characterised as an avowedly 
mission-oriented endeavour. Conservation biology continues to invoke a sense of ethical 
duty to promote the merits of a scientific and holistic approach to conservation, of 
studying and protecting the whole biosphere and the ‘continuity of entire ecosystems’21, but 
also of acknowledging and improving upon the deficiencies of existing conservation 
thinking. This mission was not limited to educating and raising public awareness over these 
issues, but aimed to actually affect the formulation of conservation policy and practice. 
 
Biodiversity contributed to this overall programmatic goal of applying scientific tools to 
environmental problems primarily by fleshing out the integrative directive. It concisely 
confronted and unified the disparity of existing conservation thinking, in addition to 
highlighting its negative and adversarial standpoint. This was achieved when the acceptance 
of biodiversity as a valid conservation concept was initially anchored by the gradual 
introduction of its definition as a synthesis of three levels: genetic diversity, species 
diversity and ecosystem diversity22. Such a composition clearly served the programmatic 
goals and tactical needs of conservation biology. The three levels corresponded with 
                                               
21 Soule, ‘What is Conservation Biology?’ 728 
22 First suggested in Elliott A. Norse, America Ecological Society of and Society Wilderness, Conserving 
biological diversity in our national forests (Wilderness Society 1986), also see Farnham 12 
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existing environmental concerns and conservation practices, embedding the new concept 
within a familiar field of environmental traditions. However, the stitching of these practices 
and traditions together also manifested the additional intent to ‘produce a shared vision of 
protecting nature and its resources’ 23 . In this way, biodiversity was at the same time 
something radically new, but also comfortably recognisable; a loud synthetic fabric made 
from traditional lamb’s wool. 
 
The first firmly policy-oriented suggestion of biological diversity as consisting of distinct 
components deserving combined protection can be found in the US Council on 
Environmental Quality’s Eleventh Annual Report, and more specifically in the second chapter 
compiled by biologists Elliot Norse and Roger McManus24. Norse later explained that they 
were writing on what they had barely understood as the ‘unprecedented subject of the 
status of life on Earth’25. Biological diversity was simply the invented shorthand to convey 
an argument of widespread and alarming decline; a ‘term that encompassed all that was 
being lost’26. This diversity is described as ‘fundamental in the functioning of ecological 
systems’ and: 
 
‘[…] Includes two related concepts, genetic diversity and ecological diversity. 
Genetic diversity  is the amount of genetic variability among individuals in a single 
species... Ecological diversity (species richness) is the number of species in a 
community of organisms’27. 
 
                                               
23 Farnham 13 
24 Elliot A. Norse and Roger E. McManus, ‘Ecology and Living Resources: Biological Diversity’ in 
Environmental Quality 1980: The Eleventh Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality (Council on 
Environmental Quality 1980). For more detail on the discussions and concerns that underpinned the writing 
of this chapter see Farnham 16-19 
25 Elliot A. Norse, ‘A River that Flows to the Sea: The Marine Biological Diversity Movement’ 9 
Oceanography 5, 6 
26 Ibid 
27 Norse and McManus, ‘Ecology and Living Resources: Biological Diversity’ 32 
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While the third level of ecosystems is omitted from this first enunciation, it is not 
disregarded altogether, as it was already a significant area of study within ecology. In such 
early stages in the advocacy cycle, a preference for easily measured and understood 
categorisations was expected. Additionally, the publication of this report coincided with a 
period when North American conservation thinking was heavily centred on species-centric 
conservation, under the influence of stark warnings of coming extinction disasters expertly 
coupled with detailed analysis of the many economic benefits to be derived if these 
extinction events were to be averted28. 
 
In the same year as Norse and McManus’ first definition of biological diversity (1980), the 
first edition of the World Conservation Strategy (WCS) was adopted at the international 
level29, as an ‘intellectual framework and practical guide’ for conservation practice around 
the globe. While both mainstream30 and critical31 histories of biodiversity seem to imply 
that holistic or synthetic environmental thought began with American conservation 
biology, this policy document indicates that parallel paths to acceptance for this form of 
environmental thought also existed at the international stage. The WCS was influenced by 
different ecological emphases on ecosystems and the biosphere, as well as the 
biogeography school, but ended up articulating what can be perceived as a form of 
antecedent to biodiversity conservation, termed ‘living-resource conservation’. This WCS 
conservation method had three objectives: ‘(i) to maintain essential ecological processes 
                                               
28 For the more influential examples see Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Extinction: The Causes and 
Consequences of The Disappearance of Species (Gollancz 1981); Norman Myers, The Sinking Ark : A New Look at the 
Problem of Disappearing Species (Pergamon 1979) 






and life-support systems, (ii) to preserve genetic diversity and (iii) to ensure the sustainable 
utilisation of species and ecosystems’32. 
 
Despite divergent influences, the most interesting common element connecting the North 
American and the international trajectories of biodiversity invention is the inescapable 
trend towards prioritizing the notion of the natural resource. To create novel or reform 
existing institutions, to arrange spaces and alter behaviours as regards the environment, as 
the programme of conservation biology was aiming to do - in short to have a say in the 
formulation of law and policy – it was accepted that the starting point was resource 
management. They can be called a different name, such as ‘living’ resources in the case of 
these two reports, to avoid the association with the deeply utilitarian and economicist 
history of fisheries or forestry management. Emphasis can be placed on the human 
benefits to be lost if environmental degradation continues or the correct conservation 
practices are not adopted; alternatively the reform proposal can focus on sustainable 
utilisation, on the enhancement of the economic potential of these resources. Irrespective 
of nuances and variations, and in the words of Michael Soule, ‘the emphasis is on our 
natural resources’33. 
 
These two (American-international) early articulations of notions approaching, but not yet 
identified with, biodiversity illustrate precisely the tactical rationale and strategic necessity 
for a new concept to organize the emerging synthetic framework. Comparing the 
aspirational and mission-oriented language of Conservation Biology with the more streamlined 
policy language of the WCS would have invariably left a sense of disappointment for the 
environmentalist of the time, as the narrative very quickly reverted to the standard tropes 
                                               
32 IUCN, UNEP and WWF. This set of objectives is closer to the CBD than the subsequent work of 
American biologists. 
33 Soule, ‘What is Conservation Biology?’ 728 
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of natural resource management, ignoring the impact of conservation biology’s key 
propositions. These documents give further indication that conservation biology could not 
hope to achieve its stated aims by itself as another form of science-based environmental 
advocacy. It absolutely required the carefully calibrated tool of biological diversity to take 
the next step into the mainstream. 
 
This next step was first taken in the American context. Conversation biology’s stated aim 
of becoming applied theory guiding environmental decisions came closer to realisation with 
the International Environmental Protection Act of 198334. Although this Act did not apply 
or refer to domestic environmental policy, it nevertheless included the conservation of 
biological diversity as a target and potentially a condition for US foreign aid. Farnham 
notes that the Act actually mandated that a number of government agencies, including 
USAID and EPA, draft a ‘comprehensive government strategy for conserving biological 
diversity in developing countries’35 as part of their overall foreign assistance policies. Of 
note to legal analysis is the fact that this Act contains the first mention of biological 
diversity in a formal legal context. 
 
In these first steps towards the establishment of the concept of biodiversity, the thread of 
the concerns and interests set out by conservation biology was not always clear. A ‘more 
expansive conservation paradigm’36 was definitely in the process of being formulated, but 
old concerns and ways of understanding maintained their hold. The integration of resource 
management within this new conservation paradigm would eventually produce the primary 
                                               
34 22 U.S.C 2151q.; 97 Stat. 1045 
35 Farnham 21 
36 Ibid 14 
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leitmotif that would forever accompany biodiversity: the constant interplay between 
biology and economics37. 
BECOMING AN INTEGRAL PART OF ENVIRONMENTALISM 
The defining point for the popularisation of the invention of biological diversity was the 
‘National Forum on BioDiversity’, co-organized by the US National Research Council and 
the Smithsonian Institute. Held in Washington, D.C., on September 21-24, 1986, this large 
and triumphantly multidisciplinary event, attended by ‘more than sixty leading biologists, 
economists, agricultural experts, philosophers, representatives of assistance and lending 
agencies, and other professionals’ 38 , articulated and disseminated the media-friendly 
contraction of ‘biodiversity’ for the first time, with the aim of raising public awareness 
regarding a generalised environmental crisis linked to a disturbing phenomenon identified 
as the loss of biodiversity. 
 
In terms of conservation practice, a significant number of papers presented at the forum 
focused on species diversity and the particular habitat of the rainforest39, but the overall 
discussion nevertheless cemented the overall framing of biodiversity within a grander 
context of an ‘extinction crisis’40 of ‘unprecedented urgency’41. This overall urgent tone of 
the arguments implicitly linked biodiversity with a veritable global environmental crisis42, 
further and above existing concerns over human exploitation and natural resource 
management. In this way, this forum did eventually succeed in fulfilling conservation 
biology’s original objective of forming a ‘community of interest and concern’ by 
                                               
37 As examined further in Chapter 3 
38 Editor’s Foreword in Edward O. Wilson (ed) BioDiversity (National Academy Press 1988). 
39 E.g. ‘I concentrate on the tropical moist forests, because of all the major habitats, they are richest in species 
and because they are in greater danger’ in ibid 3 
40 E.g. see Paul  Ehrlich, ‘The Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences ’ in Edward O. Wilson (ed), 
Biodiversity (National Academy Press 1988) 
41 Wilson, BioDiversity 3 
42 Farnham 2 
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transforming conservation biology from a mission-oriented to a crisis-oriented school of 
thought. 
 
Although opinion regarding the actual inventor of the –then- neologism of ‘biodiversity’ 
varies 43 , the previous standing of Edward O. Wilson enabled him to assume a 
‘spokesperson’ status for the concept, integrating it within his broader work that sought to 
alter not only the objectives of conservation, but also the very role of biology and science 
within society44. The Wilson-edited conference proceedings, titled simply BioDiversity, have 
been so influential that they have been subsequently referred to as the ‘Bible of 
Biodiversity’45. By capturing and presenting a mosaic of different environmental concerns, 
ecological traditions, conservation practices and resource management systems - in a sense 
merging theory and application - interacting under the single umbrella of biodiversity, 
Wilson was able to confirm and popularise the unification of existing strands of 
environmental thought under the new synthesis and organizational schema of biodiversity. 
Chapters ranged from different methods for measuring and preserving elements and 
processes to be included under biodiversity46, to identifying the different values that may be 
attached to nature once conceived of as biodiversity47, to necessary policies that have to be 
adopted and solutions for the restoration of endangered biodiversity 48 . BioDiversity 
represented a strong indication that the programme of conservation biology was coming to 
fruition, precisely due to the invention of the concept of biodiversity as a holistic symbol. 
                                               
43 See Daniel P. Faith, ‘Biodiversity’ (2007)  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/biodiversity/> . Walter G. Rosen had the main 
responsibility for organising of the event from his post within the National Academy and proposed the 
contraction initially, but Edward O. Wilson being the keynote speaker and subsequent editor of the 
conference volume, has been primarily associated with it, despite initially rejecting the concept as too ‘glitzy’ 
44 Edward O. Wilson, ‘The Biological Diversity Crisis: A Challenge to Science’ 2 Issues in Science and 
Technology 20 
45 Michael Flitner, ‘Biodiversity: Of Local Commons and Global Commodities’ in Michael Goldman (ed), 
Privatizing Nature: Political Struggles for the Global Commons (Pluto Press 1998) 
46 Wilson, BioDiversity Part 6. 
47 Ibid Parts 5 and 12. 




With the three-tiered definition (genes-species-ecosystems) not yet set in stone, the range 
of different approaches and understandings in the conference proceedings clearly 
illustrated the advantage of familiarity that the concept possessed in addition to its 
‘revolutionary’ aspect. As indicated in Norse and McManus’ early attempts at defining it49, 
while biodiversity itself was presented as a novel term, the components and levels of its 
proposed reorganisation of the natural world were familiar objects of research for 
ecologists and domains of activism for environmentalists. 
 
For example, a conservationist could focus on the extinction of species, reading 
biodiversity as a complex, but endangered, diagram of the ‘production line’ of evolution. 
An ecologist might focus on ecosystems, identifying diversity as an intrinsic property of all 
natural communities. An agricultural expert would read biodiversity in the context of plant 
diversity required for maintaining and strengthening the world’s food supply and security. 
An environmental economist would focus on the economic benefits that can be derived 
from the utilisation of biodiversity, viewing biodiversity in an even more applied sense, as a 
global system of natural resources and services, whose maintenance has to be priced 
correctly. An activist could concentrate on more localised campaigns for the protection of 
specific habitats or species. Within the all-inclusive framework of biodiversity, all these 
ideas, emphases and activities can be understood both separately, as well as together as a 
whole, exemplifying biodiversity’s holistic ‘character’ 50  or ‘sensibility’ 51 . They may be 
referring to different issues, but they are all, in their own way, talking of biodiversity. 
                                               
49 See note 24 above 
50Marjorie L. Reaka-Kudla, Don E. Wilson and Edward O. Wilson (eds), Biodiversity II: Understanding and 
Protecting Our Biological Resources (Joseph Henry Press 1996) 
51 Farnham 15 
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‘Biodiversity has to be thought of in a number of different ways,’52 i.e. be ‘a paradigm of 
nature conservation that all can rally behind’53. 
 
The combined impact of the forum and the ‘bible’ represented an astute tactical 
achievement not only for the specific programme of conservation biology, but 
predominantly for biology in general. The conceptual interdependence of biodiversity’s 
components paralleled the functional interdependence of the planet’s ecological processes 
and living things, thus mutually reinforcing the conceptual synthesis of the whole. Highly 
incontestable universal goods of diversity and interdependence became entrenched. More 
importantly however, the notion of biodiversity as the ‘web of life’ generated a form of 
environmental thought intrinsically based on an understanding of the environment as 
biological life. Subsequently, ‘any interest in geologic, chemical and physical attributes of 
the natural world is placed in the context in the context of their impact upon or connection 
to biological life’54. This continued centrality of biology enabled the entry of other strands 
of biological thought, such as the sociobiology discussed later in this chapter. 
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
From the mid-1980s onwards, the scientific formation of biodiversity was steadily 
expanding from its origins as novel conservation mentality. A new ‘community of interest 
and concern’ was gaining ground towards the mainstream of environmentalism. Legal 
recognition of these realignments was just around the corner. A formal mandate by the UN 
General Council was handed to UNEP in 1987 to form an ad-hoc working group of 
experts ‘to investigate the desirability and possible form of an umbrella convention to 
                                               
52 Reaka-Kudla, Wilson and Wilson 7  
53 Emphasis added. Farnham 15 
54 Ibid 2 
69 
 
rationalise current activities’ in the field of biological diversity55. This mandate was agreed at 
the same UNEP Governing Council where the official unveiling of sustainable 
development took place through the publication of the Report of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development56. This ‘debut’ of biodiversity in international law, albeit 
overshadowed by the Brundtland Report, confirmed the concept’s continuing ascendancy 
towards the mainstream of environmentalism. It is also highly symbolic of its eventual 
intrication with the concept of sustainable development itself57. 
 
Once the working group was set up, the inescapably winding negotiations for drafting an 
international treaty on biodiversity took more than four years. The various twists and turns 
can be followed in Fiona McConnell’s first-hand account of the negotiations, in which she 
participated as a member of the UK delegation 58 . Despite the small steps towards 
acceptance and the converging trajectories outlined in the preceding pages of this chapter, 
it was clear that during the treaty negotiations biodiversity was not yet a concept 
sufficiently ‘internalised’ by the existing international network of diplomats, administrators, 
lawyers and economists that participate in such meetings. McConnell refers to these 
unusual circumstances in the following incident: 
 
‘Because the phrase “conservation of biological diversity” was so cumbersome a 
proposal to revert to the shorter, traditional concept of “nature conservation” 
appealed to many delegates who had no deep knowledge of the subject. But this 
was fiercely attacked by the few scientific experts present who had a hard but 
eventually successful task in convincing the ignorant majority that biological 
                                               
55 UNEP/GC/Dec 14/26 (1987) 
56 Gro Harlem Brundtland, Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) 
(Brundtland Report) 




diversity was the correct term. Very soon everyone was using the shortened form–
biodiversity--but with as yet little clear understanding of its meaning’59. 
 
By recounting this first encounter between biodiversity and international law and the 
‘rejection’ of nature conservation, McConnell unconsciously summarises the ascent of 
biodiversity from alternative conservation mentality to holistic environmental concept and 
separate strand of environmental thought. The ‘fierce attack’ of the resident ‘scientific 
experts’ further illustrates the centrality of biological thought within this particular 
environmental project. This enforcement of biodiversity as the ‘correct term’ can be 
regarded as the first of many battles over the control of the concept. This biodiversity 
‘war’, within a context of an urgent and pressing narrative of environmental crisis, 
constitutes another important running theme throughout the history of biodiversity. This 
first battle’s objective was to ensure that the formal legitimation of this new way of seeing 
life and nature proceed along the ‘correct’ trajectory, i.e. that of biological thought and 
conservation biology’s programme. 
 
The first part of this chapter chartered an initial period of biodiversity’s existence from the 
late 1970s to roughly 1987. In this period, the early propositions of the programme of 
conservation biology to reorient nature conservation are condensed and enhanced by the 
new composite term of biodiversity. Biodiversity’s initial trajectory as a conservation 
mentality that synthesised traditions and practices and behind which all could rally is traced 
through certain early legal instruments and policy manuals. The 1986 National Forum is 
identified as a crucial event that established the notion of a global biodiversity crisis and of 
a new synthetic crisis-discipline that would mimic biodiversity’s holistic sensibility and set 
out to combat this global crisis from different perspectives and levels. The first battle over 
                                               
59 Ibid 5 
71 
 
the control of the idea of biodiversity was fought during the start of the CBD negotiations, 
in what would become a running theme in the history of biodiversity. 
II | CONSERVATION BIOLOGY AS SOCIOBIOLOGY REDUX60 
The steady stream of realignments, already apparent in this early period, may explain how 
biodiversity became a sort of rainbow banner that everyone within environmentalism could 
take up, but it is important at this point to step away from linear history. The trajectory of 
biodiversity, largely from mission to global crisis, mapped in this first period does not 
adequately underpin the legal and the political decisions that resulted in 192 national 
governments signing and ratifying an international environmental treaty on the issue within 
four years of its emergence. Even if an argument could be made in relation to the synthesis 
of a global biodiversity crisis presented at the 1986 forum, the rapid emergence of the legal 
regime is incongruent with the odd phenomenon of the state (US) with the more active 
‘community of interest and concern’ for biodiversity - in terms of both applied and 
theoretical research, environmental activism etc. – only having an observer status in the 
regime due to fundamental disagreements with its content61. If we were to plot the history 
of biodiversity so far in a linear presentation, a chart of the evolution of the term, then the 
last point would be drastically off. 
 
Therefore, there are still pages missing in this journey from idea to law, from advocacy to 
public policy. To complete the picture through the historico-critical attitude outlined in the 
first chapter, biodiversity has to be approached not simply as a new conservation mentality 
                                               
60 I will examine the sociobiology debate only in relation to its overlap with the analysis of the conditions of 
emergence of the biodiversity concept presented in this thesis, as the many twists and turns of this expansive 
debate over the last three decades cannot be covered here. For a detailed chronological mapping and 
extended bibliography on the sociobiology debate see Ullica Christina Olofsdotter Segerstråle, Defenders of the 
truth : the battle for science in the sociobiology debate and beyond (Oxford University Press 2000)For a collection of the 
major texts of the first years of the controversy see Arthur L. Caplan (ed) The Sociobiology Debate: Readings on 
Ethical and Scientific Studies (Harper & Row 1978) 
61 The case of the US rejection of the CBD is further examined in Chapter 4. 
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or paradigm, but as a wider problematization, as a form of thought that poses new 
questions for environmental law and politics. The origins of the concept within 
conservation biology do not hold some form of original truth regarding the essence 
biodiversity that has been lost along the way. The fact that conservation biology was the 
first school of thought to apprehend the strategic potential of a new synthetic 
environmental concept does not mean that it has been the only field to define biodiversity. 
The idea of biodiversity as problematization implies a genealogical task; an emphasis placed 
on the breaks and discursive realignments in the history of biodiversity, on the conflicts 
over the meaning and use of the concept that transferred it away from conservation 
biology’s initial programme. The first such break - the first discontinuity in the chart of 
biodiversity – was created by the entry of sociobiological thought. It was sociobiology, and 
in particular Wilsonian sociobiology, that set the course of biodiversity away from 
conservation concerns, and towards questions of political economy. 
 
In 1975 an acrimonious debate erupted with the publication of a controversial glossy 
coffee-table book by Edward O. Wilson62, which proposed a new holistic discipline called 
‘sociobiology’, defined as ‘the systematic study of the biological basis of all social 
behaviour’63, i.e. both in nature and in human society. Already a renowned entomologist 
and biologist, Wilson extended a very detailed collection of methods and formulas from the 
field of population genetics - through which changes in animal social behaviour were 
identified with changes in gene frequencies of traits brought about by evolution by natural 
selection - to the study of Homo sapiens in the last part of the book64, articulating a ‘hyper-
                                               
62 This is the same scientist who in later years would oversee the 1986 Biodiversity Forum and edit the ‘Bible 
of Biodiversity’ 
63 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology : The New Synthesis (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1975). 
‘Wilsonian’ sociobiology was further elaborated (and defended in response to harsh criticisms) in Edward O. 
Wilson, On Human Nature (Harvard University Press 1978), as well as in Charles J. Lumsden and Edward O. 
Wilson, Genes, mind and culture: the coevolutionary process (Harvard University Press 1981) 
64 Chapter 27 in Wilson, Sociobiology : The New Synthesis 
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Enlightenment’ quest for the ultimate coupling of scientific truth and moral values65. Very 
briefly, he argued that in ‘identify[ing] the behaviours and rules by which individual human 
beings increase their Darwinian fitness through the manipulation of society’66, society and 
culture become group behaviours, collections of traits linked to specific genes evolved 
through a process of natural selection. In other – and bolder - words, ‘genes hold culture 
on a leash’67. Using this hypothesis, in that last and most controversial chapter Wilson 
attempted to explain the existence of aggressiveness, morality, religion, economy, and many 
other human traits or social functions by reference to humanity’s genetic code and 
evolutionary heritage. This ‘new synthesis’ of sociobiology thus referred to a view that 
‘humanities and social sciences shrink to specialized branches of biology’68. 
 
This ambitious programme came under sustained attack almost immediately, starting with a 
rhetoric that placed Wilson along a historical continuum of social Darwinism and biological 
determinism, including the ‘eugenics policies of Nazi Germany’69. In a period when the link 
between genetics, the theory of evolution and human behaviour still prompted strong 
feelings of aversion and outright rejection70, sociobiology came under sustained attack from 
both within biology71 and from the other sciences that it aimed to subsume72. This was 
perhaps unsurprising in a climate where American critics of sociobiology dramatically 
stated that ‘not since Hobbes’ Leviathan has there been such an ambitious programme to 
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explain and prescribe the entire human condition beginning with a few basic principles’73. 
This was a debate that exceeded a mere dispute over scientific facts, methodology or 
theory; Wilson’s forceful introduction of a new paradigm in biology met with fierce 
opposition on many levels. 
 
The criticisms did not restrict themselves solely to disputing the sociobiological 
methodologies for establishing the natural selection and genetic coding of certain human 
traits, but extended to questioning the sociobiologically-instituted metaphysics of human 
nature and free will that were deemed to hide behind the mask of scientific method. 
Finally, they also focused more intensely on the political implications of this depoliticised 
biological explanation of all human culture and behaviour. Especially in reference to this 
last point, the epistemological debate coalesced into a generally negative reception for this 
proposed new synthetic discipline, with a rough consensus being that if ‘social 
arrangements are the inevitable manifestations of the specific action of the genes’74, and if 
these particular genes ‘have been selected in evolution because the traits they determine 
result in higher reproductive fitness of the individuals that carry them’75, then sociobiology 
is to be denounced as presenting a politically and ethically dangerous ‘claim that human 
society as we know it is both inevitable and the result of an adaptive process’76. In effect, 
Wilson and sociobiology were criticised for providing a thoroughly conservative 
justification of the political and social status quo as the genetically optimal system of social 
organization. 
WILSON MARK II 
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It is perhaps difficult to see the direct relevance of the above rudimentary sketch of the 
sociobiology debate to environmentalism and more specifically the historical analysis of 
biodiversity undertaken in this thesis. The dangers of genetics and biology are associated 
today –if at all - with the future risks of biotechnology and genetic engineering and the 
slick, all-consuming effectiveness of information technology, and not with the past 
nightmares of the ‘racial hygiene’ of Lorenz and the brutal experiments of Mengele at 
Auschwitz. Hence the substantive acerbic exchanges of the original sociobiology debate in 
the mid to late 1970s possess largely historical value. Moreover, the very constructivist 
approach to biodiversity as a social construct employed here will appear bewilderingly 
unproductive and dangerous to both sides of the sociobiology debate, each considering 
themselves – in Segerstrale’s title – as ‘defenders of the truth’77. But the link is Wilson 
himself; or more precisely his notion of scientific and biological truth mixed with ethics 
producing a political-economic prescriptive agenda that is of crucial importance to a 
historical examination of biodiversity. 
 
It has been observed that ‘by the end of the 1980s, Wilson had seemingly transformed 
himself from Wilson I, the politically incorrect sociobiologist, to Wilson II, the politically 
correct environmentalist’78. In escaping the controversy of sociobiology and becoming the 
eloquent and influential spokesperson for protecting all life on Earth, he certainly seemed 
to escape the controversy of the sociobiological synthesis and its critiques79. On the other 
hand however, the genetic reductionism in his thought is so ingrained as to actually include 
the very holistic ethic and ecological awareness advocated by Wilson after his defection to 
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environmentalism. His proposed ‘biophilia’80, an environmental ethic that drives ecological 
awareness, was to be found in our genes: we have an inherent, genetic need to gain 
‘spiritual reward’, ‘spiritual enrichment’ and a ‘deep sense of fulfilment’ from 
‘contemplating and living closer to our environment’81. Thus, according to Wilson, even 
humanity’s love of nature is genetically embedded within human nature itself. As far as 
ecocentric turns go, this inward shift towards the gene was perhaps the exact opposite of 
the grand shift in the Gaia hypothesis of deep ecology. 
 
This convenient escape into holistic ecological conscience did not mean either that Wilson 
had abandoned his broader synthetic goal of subordinating the social sciences and 
humanities or that he had renounced his particular ‘philosophical style; the coupling of 
scientific and moral notions’ and ‘fondness for holistic explanations’82. In his conceptual 
schema, the positivist science and rationality serves to eradicate the possibility of arbitrary 
or irrational codes of conduct, aiming to guide towards achieving a ‘genetically accurate and 
hence completely fair code of ethics’83. 
 
This combination of a positivist framework (biology and genetics) with a holistic ethic 
parallels the similar characteristics of biodiversity as originally envisaged within 
conservation biology. In this way, it can be argued that the transformation of Wilson into 
the ‘good’ environmentalist fitted very well within his broader research agenda and did not 
significantly alter its overall aims. In 1985, J. Krebs had commented on Wilson’s Sociobiology 
that: 
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It was published at just the right moment, coinciding with, and acting as a focus 
for, the surge of interest in the subject; it defined in a thorough way the range of 
possible contents of the discipline and it gave a name to a field of study that has 
not before seen itself as a single, unified enterprise’84. 
 
This comment is almost interchangeable between the two versions of Wilson 
(sociobiologist and environmentalist). It can equally and perfectly describe the unification 
of conservation traditions through the biodiversity concept consolidated by Wilson in the 
late 80s. The function and aims are almost identical. We are witnessing exactly the same 
discursive process. After establishing the concept of biodiversity within environmentalism, 
Wilson enunciated his updated synthesis, complete with an environmental focus that 
sidestepped the controversial specificities of his sociobiological past: 
 
My truths, then, three in number, are the following: first, humanity is ultimately the 
product of biological evolution; second the diversity of life is the cradle and 
greatest natural heritage of the human species; and third, philosophy and religion 
make no sense without taking into account of these first two images’85. 
 
It is obvious that such a programmatic declaration went far beyond the confines of 
introducing a novel conservation mentality or proposing specific reforms, such as larger 
and more actively managed natural reserves. It transcended the environmental limits of 
conservation biology’s programme, becoming an unbounded holistic project. The entirety 
of the socionatural world was supposed to be inscribed and prescribed by biology. After 
the involvement of sociobiology through the influence and work of Wilson, the 
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transformation of biodiversity from a conservation issue to a wider political 
problematization was cemented. Initially at least, the direction of this problematization was 
firmly under the control of biology. 
III | THROUGH THE LENS OF BIOLOGY 
After the involvement of sociobiology, biodiversity was no longer an invention for 
organising conservation traditions and practices into a more elaborate and ornate archive of 
environmental thought. The programme was also no longer simply driven by conservation 
biologists seeking to test their theories in the ‘real world of institutions, governments and 
management’. Instead, this early history of biodiversity can yield a more ambitious project 
for the construction of a complex ‘lens’ through which previous environmental practices 
and ethics are refracted, in order to holistically fabricate a new nature and a new society. 
The core element of this lens is the centrality afforded to biological knowledge in the 
edifice of biodiversity. This centrality attracted a wider range of biology strands seeking 
advisory and prescriptive roles in all public policy and politics, in the very fabric of social 
organisation. As will be analysed in the subsequent chapters, while this lens of biology 
indeed formed the basis for a more expansive role for biodiversity knowledge in spite of 
the uncertainty and complexity of the concept, the genetic reductionism hidden within has 
created further crossroads in the history of biodiversity and opened pathways unforeseen 
by the original inventors of biodiversity. In a way, it was no longer conservation biology’s 
programme to administer. To close this analysis of the intrinsic link between biodiversity 
and biology, the elements of this subtly altered biological programme of biodiversity are 
documented below. 
THE CENTRALITY OF BIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
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Today, thinking of nature under the rubric of biodiversity necessitates an acceptance that 
environmental problems are all ‘biological in the first place’86 . This proposition, once 
accepted, is swiftly followed by the self-evident conclusion that any environmental 
intervention should be prescribed primarily by the relevant expert biologists able to 
comprehend precisely this biological character of the environmental crisis. Biodiversity is 
meaningless, as either a collection of conservation practices, environmental standards and 
indicators or a holistic ethic, without the central figure of the biologist objectively 
measuring, classifying, studying its components and processes, revealing their place in 
nature and their connection to human history and society. 
 
In this sense, this essentialist mode of environmental thought is closely aligned to what 
Haraway calls the ‘ultimate message’ of the determinism of sociobiology, which is ‘the 
identification of the proper expert who has the authority to exercise effective power over 
nature through knowledge of the word, [...] cracking of the code of nature’s secret voice’87. 
When the expert insists on biodiversity being the ‘correct term’, he also indirectly insists 
that he is the ‘proper expert’. 
 
Therefore, this privileging of biological knowledge aims to first establish a mode of thought 
and a set of practices in relation to biodiversity based on the ‘legitimate perspective of the 
agent of knowledge’88, i.e. the scientist possessing biological expertise. The scientific tools 
for understanding biodiversity are derived from the stable of biology: biochemistry, 
molecular biology and population genetics. Contrary to conservation biology, which sought 
to unify the environmental sphere in the ‘struggle’ to convince the ‘populace and 
politicians’ of the merit of environmental concerns, the struggle here is first directed against 
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other strands of environmental thought. To adopt a different perspective, to think outside 
the epistemological rules framing biological knowledge of the environment would entail 
assuming a viewpoint and a language that is beyond comprehension, to go against the 
particular environmental truths of biodiversity, to fall into falsehood and absurdity. 
 
Under this programme, biodiversity thus further entrenches biology as the central 
rationality of environmentalism. Harking back to the mission of conservation biology, it is 
underlined that ‘a scientist should not just study nature but should take care of humanity, 
life and our planet’89. However, that same statement also infers that environmentalism itself 
is not the endgame for this biological programme. In the context of a broader horizon, as 
Haraway noted, a ‘biological enterprise’90 had assigned itself the task of defining humanity’s 
place in nature and in history. Wilson’s research agenda benefited from its association with 
biodiversity, but also transplanted the concept firmly within what Haraway has called this 
biological enterprise, this programme for science-based prescription. In this way, while 
biodiversity was initially constructed as a lens through which society would regard and 
value nature, its construction was eventually modified for additional use as an instrument 
that biology would use to regulate society. 
A REDUCTIONIST VIEW WITHIN THE SYNTHESIS 
In 1990, Haraway lamented that biology had become ‘a science studying automated 
technological devices’ 91 . Since then, with developments in biotechnology, genetic 
engineering and information technology, this can be phrased in even starker terms: life is 
genetic code, to be mapped, broken up in pieces, recombined; code extracted, code added. 
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The world is a giant genetic database consisting of units of information – or a global 
genetic stock exchange - to be read, invested in, utilised and optimised. 
 
Following down the same reductionist path, biodiversity is infused with a very specific 
techno-scientific understanding of both nature and society, an ‘atomistic machine view of 
the world’92 which Lewontin terms the ‘forgotten metaphor’ bequeathed by Descartes: ‘we 
no longer think that the world is like a clock. We think it is a clock’93. According to this 
logic, only if we can break down and reduce the whole into separate smaller and smaller 
components, up to the genetic level and further deeper, we will be able to understand the 
whole and reduce uncertainty. 
 
Furthermore, by extending this perspective to the socionatural world, the whole is 
consistently deprived of any properties of its own, except those derived from its parts; the 
whole is nothing more than a collection of individual parts, or individual subjects in the 
case of society. Such complete denigration in turns postulates a clear line of division 
between the individual and the group, the inside and the outside, and the organism 
determined internally by its genes and the external factor of its surrounding environment94. 
 
There is a certain contrast between this level of genetic reductionism derived from the 
single gene model, whereby ‘evolution by natural selection could be expressed as a change 
in the gene frequencies of traits’95, and the attributed holistic or synthetic character of 
biodiversity. It is difficult to reconcile such a programme, more reminiscent of Dawkins’ 
Selfish Gene than Wilson’s holistic philosophy regarding the diversity of life, with 
biodiversity. The latter synthesises life into a web, while the former breaks it down into 
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smaller and smaller pieces. Yet these opposite poles do co-exist today within the discourse 
of biodiversity, and the reductionist view is gaining influence. This can be observed in the 
consistently more pronounced96 genetic ‘panel’ on biodiversity’s ‘triptych’ of genes, species 
and ecosystems, despite the various vitalist pronouncements about life on Earth and the 
web of life. Indeed, both major protocols appended to the CBD in the last ten years 
concern genetic resources. 
 
This reductionist view is also bound to become progressively more prominent as 
biotechnology –in the traditional sense of sampling and re-combining genes – becomes 
obsolete and the age of synthetic biology becomes a reality. A good example of the notion 
of life as code employed in practice is Craig Venter’s 2003 marine bio-prospecting 
expedition. Alain Pottage writes of the technology-driven, brutal efficiency of this special 
venture: 
 
‘The yacht stops every 200 miles or so to take samples of seawater from a depth of 
5 feet. Each batch of water is sieved through a set of progressively finer meshes to 
produce paper-bound samples of marine micro-organisms, which are then frozen 
and airlifted back to Venter’s Institute for Biological Energy Alternatives. In the 
laboratories […], DNA from the genomes entangled in each sample is extracted, 
fragmented, amplified and then recomposed into a set of plausible genomes by 
means of the bioinformatic technologies’97. 
 
While initial forays of biotechnology theorised genes as units of information, synthetic 
biology dispenses with the metaphor and simply transforms them into units of information 
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devoid of any interrelation with surrounding habitats and ecosystems. Descartes’ metaphor 
is no longer forgotten, but simply obviated. Standard methods of sample collection, 
taxonomy and classification – the very origins of biology as natural history- are abandoned 
completely. The characteristics and the identity of the organism are irrelevant; it only 
matters as a genetic assemblage, a device holding genetic information, decoded and utilised 
in various technological applications. 
 
One may wonder whether this integration of additional forms of biological thought over 
and beyond what conservation biology represent - or from a different perspective the 
usurpation of conservation biology’s practical programme by a more ambitious political 
and social agenda – carries the seeds of the eventual derailment of the whole project of 
biodiversity. Yet while it seemed improbable that this new edifice would be able to hold, 
unify and synthesise all these conflicting ideas according to its holistic ethos, an 
international treaty was agreed only five years after the publication of BioDiversity. 
Additionally, the exponential growth in interest and research in biodiversity 98  followed 
precisely on from this widening of the scope in the late 1980s. 
 
Therefore, the centrality of biology and in particular the reductionist view has perhaps 
counter-intuitively increased the importance of biodiversity. Considering the broader 
political and social context – namely the dual and plausibly linked99 rise of neoliberalism 
and the ‘life sciences’ industry in the US - of the emergence of biodiversity in 1980s, the 
introduction of genetic reductionism into the biodiversity mix actually marks an important 
turning point in its history. This turning point will be further examined in Chapter 3. 
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IV | LEAVING CONSERVATION BEHIND 
While ecologically-minded biologists envisaged a strategy by which a newly legitimised and 
authorised expert would be able to actively intervene on political, economic and legal 
debates armed solely with environmental truth as derived from knowledge of biodiversity, 
the door was also opened to other technical experts and engineers of nature and society, 
such the resource economists, the biotechnology industry, and others to be discussed 
throughout the thesis. Biodiversity had become part of established environmental law and 
policy, but a price was paid: the aesthetic and ethical holism receded, in favour of the 
practical and the technical; and - as many other types of experts before and alongside him- 
the environmental expert was ‘no longer the rhapsodist of the eternal, but the strategist of 
life and death’100. 
 
By using the tactical weapon of biodiversity, conservation biology aimed to ‘offer a new, 
emotive term for some older ideas and programmes’101  and change the ‘terrain of our 
mental map’, but its imagination was extended to the integration of existing conservation 
concerns and interests under a single archive, in the hope of creating a new synthetic 
environmental guide to conservation policy and practice. In a retrospective essay on 
biodiversity, Norse - as one of the direct ‘inventors’ of the term - uses the analogy of a river 
forming out of tributaries and eventually flowing to the sea to describe the many 
beginnings of what he describes as the biological diversity movement 102 . In order to 
evaluate the movement based on this analogy, it is necessary to ‘tell whether the River will 
flow to the sea strongly enough to affect it significantly, or drain into an arid, land-locked 
basin and evaporate without a trace’103. 
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As Norse readily admits however, from a historical perspective these different rivers are 
not easy to discern, map or figure out where they meet. Two such distinct, but 
interweaving ‘rivers’ or trajectories have been identified in this chapter: the initial mission 
of conservation biology and its usurpation by sociobiology. The first one was concerned 
with a reworking of practices in the field of conservation, while the second one was 
concerned with reworking much more abstract questions regarding nature and life. As the 
following chapters of the thesis will illustrate, these are not the only rivers that joined the 
flowing river of biodiversity. Nevertheless, their early interweaving and conflicts produced 
a number of effects, such as the shift from mission to crisis or the paradoxical integration 
of holism and reductionism. 
 
Ultimately, the conclusion to be drawn from this first period of biodiversity’s history is that 
biology was ‘stitching together nothing less than a new “natural” religion, with biodiversity 
as the icon of worship’104, a lens through which the entirety of the socionatural world 
would be refracted. With sociobiology’s ‘total synthesis’ as the core engine, the aim was 
bound to be set high. After the involvement of Wilson, biodiversity became a much more 
political problematization than its original inventors had ever envisaged. 
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As if they’ve been kept safe in some time-
free zone all these years but now, at the unreadable 
whim of something in power, must re-enter the 
clockwork of cause and effect1 
 
 
In the early years of the tentative ‘biological diversity’, before the 1986 Forum and the 
populist contraction into biodiversity, it was understood that ‘conservation biology, strictly 
speaking, does not include the subject of economics’2. While the initial paths of acceptance 
for the concept did traverse questions of resource management, those were still considered 
ancillary to the main argument. Biological science, not economics, was primarily 
responsible for articulating environmental truth and the argument regarding the value of 
biodiversity. 
 
Jumping forward to 2010, one can observe that the most recent Nagoya COP has endorsed 
a report on the economics of ecosystems and biodiversity3 that offers for the first time a 
detailed economic valuation of the total sum of nature, including all components of 
biodiversity. In the preface of this TEEB report, the authors stress: 
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‘Ideally, TEEB will act as a catalyst to help accelerate the development of a new 
economy: one in which the values of natural capital, and the ecosystem services 
which this capital supplies, are fully reflected in the mainstream of public and 
private decision-making’4. 
 
In the intervening years, there has obviously been a significant swing from the periphery to 
the centre in terms of the presumed role of economics within biodiversity. In the second 
part of the thesis, the centrality of economic thought and this ‘new economy’ in present-
day biodiversity governance will be further illustrated in the various techniques and 
arrangements designed within the biodiversity complex. For the purposes of the history of 
biodiversity presented in this first part, it is important to highlight the first steps of this 
crucial shift. 
 
This shift was initially driven by two factors, one external and one internal to biodiversity 
discourse. The former relates to the particular historical conditions at the time when 
biodiversity was becoming an established environmental sub-movement within 
environmentalism, which occurred during the widely acknowledged ‘neoliberal decade’ of 
the 1980s. The exigencies of that political economic situation necessitated a fuller 
consideration of particular strands of economic thought; that biodiversity re-entered the 
clockwork of cause and effect. The internal factor was the association of biodiversity with 
neo-Malthusian demography, which brought to the fore the problematization of the human 
population, with special reference to the South. There are interesting effects to be 
compared and parallels to be drawn between this connection and the already discussed 
theoretical links with sociobiology. 
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In terms of the analytical grid proposed in Chapter 1 based on the Foucaultian notion of 
government5, this connection produced a major shift in the objects or targets of governing; 
in very broad terms from nature reserves to human population in the South. In this way, 
this shift precipitated further discontinuities in the history of biodiversity, such as the 
confirmed abandonment of the plan to alter conservation practices and the dominance of 
genetic gold within biodiversity. 
I | BIODIVERSITY AS A FAILED LIBERAL MOVEMENT 
To understand how this shift in the standing of economics came about, some of the events, 
breaks and conflicts presented in the previous chapter have to be revisited from the 
perspective of political economy. Takacs summarised the combined strategic mission of the 
proponents of biodiversity thus: 
 
‘They wage battle in the contested realm of how we view, and thus value, and thus 
treat the Earth. Biologists seek revolutions not only in our environmental ethic but 
also in who should be the spokespersons for that ethic, the shapers of our ideas 
about the natural world, and the policies that stem from these ideas’6. 
 
The theoretical preoccupations of these advocates were located within the realms of pure 
science. Their primary goals were related to improving understanding and reducing 
uncertainty through the identification, clarification and description of the various 
components and processes of life, such as species and ecosystems; i.e. ‘how we view and 
thus value the Earth’. Their tactical choices as spokespersons were centred on which of 
these processes and components to include under the biodiversity umbrella, and how to 
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make its definition evocative and sufficiently instructive of the environmental crisis at hand 
and the urgency of action required. Lastly, these advocates, after being shown the ‘way’ by 
Wilson, were also invariably seeking the privileges as experts that would stem from the 
acceptance of the concept as a novel lens of viewing nature and presenting the case of 
environmental problems. 
 
The crucial elements of this school of thought were the assumption of an almost automatic 
translation of biodiversity knowledge and environmental ethics into environmental value 
and this inherent belief that better understanding of environmental complexity is the 
driving factor of environmental law and policy. Under this perception, this self-
appointment of biologists as the ‘shapers of policies’ appears self-evident. Gathering the 
knowledgeable experts constitutes the expected rational response to any crisis, such as the 
alarming degradation in the environment widely observed from the 1970s onwards in such 
respected studies as Myers’ Shrinking Ark7. These activist scientists were witnessing species 
disappear and habitats degrade at an alarming rate, as the evocative, but stark, warnings 
about pollution and overconsumption, repeatedly phrased since the 1960s and 1970s 
during the process of founding modern environmentalism were ignored. Surely the 
scientists more capable of understanding this unfolding disaster would be called upon to 
arrest its damaging course? However, this simplistic causal connection, derived from a 
simple understanding of the role of science, was uniquely unsuited for the changing 
political economy that biodiversity was seeking to influence. The call never came; at least 
not until this simplistic assumption was altered. From Takacs’ summary of the biological 
programme of biodiversity above, the seeds of its political naivety as a movement seeking a 
place at the policy table can be carefully extracted. This political naivety is presented below. 
 




First, the assumption regarding the automatic connection between knowledge and value 
could not hide a serious conceptual flaw or perhaps an overconfident perception of the 
capacities of biological science. Namely, it could not evade the paradoxical trait that exists 
to a certain extent within all natural sciences, but is crucial in ecology: any increase in 
knowledge will result in an increase of complexity and uncertainty8. If the formation of a 
privileged biological perspective of biodiversity relies foundationally on the accumulation 
of knowledge, then this process is only ‘able to develop only insofar as the problem of the 
specificity of life and the threshold it marks among all natural beings was continually 
thrown back as a challenge’9 . In other words, any conception of nature or life as an 
infinitely complex web of interdependent components and processes means that complete 
knowledge of this intricate structure of the natural world is by default a moving target, 
always moving just out of reach. 
 
An increase in understanding within a specific segment of the vast complex of life will 
always trigger new vistas of unexplored domains, both physical and discursive; biology’s 
chances of reaching a final understanding of nature through biodiversity are, in effect, 
constantly reduced by its successes, as the complexity of this composite object of analysis 
effectively increases with each separate discovery. Thus, the persistence of uncertainty 
continually undermines this assumed automatic connection between knowledge and value 
for the purposes of law and policy. If value is understood as intrinsically linked with this 
view of nature that is always provisional, then this makes its value also provisional. Or 
rather, the values recognised by pure science may not be automatically translatable as values 
                                               





recognised by applied science 10  in ‘the real world of institutions, governments and 
management’. 
 
In addition to falling into this subtle epistemological trap, the programme also relied 
strongly on the conviction that if all ‘ecologically-inclined’ sciences could present a ‘united 
front’ of sorts, enhancing the wider public’s scientific ‘literacy’ of environmental issues, this 
would raise environmental concern sufficiently to take concerted action to avert the 
impending catastrophe. By sharing the knowledge and pure marvel at the complexity of life 
on Earth as the natural output of the 4-billion year evolutionary process and alarm over its 
human-induced degradation, they would get people and administrations on board. 
Therefore, notwithstanding the perhaps inadvertent elitism of the spokesperson-biologists - 
this dream of scientist-kings and their ruling crisis discipline – it is clear that they 
nevertheless regarded themselves as representatives of an emerging social/environmental 
movement (the ‘community of interest and concern’ heralded by conservation biology), 
whose rhetoric was directed towards both the general ‘populace’ as well as the 
‘politicians’11. 
 
If biodiversity is to be seen as an environmental movement, then its leaders, by deriving 
their discursive tactics from science and ethics, were simply copying the rhetoric of other 
environmental movements of the time of the late 1970s; and in the process perhaps 
downgrading the novelty and complexity of the biodiversity concept. However, the 
reinforced scientific uncertainty that stemmed from the irreducible complexity of 
biodiversity, ensured that such tactics backfired, as concrete and conclusive scientific 
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evidence in support of this movement failed to materialise in a format that was easily 
accessible to either the ‘populace’ or the ‘politicians’. By consequence, the predicted 
increase in awareness and media/public pressure did not materialise as well, despite the 
pronounced rise of biodiversity as a key environmental term in academic research. This 
lack of impact should not be attributed completely to the naivety of its proponents. This is 
a problem germane to all environmental politics, but was particularly accentuated by the 
ever-increasing complexity of biodiversity as a catch-all term for the web of life. 
 
As an environmental movement seeking to make inroads, in addition to its grounding in a 
primary role reserved for science, this programme of biodiversity also contained certain 
assumptions regarding the role of law and the state. In articulating their plan for the 
formation and intervention on a new biological and ecological reality, in targeting the 
‘populace and politicians’, biodiversity experts were seeking the logical companion to the 
authority of science, the legitimizing and enforcement mechanisms of state law; the power 
of science was seeking to join up the power of the state, identified as the primary law and 
policy-making institution. 
 
Following David Harvey in this argument12, this particular understanding of the law and the 
state illustrate that the concept of biodiversity emerged out of an era of liberal and state-led 
capitalism in the 1970s, associated with the advent and predominance of command-and-
control legislation in the environmental field. Despite being acknowledged as a period of 
crisis for liberalism, since various manifestations of the ‘left’ political spectrum still yielded 
considerable power in Europe and in the Democrat-controlled US Congress, strong 
regulatory reform (such as the Endangered Species Act 1973) that deepened state control 
                                               
12 As developed in David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Blackwell Publishers 1996); 
David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press 2005) 
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over the economy remained the preferred path13 . This ‘embedded liberalism’14 was the 
political economic system that sought the right balance between State and market to 
guarantee peace and stability, economic growth, and citizen welfare. Its two more well-
known versions were the American Keynesian state and the European welfare state, 
precisely the two loci of biodiversity’s emergence. It has been argued that, in the latter part 
of the 20th century, environmental protection had become an essential element of the 
definition of the state itself 15  and more specifically of this liberal rationality of rule, 
precipitating ‘a proliferation of environmental laws, regulations, constituencies and 
norms’16. 
DISDAIN OR DISMISSAL: THE EARLY LINK BETWEEN BIODIVERSITY AND 
ECONOMICS 
In this wider context of the predominance of the state as the source of authority for 
environmental action and of a hierarchical willingness to take authoritative environmental 
action, the politics of the emerging social movement of biodiversity by consequence 
prioritised a set of certain values (scientific, aesthetic and ethical) deemed essential for 
increasing public support for reform and for influencing the always elusive policy agenda 
formed at the level of the state. There was no demonstrable need to forge a closer 
relationship to economics as anything other than a subsidiary consideration once the 
ecological, ethical and political arguments were played out. As such, the biodiversity 
movement’s relation to economics veered from a somewhat curt treatment by academic 
scientists too immersed into the specifics of biological theory, to outright negativity, by the 
same scientists in their indignant guise as activists damning the environmental impacts of 
                                               
13 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism 12 
14 Ibid 9 
15 David John Frank, Ann Hironaka and Evan Schofer, ‘The Nation-State and the Natural Environment over 
the Twentieth Century’ (2000) 65 American Sociological Review 96 
16 James McCarthy and Scott Prudham, ‘Neoliberal Nature and the Nature of Neoliberalism’ (2004) 35 
Geoforum 275, 278 
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the specific economic system of Western liberal capitalism and lobbying for significant 
changes to prevent the coming catastrophe. 
 
When Soule and Wilcox succinctly dismissed economics in Conservation Biology17, they also 
neatly summarised the first approach to the role of economics as not ‘strictly included’. In 
the same study, when discussing the advantages of maintaining fewer and larger natural 
reserves as opposed to numerous small ones, the authors argued that ‘a serious and 
thorough analysis of management costs probably would demonstrate the long term advantages 
of large reserves’18, but no economic analysis was undertaken or findings presented. As 
already indicated in Chapter 2, the argument for increasing the size of nature reserves was 
based on ecological findings. This type of economic justification appeared simply outside, 
if not beneath, the remit of the mission to avert environmental disaster. 
 
There are also examples, predominantly from the pre-1986 Forum period, of a second 
approach to the potential link between the biological programme and economics, where 
outright negativity towards the whole economic system of Western liberal capitalism is 
expressed in quite strong terms. For example, Paul Ehrlich begins the last chapter19 of 
Conservation Biology with a moderately phrased call for change in the ‘economic systems’, but 
progressively builds up towards adapting Kenneth Boulding’s rather more radical critique 
of the ‘cowboy economic system’20 of the US and its ‘reckless, exploitative, romantic and 
violent behaviour’ in terms of energy use, but also from the demographic perspective of 
                                               
17 See the first paragraph of this chapter and note 2 above 
18 Emphasis added. Soule and Wilcox, Conservation Biology: An Evolutionary- Ecological Perspective 23 
19 Paul Ehrlich, ‘The Strategy of Conservation 1980-2000’ in Michael E. Soule and Bruce A. Wilcox (eds), 
Conservation Biology: An Evolutionary - Ecological Perspective (Sinauer Associates 1980) 329-44 
20 Kenneth E. Boulding, ‘The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth’ in Henry Jarrety (ed), Environmental 
Quality in a Growing Economy (The John Hopkins Press 1966) 9 
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population growth. In the same text, Ehrlich also does not hesitate at using terms, such as 
‘overdeveloped countries’21 that later vanished completely from his work. 
 
Another example of outright negativity towards the economic sphere as a whole can be 
found in David Ehrenfeld’s proto-biological conservation, where he identified the 
‘economics of perpetual expansion’ as a source of the problem of the ‘irreversible loss of 
diversity’ in nature22. Soule has criticised the ‘profane grail of sustainable development’ as 
the ‘odd delusion of having your cake and eating it too’23, even as late as 1995, after the link 
between conservation and sustainable utilisation of biodiversity had achieved the status of 
self-evident truth under the auspices of the CBD. 
 
In expressing such views, the proponents of biodiversity did not vary significantly from 
other environmental movements of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The anti-economic 
growth statements simply echo the concerns of the authors responsible for inspiring and 
establishing the modern environmental movement in the US, such as Leopold, Vogt, 
Commoner, Carson and others. In this way, biodiversity was also interpreted as an idea for 
political mobilization, lifted from the tactical handbook of the radical politics of the 
previous decade. When placed within the context of embedded liberalism outlined above, 
these statements verify not only the epistemological, but also the political and cultural 
lineage of biodiversity in the liberal democracies of the developed, capitalist states of the 
Western world. The impact of this descend, i.e. of biodiversity as a Western liberal project, 
is a theme that the thesis will return to when examining the globalization of the biodiversity 
concept. 
 
                                               
21 Ehrlich, ‘The Strategy of Conservation 1980-2000’ 335 
22 David Ehrenfeld, Biological Conservation (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1970) 207 
23 Michael E. Soule, ‘The Social Seige of Nature’ in Michael E. Soule and Gary Lease (eds), Reinventing Nature? 
Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction (Island Press 1995) 159 
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Under such conditions and lineage, the early positioning of biodiversity in relation to 
policy-making and the political and economic spheres more generally was sufficiently 
appropriate. The belief in state intervention directed the burgeoning movement towards 
the administrative mechanisms of the state. The market and commercial activity in general 
was ‘surrounded by a web of social and political constraints’24, so any emerging crisis-
discipline with aspirational and prescriptive agenda did not expect to engage with them 
constructively or adopt their rationalities. At most, it was expected to contest and refute the 
market’s presumed anti-environmentalist bias and arguments. At this early stage then, the 
biological programme of biodiversity appeared to adopt a fairly standard critique of 
economic systems based on ecological facts and environmentalist values. The very notion 
of the economic still remained outside, a form of ‘enemy at the gates’, to be tentatively 
allowed in once it proved that it was no longer dangerous for the environmentalist agenda. 
 
It can be concluded that these early politics of biodiversity overestimated the role of 
science and underestimated the role of economics in law and policy design. As a result, the 
biodiversity movement became naive in short order as the 1980s wore on. Conservation 
biologists were perfecting weapons (scientific truth, biological awareness, holistic ethic) for 
a righteous offensive on the state. Biodiversity, the lens through which biology viewed 
nature, was expected to yield substantive change not only in terms of the public perception 
of environmental problems, but also effective legal reform. A place in the policy agenda 
would be a legitimation of this novel programme, an entry into the rule of law of the liberal 
state. However, at the same time the very method for putting items on the policy agenda 
was changing. The movement was seeking to make inroads into an area already being 
abandoned; it was fighting a war using what amounted to obsolete weapons. 
                                               




By the time of the 1986 Biodiversity Forum, conditions had changed. By the early 80s, the 
‘embedded liberalism’ that the biological programme and biodiversity movement referred 
to had disappeared. A different and far-reaching strategic programme - neoliberalism - was 
successfully testing and imposing its own objectives by attacking the state through the 
rationality of the free market. Neoliberalism views the market as a ‘constitutive component 
of the human condition’26; no longer ‘an institution which must be regulated by social 
forces, but on the contrary which should be used to regulate society as a whole’27 . It 
proposes that ‘economic rationality then can be used to analyse all, or nearly all, aspects of 
human behaviour and provide guidelines for policy’28. Foucault notes that: 
 
The generalisation of the economic form of the market beyond monetary 
exchanges functions in American neoliberalism as a principle of intelligibility and a 
principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual behaviour. This 
means that analysis in terms of the market economy or, in other words, of supply 
and demand, can function as a schema which is applicable to non-economic 
domains.29 
 
                                               
25 The following section represents a short overview of certain themes within neoliberalism as they pertain to 
the history of biodiversity. For a detailed history see Taylor C. Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse, ‘Neoliberalism: 
From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan’ (2009) 44 Studies in Comparative International 
Development 137 
26 Gertrand Berthoud, ‘Market’ in Wolfgang Sachs (ed), The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power 
(Zed books 1991) 74 
27 Ibid 70 
28 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society 72 
29 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979 (Michel Senellar and others 
eds, Graham Burchell tr, Palgrave MacMillan 2008) 243 
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This mode of analysis in terms of the market economy is further supported by an emotive 
appeal to freedom30  and the belief that human welfare can be best advanced through 
securing individual freedom, perceived and guaranteed largely in the form of an 
entrepreneurial freedom for an individual to better him or herself within the market31. As 
Karl Polanyi had already warned decades before, when freedom is equated with nothing 
more than free enterprise and private property, ‘planning and control are attacked as a 
denial of freedom’32. This omnipresent ‘use of neoliberal analyses’ is described more clearly 
again by Foucault: 
 
‘The economic grid will or should make it possible to test governmental action, 
gauge its validity and to object to activities of the public authorities on the grounds 
of their abuses, excesses, futility, and wasteful expenditure [...] It involves 
scrutinizing every action of the authorities in terms of the game of supply and 
demand, in terms of efficiency with regard to the particular elements of this game, 
and in terms of the cost of intervention by the public authorities in the field of the 
market’33. 
 
Therefore, neoliberalism did not simply constitute a different policy framework, but a 
complete new iteration of the liberal ‘art of government’. Mitchell Dean stresses that it 
should be approached, as with all forms of liberalism, ‘as a principle and method for the 
rationalization of the exercise of government – a rationalization which obeys, and this is its 
specificity, the internal rule of the maximal economy’34, i.e. efficiency. 
 
                                               
30 Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas S. Rose, Foucault and Political Reason : Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism 
and Rationalities of Government (Routledge 1996); Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought 
(Cambridge University Press 1999) 
31 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism 
32 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (GowerBeacon Press 1954) 
33 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979 246 
34 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society 73-4 
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The advent of the economic grid of neoliberalism precipitated a wide-ranging 
transformation of state and society in the West, initially as a direct response to the crisis of 
embedded liberalism and Keynesian welfare state in the late 60s and early 70s. The new 
market economy and rationality mandated that the ‘social good can be maximised by 
maximising the frequency and reach of market transactions’35. The ensuing deregulation, 
privatisation and liberalisation, especially of financial markets, produced a ‘burst in activity’ 
recognised as the beginning of globalisation36. The objective of creating markets for the 
expanding production of capital was fuelled by the increase in global links facilitated by 
new technologies. 
 
Expanding rapidly on a global scale, this intensification of economic and market 
rationalities began to posit a utopian future global society consisting solely of a self-
regulating matrix of markets and a collection of free entrepreneurs – nothing more than 
individual expressions of competitive conduct - with the state in a limited role as the 
guarantor of property, certain rights and the unimpeded operation of these markets. This 
extension of neoliberalism into a political project for reforming the global economic system 
– known as the Washington consensus37 - had to confront the concerns, targets and goals 
of the on-going project of international development. Harvey argues that all Keynesian 
influences were ‘purged’ from international institutions, such as the IMF and the World 
Bank, responsible for guiding the global economy by 1982; thus the roadmap for the 
adoption of neoliberal policies, for both the North and the South, was set. This roadmap 
included the forced and -often violent in the South- institution of privatisation and 
                                               
35 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism 3 
36 Ibid 32-3 
37 The Washington Consensus and in particular the role of the World Bank is further discussed in Chapter 4 
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deregulation was legitimised by the neoliberal ethic of personal freedom, as phrased by 
members of the Mont Pelerin society38. 
 
This completed the transformation of the market from a restricted space (marketplace) on 
the edge of society, to a separate sphere of social activity, and eventually to a self-evident 
and core aspect of human society and the human condition 39 ; in Foucault’s words, a 
principle of both intelligibility and decipherment. The elevation of the market as the 
singular locus of human activity brings about an increase in the importance of the contract 
as the primary method for human interaction and welfare creation. The legal contract 
between two free-thinking and profit-maximising individuals, two economic subjects, 
becomes an ideal symbol of the centrality of the economic grid in every aspect of human 
life. 
 
Turning back to biodiversity as an environment/social movement in light of this short 
overview of some key shifts of neoliberalism, one can deduce that the initial biological 
programme was geared towards affecting the ‘social and moral economy that was fostered 
through the activities of the interventionist state’40, but, during the attempt to achieve that 
goal, that very economy was being replaced. The extension of the market rationality and 
the scrutiny of the economic grid to all aspects of government and daily social life, ‘the 
financialisation of everything’,41 established economic efficiency, profit maximisation, cost 
minimization and the protection of private property as central considerations of policy 
design. 
 
                                               
38Group responsible for developing the doctrine of neoliberalism as response to problems in international 
capitalism, see Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism 19-26 
39 Karin Knorr Cetina, ‘The Market’ (2006) 23 Theory, Culture & Society 551 
40 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism 11 
41 Ibid 33 
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This was not a unique obstacle for biodiversity. All forms of environmentalism had to 
adjust to changing political economic landscape and the new conditions in the way law and 
policy reform was proposed, evaluated and instituted. The statist tendencies of mainstream 
liberal environmental politics of the time would be hard pressed to adjust to the harsh 
realities of a new ‘financialised’, individualist and managerialist world of global deregulated 
markets. The perception of the economic as a largely separate sphere of action, to be 
engaged with but essential maintained at distance from environmental research and action 
was at odds with this ‘financialisation of everything’. The target of influencing public 
opinion on environmental issues as a mechanism for exerting more pressure on the state 
was missing the mark. While regarded from within the environmentalist ranks as the 
primary institution for environmental protection through the adoption of coercive laws, the 
role of the state had become increasingly secondary, in conjunction with an across the 
board reduction in its capacity to intervene in the economy. 
 
In this changing political economic climate, the advocates of biodiversity had to fully 
contend with the market, an institution that they had slightly pushed aside in those early 
efforts. In order for biodiversity to remain relevant as a movement and continue to 
influence environmental law and policy, the market and not the state would have to be the 
locus of a new battle. Unrealised by its early advocates within conservation biology, 
biodiversity in particular, compared to other environmental problematisations, was 
however uniquely placed to adjust and benefit from this shift in economic thought. The 
reductionist view instituted by sociobiology42 contained a number of elements that would 
ease the transition. For example, the techno-scientific ‘atomistic-machine view’ of the 
world consisting only of genetically-determined individuals with no properties assigned to 
the whole is compatible with the competitive individualism required for the utopia of the 
                                               
42 See Chapter 2 
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free profit-maximising individuals. In order to fully explore the connection between 
biodiversity and economics however, the history of biodiversity will have to venture into 
the Darwinian, evolutionary origins of the biological theories that spawned biodiversity in 
the first place. 
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN DARWIN AND MALTHUS: NATURE’S ECONOMY 
In this section, it is argued that the same Darwinian schema that underpins sociobiological 
thought also provided solutions to the difficult encounter of biodiversity with 
neoliberalism. This argument is based on Donald Worster’s historical hypothesis that 
Darwin’s reading of Malthus Essay on the Principle of Population43 was crucial for both the 
development of Darwin’s theory of evolution, as well as for the general idea of an 
‘economy of nature’ within ecological thought44. By positing the existence of an economy 
of nature, a certain economic understanding would be able to complement the original 
biological programme. 
 
Malthus’ well-recited predictions regarding the imbalance between the pace of human 
population growth and the availability of natural resources, and in particular food supply, 
added a rudimentary pre-ecological twist to political economy. Complete with alarming 
predictions of catastrophe, this concern articulated a form of pre-modern, inverse social 
ecology that combined social and resource problematisations from an obviously 
anthropocentric perspective. It was a sort of inverse proto-social ecology because Malthus’ 
political economy did not represent a critique of the Industrial Revolution or its associated 
economic liberalism and laissez-faire attitudes, despite the ‘dismal ratio’ of population and 
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food supply. In line with Adam Smith and others, Malthus still spread the ‘gospel of 
progress’45, naturalising the modes of a social organisation of that era, but urging caution 
regarding certain specific resource issues of the inevitable march towards progress. This 
march itself was a necessary and self-evident eventuality, with only minor adjustments to its 
direction being considered. 
 
Malthusian arguments are inflexible due to being based on abstract constants, such as 
fertility as a fixed ‘mechanical’ function of organisms unaffected by the surrounding 
environment or the scarcity as a fixed characteristic of natural resources. When all other 
variables remain fixed with the exception of the human population then conflict over 
scarce resources is inevitable. According to Worster, it is in this Malthusian conflict-
determined image of 19th century British, laissez-faire, industrial society that Darwin found 
an economic-ecological analogy to assist his own emerging understanding of his theory of 
evolution. This proposed connection between Darwinian biology and Malthusian political 
economy presents them as mutually reinforcing forms of thought addressing the complex 
relationship between nature and society. They both recognise competition between 
individuals (whether persons or genes) as the truth to be found and verified in nature46. 
This competition is fostered by the scarcity of resources, the ‘currency’ of the natural 
economy. 
 
Donald Worster outlines four propositions of this Darwinian natural economy47: (i) nature 
is a complex web of relations, which means that the survival of individual organisms is 
determined by its interactions within that web (ecological interdependence), (ii) based on 
the idea of constantly scarce natural resources, nature is also a closed system of 
                                               
45 Ibid 150 
46 Ibid 291-3 
47 Ibid 156-61 
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‘places’/niches (conceived abstractly by the biologist observing) occupied by organisms 
that have evolved to adapt to the conditions of these places, (iii) there is a constant struggle 
to seize these limited places in the economy of nature and with this competition the overall 
natural system achieves better overall efficiency, and finally (iv) evolution proceeds 
essentially by ecological replacement, when a new genetic variation in an organism enables 
it to conquer a new niche for itself within the economy. After the fact, this can be seen as 
representing one of the first bioeconomic models of nature, and which has at times been 
employed to justify the essential competitive individualism of all organisms. 
 
This natural economy mirrors ideas of struggle, competition and conquest that dominated 
the Victorian society of Darwin’s and Malthus’ time 48 . Darwin observed in nature 
behaviours and functions very similar to what Malthus observed in a human society. 
However, Malthus’ societal view concerned only a specific type of Anglo-American, 
18th/19th century, laissez faire society. It was based on what he was witnessing around him 
in the British Isles. The mutual reinforcing of the two views, highlighted and heightened to 
extremes by sociobiology, by default justified the specific rationality of governing present in 
that specific period; a naturalization of society through the ‘socialization’ of nature. When 
neoliberalism brought these competitive and individualist ideals back to the surface, the 
discourse of biodiversity could adapt by resurrecting this circular self-validating regime of 
truth while adding a more updated and modern ecological twist. This twist was provided by 
way of the overpopulation thesis. 
II| NEO-MALTHUSIAN DEMOGRAPHY: INVENTING THE POPULATION 
PATHOGEN 
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This interconnected theoretical descent enabled the field of neo-Malthusian demography to 
become the second (after sociobiology) controversial school of thought to be attached to 
the invention of biodiversity, through one of its most prominent members, Paul Ehrlich. In 
cooperation with sociobiology, this form of demography completed the strategic 
realignment of biodiversity for its encounter with neoliberalism. This was achieved by 
building on the commonalities between biological theory and political economic theory 
indicated in the previous section and in particular the idea of a natural economy. In general 
terms, due to the Malthusian influences, the issues of resource scarcity and ‘runaway’ 
population growth came to dominate the type of economic thought that was infused into 
the biological programme of biodiversity. This form of economic thought brought 
significant shifts in focus, towards the South and the pathology of its expanding human 
population.  
 
Malthus’ predictions of impending social, political and economic catastrophe due to 
escalating conflicts over food resources of course never came to pass, at least to their 
predicted extent, and certainly not in the rich states of the North as originally envisaged in 
his predictions. The failure of these predictions was attributed to a ‘variety of unforeseen 
circumstances’49, such as the full exploitation of North American and other colonial natural 
resources and the rate of technological innovation, not factored in by Malthus. Especially 
in the field of food production, constantly improving industrial agricultural techniques kept 
the spectre of famine away in the states of the North. An example of the former argument 
can be found in Vogt’s Road to Survival50, where the author argued that the full exploitation 
of the natural resources of the ‘New World’ delayed the materialisation of the Malthusian 
predictions. Frank Furedi graphically argues that Vogt’s claim was that these predictions 
                                               
49 For an overview of the ‘various unforeseen circumstances’ used to rationalise the persistence of Malthusian 
theories see Frank Furedi, Population and Development : A Critical Introduction (Polity Press 1997) 147 
50 William Vogt, Road to survival (Gollancz 1949) 
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were in fact ‘buried beneath the bounty from the New World cornucopia’51. Vogt’s early, 
but influential, text urged ‘mankind’ to come ‘face to face with a serious depletion of 
resource capital’ 52 . It expanded the Malthusian focus on food supply towards a more 
general notion of linking human population growth with the limits of the fixed and scarce 
natural resource base required to support it. Vogt cautioned against the pursuit of 
economic growth at all costs, reminding the reader that ‘our real wealth is drawn from 
earth, in always limited quantities’53. 
 
As precursor to modern environmentalism, Vogt thus maintained the Malthusian line of 
thinking, but updated its population problematisation through an environmental critique of 
certain aspects of the capitalist economy and mode of social organisation, such as the 
overexploitation of natural resources. Road to Survival is an important blueprint because 
initial traces of the conception of population as a pathogen can be observed, most vividly 
in Vogt’s criticism of America’s becoming a ‘self-cannibal’54 that overexploits the natural 
resources of its lands. 
THE OVERPOPULATION DEBATE: EMULATING SOCIOBIOLOGY’S TACTICAL 
ATTACHMENT 
Vogt’s work is reviewed here as the crucial early step towards the direction of 
problematising the link between human population and natural resources, subsequently 
picked up, reworked and given centre stage by Paul Ehrlich as the ‘too many people’ thesis 
in the 60s55. While nominally on the same path, Ehrlich’s Malthusian logic would come to 
diverge greatly from Vogt’s work. By 1972, Ehrlich had laid claim to capturing the ‘essence 
of the predicament’ in terms of the coming environmental crisis, by once more stretching 
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53 Preface in ibid 
54 Ibid 112 
55 Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (Pan Books 1971) 
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the Darwinian/Malthusian struggle of all against all into a narrative of global conflict driven 
by overwhelming necessities and pressures from an ever-expanding human population 
threatening to engulf the whole planet. On one side of this global arena, in the South:  
 
‘hundreds of millions have lived constantly, often consciously, almost always 
helplessly on the brink of famine and epidemic disease, awaiting only some modest 
quirk of an environment already stretched taut –an earthquake, a flood, a drought – 
to push them over that edge’56. 
 
On the other side, in the North  
 
‘the prosperity of the developed countries -awesome by comparison with the 
poverty of the less developed countries- has been built on the exploitation of the 
richest soils, the most accessible fossil fuels, and the most concentrated mineral 
deposits of the entire globe – a one-time windfall’57. 
 
The implied argument here was that if those in the South attempt to follow down the same 
route as the North, they ‘will find the bridges burned ahead of them’58. While Vogt had 
taken Malthusian logic away from the limited focus on food supply, Ehrlich made further 
alterations by taking Malthus squarely into the 20th century’s global arena of development 
politics59. 
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In similar fashion to the sociobiology agenda however, the political and social prescriptions 
derived from this scientific formation, such as the ‘limits to growth’ argument of the 
1970s60 or policies of population control, were to prove highly controversial61. Despite their 
environmental credentials, these proposals were outlining a grim future for Southern states, 
creating factions within a previously more homogenised environmental movement. For 
example, Barry Commoner accused one of the main proponents of population control, 
Garrett Hardin, of barbarism 62 . Ehrlich’s support of Hardin inevitably led to further 
disagreements63. Commoner went on to predict and pre-emptively criticise, already in 1972, 
the coming reductionism of a staunchly Darwinian and Malthusian biological 
environmentalism: ‘[the environmental crisis] is not the product of man’s biological 
capabilities, which could not change in time to save us, but of his social actions-which are 
subject to much more rapid change’64. It can be plausibly argued that a whole different 
form of environmental thought known as social ecology was introduced for the purpose of 
counteracting to these population problematisations and economic rationalisations. 
 
Faced with this difficulty, Ehrlich and the field of demography emulated Wilson and 
sociobiology in the attempt to gain added legitimacy through biodiversity65. Once more the 
discourse of biodiversity became the node of connection between two contrasting trends: 
the rising popularity of environmental concerns and the declining relevance of Malthusian 
predictions. In similar fashion to sociobiology, the involvement with biodiversity allowed 
the field of neo-Malthusian population studies to maintain its relevancy in a new global 
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arena of environmental crisis. In exchange, this particular school of demography contrived 
to imprint on biodiversity a fear of a global arena where the phenomenon of ‘runaway 
human population growth’66 brings into being ballooning human populations threatening 
to unravel and overwhelm the balanced system and the harmony of nature. 
A NEW PATHOLOGY: THE STRATEGIC PROBLEMATISATION OF THE SOUTH 
The neo-Malthusian reformulation of the population problem on a global scale placed at 
the core of the wider biodiversity problematisation initiated by sociobiology a global 
pathology consisting of helpless Southerners and gluttonous Northerners fighting over 
dwindling resources, in similar fashion to individuals competing over niches in the 
economy of nature. The ecological crisis of the planet was thought to be aggravated by the 
presence of the alarming phenomenon of ‘overpopulation’, defined by the two fixed 
constants of economic scarcity and ecological finite ‘carrying capacity’ 67  of natural 
resources. 
 
This perception of the environment being endangered and unbalanced by the spreading 
pathogen of overpopulation was crucial for the full entry of economic thought in the 
biological programme of biodiversity. Ehrlich’s contribution to BioDiversity was a major 
chapter on the causes and consequences of biodiversity loss 68 . In that chapter, he 
proceeded to call for a focus on ‘more obscure and (to most people) unpleasant truths’69. 
The most important of those truths was that: 
 
                                               
66 Ehrlich, ‘The Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences ’ 
67 Hardin 204 Also Brown and Kane, Full House : Reassessing the Earth's Population Carrying Capacity 
68 Ehrlich, ‘The Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences ’.The arguments were first articulated in Ehrlich 
and Ehrlich, Extinction: The Causes and Consequences of The Disappearance of Species , then subsequently extended to 
the broader context of biodiversity. 
69 Ehrlich, ‘The Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences ’ 
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‘The primary cause of the decay of organic diversity is not direct human 
exploitation or malevolence, but the expansion of human populations and human 
activities’70. 
 
This statement turned the population-as-pathogen argument into a foundational 
perspective for understanding the global aspect of biodiversity. Ehrlich confirmed his 
theoretical endorsement of biodiversity by decrying the excessive focus on single 
environmental issues - such as pollution, waste and the protection of endangered species - 
and by adopting the holistic/integrative approach initially put forward by conservation 
biology and seconded by sociobiology. He then absolved overexploitation from any role in 
the phenomenon of biodiversity loss he was urging action against. 
 
Fifteen years earlier, the conclusion from the same author, derived from employing similar 
neo-Malthusian arguments, had been remarkably different and more controversial: 
 
‘The cornerstone of a rational programme should be a great reduction in the 
growth of throughput of energy and materials in the rich countries’71. 
 
It is easy to observe that the second time around (i.e. in his BioDiversity chapter) the 
prescribed reduction is aimed more abstractly towards human ‘population and activities’, 
rather than resource consumption in the North. The loss of biodiversity is thus attributed 
by Ehrlich to the loss of natural habitat, which is in turn an inevitable consequence of the 
expanding human population, ostensibly without focus on either the North or South.  
However, ‘uncontrolled’ human encroachment on the environment through population 
growth conjures images of the sprawling metropolises of the South, complete with images 
                                               
70 Ibid 
71 Ehrlich, Ehrlich and Holdren, Ecoscience: Population, Resources, Environment 956 
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of favelas, illegal logging, rising pollution and waste. In line with the rainforest and tropics 
focus of the rest of volume, this retreat of natural habitats due to the encroaching pressure 
of human population in practice is understood to occur predominantly in the poorer parts 
of the South, where the majority of ‘unspoiled’ and ‘undeveloped’ land, including the last 
areas of high biodiversity, still remain. By further universalising claims regarding the impact 
of population on the environment, the focus of biological lens of biodiversity turned firmly 
towards the South. In short, after Ehrlich biodiversity loss was now thought to be caused 
by the over-population of the South, not over-consumption of the North. 
 
The obvious tactical manoeuvring of the author is of far less importance than the impact of 
these arguments in terms of the widening of biodiversity as a global problematization. They 
clearly constituted an attempt to arrest the exclusion of the economic sphere by 
incorporating a neo-Malthusian strand of political economy into the biological programme. 
As a new path for interacting with the economic grid, it introduced a form of economic 
analysis that uncovered a significant pathology of the South, caused by the pathogen of 
overpopulation ruining the delicate ecological balance of ecosystems. 
 
By putting forward the overpopulated South as the primary locus of biodiversity loss, 
Ehrlich’s demography became politically relevant again through its association with 
biodiversity. The overpopulation thesis no longer remained a controversial sub-field of 
demography, but assumed the status of a constituent element of the pertinent and urgent 
problematisation of biodiversity. Aside from these obvious academic benefits for the 
particular sub-field of demography, this problematisation of the South had a number of 
strategic advantages for the discourse of biodiversity struggling to be heard during the 
neoliberal decade of the 1980s. In exchange for this ‘act of salvage’, the discourse of 
biodiversity ‘received’ a solution for engaging with both globalization and neoliberalism, 
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which was to recalibrate the object to be governed under the programme of biodiversity 
towards a greater emphasis on the problems of the South - rather than the conservation 
practices or consumption options of the North. 
III | AT THE CROSSROADS OF DARWINIAN BIOLOGY AND 
MALTHUSIAN ECONOMICS 
By obscuring questions of exploitation and distribution, as evidenced in clear terms by the 
difference in the two Ehrlich quotes above, the historical conditions for the concentration 
of both environmental degradation and widespread poverty in the South are consistently 
underplayed. Going forward, ‘everyone becomes equally responsible for the degradation of 
the environment’72. What had started out with Darwin’s alienation with the competitive 
atmosphere of Victorian London 73  was now a truly global pathology, a new grave 
environment threat in its own right. In a brutal, morally and politically abhorrent re-
envisioning of the Night of the Living Dead, when the poverty-stricken masses of the South 
expand and progressively use up the surrounding ecosystems simply to sustain their 
existence, they will not simply be harming their own local environment, but their behaviour 
will actually threaten the entirety of human existence74; a shuffling sea of humanity draining 
the last reserves of biodiversity, destroying everything in its wake. 
 
Secondly, the biodiversity problematisation arguably became part of an environmentalism 
that invokes scarcity without regard to equity75. By eradicating environmentalism’s strongly-
worded criticisms of fundamental tenets of liberal capitalism, by absolving terms such as 
production, use, exploitation or utilisation of their 'dirty past', by focusing on the problems 
                                               
72 Furedi 
73 Worster 
74 Christa Wichterich, ‘From the Struggle Against "Overpopulation" to the Industrialization of Human 
Production’ (1988) 1 Reproductive and Genetic Engineering 21 
75 Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference 
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of the South, and by finally exiting the confines of North American-centric conservation 
concerns, the concept of biodiversity would be able to test its authority not only within the 
environmental policy agenda, but would also become part of the emerging of the time 
Washington consensus and the global realignment towards neoliberalism. The South was 
identified with the pathological state, while the North assumed the status of normality. The 
stage was appropriately set for another trajectory to join the ‘river’ of biodiversity. In order 
to survive the neoliberal decade, the discourse of biodiversity became an amalgam of 
sociobiology, neo-Malthusian demography and development economics, the companion 
piece to sustainable development76. 
 
It is doubtful whether the CBD, or any other multilateral, North-South agreement on 
biodiversity, would have materialized without this subtle refocusing of the biological lens 
towards the South. The understanding of non-American environmental issues and 
concerns in the early years of the biological programme was at the very least incomplete, if 
not downright offensive. For example, Conservation Biology includes a chapter on ‘African 
wildlife resources’ that consists of a patronising and near-colonial portrait of the 
continent’s interaction with its environment complete with a pastoralist view of its 
inhabitants. In place of this early naivety, the South was identified as the flashpoint of a 
global biodiversity crisis, while the differentiated historical responsibilities of the North and 
the South were condensed into a thick haze of abstract, de-politicised and collective 
responsibility77. 
 
Following the same line of reasoning, it was accepted at the other end, i.e. in the South, 
that the keys to both environmental destruction and salvation were no longer held by 
Northern states. Even if this acceptance glossed over issues of historical responsibility, it 
                                               
76 The role of sustainable development is examined further in Chapter 4 
77 In legal terms, the ‘common concern’ of the CBD’s preamble. See Chapter 1 
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nevertheless created an opportunity for negotiation, always a positive outcome in a 
neoliberal political economic climate. Ehrlich’s contribution therefore provided the basis 
for an international negotiation divided across North-South lines, as well as leverage for 
both sides at the negotiating table. In line with the neoliberal paradigm, the CBD itself 
would ultimately be conceived as a market transaction: ‘the Convention can be interpreted 
broadly as an instrument to promote the equitable exchange, on mutually agreed terms, of 
access to genetic resources and associated knowledge for finance, technology and 
participation in research’78. 
 
The chapter has suggested that, once the naivety and deficiencies of the initial biological 
programme were exposed and addressed, the interplay of biology and economics within the 
concept of biodiversity could be described in fairly simple terms: the underlying biology is 
distinctly Darwinian, while its economics are distinctly Malthusian. The consequences of 
this division of labour remain present throughout the conceptual edifice of biodiversity, as 
well as its governance arrangements, and will be examined throughout the rest of the thesis. 
Some introductory observations are outlined below in order to conclude the chapter. 
 
In relation to biology, Foucault notes that ‘it proved impossible to make up a science of the 
living being without having taken into account, as essential to its object, the possibility of 
disease, death, monstrosity, anomaly, error’79. The early argument for studying, measuring, 
analysing and protecting biodiversity was precisely motivated by an observed pathology of 
environmental loss, i.e. the concept of biodiversity was organised around what was being 
extinct, lost, degraded and destroyed. After neo-Malthusian demography and neoliberal 
economics, the resultant adjustments altered the base pathology of the concept. It was no 
longer linked narrowly to the decline of biodiversity or environmental degradation in 
                                               
78 UNEP/CBD/COP/3/Inf. 53 (1996). See chapter on access and benefit sharing. 
79 Foucault, ‘Introduction ’ 17 
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general, but for the first time directly to human conduct, not necessarily linked to the 
environment (e.g. resource exploitation), but in the general shape of the political economy 
of Southern states, their problematic individual and collective subjectivities as members of 
the emerging globalised socionatural world. The question of conservation practices and 
nature reserves had become a question of human conduct and the development problems 
of the South. This alteration in base pathology has created a subtle obfuscation; a binaural 
recording masquerading as stereo. Action is urged and proposals are being formed, while it 
remains unclear to which pathology they refer to. Are they arguments in respect to nature 
backed by the authority of ecological science, or actually prescriptive arguments about 
society, backed by the authority of economics? The line between the two has become so 
inveigled as to be impossible to discern. 
 
More specifically in terms of economics, the shift in biodiversity towards a positive view of 
economics was inevitable for a programme wanting to test itself in the area of law and 
policy during the rise of neoliberalism. This can be easily observed even in the simple 
change of subtitle between the first and second editions of Conservation Biology. The 1980 
edition attaches ‘an evolutionary-ecological perspective’ to its title, stressing the emerging 
field’s origins in Darwinian evolutionary biology and its novel extension into more directly 
environmental issues. The subsequent 1986 edition instead chooses ‘the science of scarcity 
and diversity’, signalling the shifts outlined in this chapter were already underway. The well-
publicised 1986 Forum on BioDiversity thus appears as an event that played the role of a 
stepladder, allowing old and –at that time nearly discredited- disciplines of sociobiology and 
neo-Malthusian demography, along with their often dismissed controversial tools, 
hypotheses and objects of analysis, as well as the resultant political and ethical 




THE POLITICAL QUESTION OF 
BIODIVERSITY: UNPACKING THE RESPONSES 
FROM NORTH AND SOUTH 
 
 
‘You see these buildings breaking apart and coming 
down? He looked at me. You don’t think this is 
what we’re supposed to see when we look at these 
buildings? He wanted nothing to do with this idea. 
You don’t think it’s a new way of seeing?’1 
 
 
The widening of the problematization of biodiversity was in full flow once the concept was 
recognized as presenting the pathology of the South to be governed in the name of 
biodiversity. This new problematization involved primarily an engagement with the full 
effects of biodiversity as a political question, i.e. as a question of power and global 
governance and not strictly an environmental or conservation issue. The thesis understands 
this wider problematization of biodiversity as consisting of two interlinked parts. The first 
part refers to identifying the new multiple goals to be sought in governing this pathology. 
The second part concerns instituting (and choosing between) laws, processes, mechanisms 
and techniques for realizing these goals. The rest of the thesis is focused on these 
interlinked parts of the problematization of biodiversity. 
 
These strategic formulations of goals and processes took place within the broader 
framework of sustainable development, understood here as a grand rhetoric of the future 
that constituted the environmentalist response to the challenge of neoliberalism2. Under 
sustainable development’s guidance, the globalisation of biodiversity confirmed the 
                                               
1 Don DeDillo, Underworld 
2 For an excellent examination of sustainable development see Alexander Gillespie, The Illusion of Progress: 
Unsustainable Development in International Law and Policy (Earthscan 2001) 
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permanent retreat from the notion of biodiversity representing a novel conservation 
mentality, and towards the multi-faceted integration of forms of thought, conducts and 
rationalities into a broader complex for governing specifically tailored for conditions in the 
South. 
 
The initial formulation of this biodiversity-based rationality of government proceeded 
down the hierarchical, ‘top-down’ paths of the CBD negotiations. For this reason, it is 
important to first address in more detail the process of biodiversity’s formal entry into 
international environmental law. However, more detours and breaks, in the shape of 
alternative Southern imaginings of biodiversity, have also contributed to the biodiversity 
problematization, mostly by resisting the dominant conceptions of biodiversity discussed in 
the previous chapters. So far, the preceding historical survey has placed the invention of 
biodiversity amongst the practical concerns of conservation biology, the ethical holism and 
genetic reductionism of sociobiology and the abstracted global prescriptions of neo-
Malthusian demography. In order to complete the historical picture of this concept’s 
becoming, this chapter argues that an additional series of struggles and transformations 
occurred with the migration of the concept to the global level, at the crossroads of 
sustainable development and international law. 
I | CBD NEGOTIATIONS: NEW ACTORS AND TRAJECTORIES 
The details of the CBD negotiations represent important points in charting the link 
between biodiversity and sustainable development. Most analyses have described the 
negotiations through the analytical unit of the state3, poring over the reports, opinions, 
submissions and exchanges of this abstracted game of international quid pro quo, 
compartmentalized according to the simplistic rubric of a North-South divide. This 
                                               
3 As examined in Chapter 1 
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prolonged preoccupation with the rhetorical flourishes, the personal posturing and the 
variously coloured rooms of international meetings where deals are concluded actually 
serves to completely depoliticise the issues and disputes at hand, distancing policy from 
practice. Drawing a sovereign veil of state-derived legitimacy over abstract hierarchical 
bargains, in order to place them within a linear historical continuum of the ‘law of 
biodiversity,’ serves the purpose of comfortable legal closure, but ignores the history, 
complexity and malleability of the concept of biodiversity. The following analysis focuses 
on exceptions and incongruities, seeking to add a ‘micro level’ by unpacking the North and 
South ‘camps’ that supposedly fought over the wording of the text and the bargain of the 
CBD. In addition to states, the addition of new nonstate actors, vocabularies and 
discourses produced further conflicts regarding the meaning and use of the concept, as well 
as the resources themselves. 
 
Therefore, this chapter argues that the global politics of biodiversity are not solely a politics 
of state compromise and quid pro quo bargaining. The signing of the CBD is not only a 
testament to the achievement of a balanced consensus bridging a North-South divide on 
the environmental issue of biodiversity. Under an international relations perspective, this 
divide would consist of a host of assumptions regarding the two blocs of the North and the 
South that have achieved almost mythical status, especially within UN discourse. As already 
discussed, the rampant homogenisation required for the operation of this binary 
systematisation leads to analyses of the CBD that concentrate exclusively at the macro level 
of states and/or groups of states4. This choice in analytical targets can yield obsessively 
detailed mappings – by way of official declarations, statements and opinions - of an 
                                               
4 This is characteristic of the doctrinal approach to international law, for example in Boyle; Bodansky, 
‘International Law and the Protection of Biological Diversity’; Tinker, ‘Responsibility for Biological Diversity: 
Conservation under International Law’but is also prevalent in regulation approaches such as in Timothy 
Swanson, ‘The Reliance of Northern Economies on Southern Biodiversity: Biodiversity as Information’ 
(1996) 17 Ecological Economics 1; Timothy Swanson, ‘Conserving Global Biological Diversity by 
Encouraging Alternative Development Paths: Can Development Co-exist with Diversity?’ (1999) Biodiversity 
and Conservation 29 
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elaborately great game played by states. Like the Dogs Playing Poker series of paintings, a 
series of poker rounds are depicted with states - in the place of dogs - as 
anthropomorphized persons exhibiting certain behaviours condensed in the image of their 
leaders. 
 
Specifically on biodiversity, Jayakumar Nayar and David Ong note that this macro-level 
explanation becomes a simplistic presentation of a ‘politically and economically motivated 
tug-of-war between developed and developing countries’ over biological resources 5 , 
explained at the geopolitical level. The main question of control over resources is always 
tracked to the ‘political and economic jockeying of states per se’6. The following history 
aims to deface the detailed map and destabilize the existing accounts of the legal origins of 
the CBD. The movement towards the CBD was not a rational progress towards a common 
goal by state actors, but a series of stabs in the dark, attempts by various state and nonstate 
actors at defining the form and content of a biodiversity treaty; sudden lunges towards 
establishing goals and ends that suited this new pathology of the South. 
DISJOINTED BEGINNINGS: BIODIVERSITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AT 
UNEP 1987-1989 
The event that formally initiated the transition of biodiversity from a North-centric 
problematisation to an issue for global governance was the 14th Session of UNEP’s 
Governing Council, held in Nairobi in June 1987. Among the stream of decisions that 
constitute the regular output of any similar session in a UN agency, there was the brief, 
one-page Decision 14/26 on ‘the rationalization of international conventions on biological 
diversity’, which mandated the investigation, by an expert working group, of ‘the 
                                               
5 R. Jayakumar Nayar and David Mohan Ong, ‘Developing Countries, 'Development' and the Conservation 
of Biological Diversity’ in Catherine Redgwell and Michael Bowman (eds), International Law and the Conservation 




desirability and possible form of an umbrella convention to rationalise current activities in 
this field; and to address other areas which might fall under such a convention’7. The 
practice to be rationalised was still nature conservation in general; the goal of the mandate 
appeared to refer to the rationalization of all existing environmental treaties under a single 
roof, following from the original aim of the unification of ecological concerns and 
conservation traditions by conservation biology. The initial proposal for negotiating what is 
known as an umbrella or framework treaty was formulated mainly by the US delegation8. 
It’s clear from the preceding chapters that this was the state where the biological 
programme of biodiversity had made the most significant inroads. Most self-appointed 
biodiversity experts were American or worked at US universities. This UNEP decision 
represents concrete evidence that this community of interest and concern had been 
successful to some degree in seeking a legal and institutional structure to cement existing 
progress and propel the movement forward. 
 
This low-key entry into the world of international treaties and global environmental politics 
is notable for being further overshadowed by another call for action for which most 
delegates had predominantly gathered at Nairobi9. This call was the Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development10, which systematised and ushered in the 
idea of sustainable development. This report was endorsed by UNEP at the same session 
with some changes in language, but the main argument kept intact 11 . The Brundtland 
Report did indirectly address many of the concerns recognised within biodiversity 
discourse (conservation as negative activity, the rise of neoliberalism, the pathology of the 
South etc.), but accomplished this by building on the pre-existing WCS idea of ‘living 
                                               
7 UNEP/GC Decision 14/26, (June 1987) 
8 Although the draft proposal for decision 14/26 was formally submitted by the representatives of Australia, 
Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States, in consultation with the IUCN 
9 This follows the account of the negotiations as set out in McConnell 
10 UNEP/GC Decision 14/4, (June 1987), UN Doc A/42/427 (Brundtland Report) 
11 Through the more moderately phrased Environmental Perspective for the Year 2000 and Beyond, see UNEP/GC 
Decision 14/13, (June 1987). 
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resource conservation’12 . In the chapter titled ‘Species and Ecosystems: Resources for 
Development’, the Report proposed alterations in the focus and aims of the development 
project by establishing a material link between environment and development. In a death-
knell to the centrality of conservation biology, environmental intervention was to distance 
itself ‘from scientific and conservationist terms’ and towards the notion of the global 
environmental problems as ‘a leading economic and resource concern’13. This reform was 
driven by the need to present a ‘powerful economic rationale... to bolster the ethical, 
aesthetic and scientific cases for preserving them’ 14  (‘them’ refers to species and their 
genetic code in the chapter). This economic rationale underpinning changes in 
environmental policy was specifically linked to the possibility of two new environmental 
markets, for ‘genetic material’ and for ecosystem services. 
 
More specifically, the Brudtland report included a ‘priority proposal’ to ‘investigate the 
prospect of agreeing to a “Species Convention”, similar in spirit and scope to the Law of 
the Sea Treaty’15. In light of such a proposal for adhering to the procedure for deriving a 
unified ‘law of the sea’, Decision 14/26 could be read as initiating the process of 
negotiation of a ‘mega-treaty’ to rationalise and unify disparate existing bilateral, regional 
and international arrangements and customary law. By that time, this idea of a ‘Species 
Convention’ seems almost like an anachronism, compared to the rest of the report, but 
most crucially placed next to the rising dominance of the neoliberal paradigm of 
deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation discussed in the previous chapter. It was an 
argument in favour of additional regulation and centralisation; that instead of having 
separate treaties for different species (e.g. whales, migratory birds) or specific harmful 
                                               
12 This was further elaborated in Chapter 2 above, see pages 50-54 
13 UN Doc A/42/427, 162 
14 UN Doc A/42/427, 149 
15 UN Doc A/42/427, 163 
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practices or endangered habitats (e.g. trade in wild animals, freshwater resources) those 
instruments should all be centralised under a new unified ‘law of nature’. 
 
Given the neoliberal character of the US administration in the late 1980s and the already 
clear US objection and non-ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, this prospective 
image of the CBD as a centralising mechanism and a further extension of state regulation 
and binding public international law seemed particularly incongruous with official US 
policy. Yet the US-led proposal for a biodiversity treaty was completely congruous with this 
line of reasoning and endorsed by the Brundtland Report. This disparity is an example of 
the dangers of depicting whole states as atomised actors exhibiting a single behaviour. In 
effect, the US in the case of biodiversity, if viewed as a single actor, adopted a 
schizophrenic stance by actually initiating (and not simply acquiescing or contributing) a 
law-making process that contradicted its stated domestic and international policy in other 
fora. This ‘behaviour’ is further explored in a separate section below. 
 
This somewhat disjointed notion of pursuing a conservation mega-treaty within a paradigm 
of sustainable development - that actually called for precisely the setting-aside of such lofty 
conservationist goals - resulted in large parts of CBD negotiations being consumed by 
discussions regarding the substantial funding arrangements required for the vast 
conservation undertakings implied by this purported unifying mega-treaty16. This mandate 
was relatively quickly clarified and divided - in the next UNEP governing council of 1989 – 
between the operational coordination of existing agreements and the adoption of further 
                                               
16. See McConnell. This appears as perhaps a waste of time considering the rapid transformation of 
biodiversity into biocapital through the idea of genetic gold examined in the next chapter. As the idea of 
biocapital is progressively seen to fail due to underwhelming revenues and technological advances (synthetic 
biology), these arrangements for the transfer of technology, funds and other benefits have returned to 
prominence in the context of a quid pro quo, North-South bargaining. 
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framework convention specifically on the issue of biodiversity17, removing some of the 
confusion. The subsequent distinction however did not remove from the negotiating 
agenda the contentious debate over the transfer of additional, publicly-administered funds 
from the North to the South, despite the fact that the idea of sustainable development did 
not call for increasing state spending on environmental protection. 
 
Aside from the emphasis on funding, the disjointed echo of this mega-treaty that would 
never come to pass has also endured in environmental legal analyses even after the entry 
into force of a very different CBD. Boyle noted that the CBD ‘represents an attempt... to 
internationalise, in a more comprehensive and inclusive way, the conservation and 
sustainable use of nature’18, lamenting how previous agreements ‘fall short of establishing a 
comprehensive global regime for the protection of nature, and largely leave untouched 
resources located wholly within a state’s own national boundaries’19 . These statements 
rather aptly described the never-realised mega-treaty of the original mandate, but fell rather 
short of understanding the role and functions of the actual CBD in force. In similar vein, 
Swanson argued that the CBD was supposed to achieve ‘the centralised management of 
global land use planning’ 20 , and that it exists ‘as a monument along the pathway of 
increasingly active intervention in the process of national development planning and 
decision-making’21. Again, such comments reflected the illusory treaty that never happened. 
The CBD was never agreed as or never morphed into such a centralised, comprehensive 
global regime, either for environmental protection or environmental management. 
 
                                               
17 UNEP/GC Decision 15/34 (1989) 
18 Boyle 33 
19 Ibid 
20 Swanson, ‘Why is There a Biodiversity Convention? The International Interest in Centralized Development 
Planning’ 308 
21 Ibid 207 
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Instead, various free-floating and pre-existing UN terms (genetic variability, living natural 
resources etc.) were finally compacted - along with academic and policy-oriented research 
on biodiversity - into a single hybrid and composite negotiation framework in the next 
UNEP Governing Council of 1989. This new framework now firmly linked biodiversity 
with sustainable development: 
 
‘For environmental, ethical, social, economic and technical reasons, the 
conservation and utilisation of biological diversity is more than ever essential for 
[...] sustainable development and [...] human survival’22. 
 
Also in 1989, the UN general assembly formally placed biological diversity under the 
mandate of the planned Rio Conference on Environment and Development of 199223. 
Biodiversity had truly arrived at the international stage. In a highly symbolic manner, the 
life of biodiversity in the texts of international environmental law was intertwined and 
overshadowed by sustainable development from the outset, which seemed to address the 
concerns raised by biodiversity more coherently and more in tune with the neoliberal 
climate. Biodiversity was constructed as the lens through which nature and – with the 
assistance of neo-Malthusian demography – society could be viewed and valued differently. 
However, at the moment of its globalization, it was almost instantly superseded and beaten 
to the punch by sustainable development, the new grand rhetoric of the Earth’s future. 
TRANSFERING THE ECOLOGICAL DEBT AROUND: DEPOLITICISING BIODIVERSITY 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF TREATY NEGOTIATION 
Even with the clarified post-1989 negotiating mandate, the abandonment of the 
conservationist perspective and the clear link-up with sustainable development, the 
                                               




provisions and overall direction of the new treaty remained unclear heading into the 1990s. 
The ‘official stance’ and negotiating tactic of the South, astutely summarised by Nayar and 
Ong24, construed any international interest in protecting biodiversity as another form of 
interventionist imperialism to be resisted. Concurrently however, biodiversity was also 
construed as an economic opportunity for Southern states: 
 
‘[...] Their possession of the mainly untapped resource potential of species 
biodiversity within their territories presents them with an unrivalled opportunity to 
finally to gain what may euphemistically be called lost development ground [...] 
Access to these resources should therefore be jealously guarded, especially from 
would be competitors who lack such species biodiversity within their own 
jurisdictions’25. 
 
This stance can be directly linked to the input of neo-Malthusian demography into the 
formulation of biodiversity, as presented in Chapter 3. The location of both biodiversity 
and the human population causing its decline within Southern territory created leverage 
during the CBD negotiations. Although uncertainty over the precise economic contours of 
this potential never disappeared, securing jurisdiction over this ‘untapped resource 
potential’ became a primary objective. This negotiating stance transplanted biodiversity into 
yet another completely different context of Southern empowerment and self-determination 
through the principle of ‘permanent sovereignty of all states over their natural resources 
and the establishment of the New International Economic Order’26. In effect, the South 
was seeking to: 
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‘Receive the maximum possible returns for the use of the plant and animal species 
extracts that are initially found within their territory... which would entail a 
complete restructuring of the present world market system for pricing raw materials 
used in industrial production’27. 
 
Phrased in this format, the opportunity that the South recognised in biodiversity bears little 
connection to environmental concerns or the holistic integration of conservation traditions. 
It was simply a repayment plan for the ‘ecological debt’ owed by the North. The rarefied 
discussion of biodiversity in academic circles, as exemplified by the 1986 Forum, had 
nothing concrete to offer in this area of political economy, which required different forms 
of knowledge. 
 
The socio-ecological notion of ecological debt is a long-standing problematisation of past 
environmental practice that guides alternative varieties of environmentalism seeking 
environmental justice, i.e. to emphasize the conditions of unjust and unequal exchange that 
underpin the global polity28 . It argues that the hypothetical ‘loan’ of natural resources 
utilised to drive unprecedented economic growth in the North has never been - and was 
never meant - to be paid back. In the narrative of ecological debt, overexploitation replaces 
overpopulation on the pedestal as the primary cause of environmental degradation, thus 
having the effect of ‘turning overpopulation on its head’29. In this way, the official stance of 
the South, while initially enabled by it, ultimately appeared to be rejecting the neo-
Malthusian element of biodiversity, which characterised the South as both the source and 
the solution to the biodiversity crisis. While the South accepted that it held the key to 
biodiversity, it refused bear the manufactured responsibility for its degradation or loss. 
                                               
27 Ibid 
28 Juan Martínez Alier, The Environmentalism of the Poor : A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2002) 




In a more interesting fashion than this abstract game of assigning blame for biodiversity 
loss and degradation, the notion ecological debt is also employed by grassroots 
environmental movements located in the South against the irresponsible and exploitative 
practices of central governments of the South 30 , and especially directed against the 
repression of local and indigenous communities. When these same states employ the 
rhetoric to claim additional funding in international fora, this internal, sub-national aspect is 
obviously missing, as can be observed in the quotes above. This disparity in the use of 
ecological debt again brings up the limits of the personification of state actors, as in the 
case, discussed above, of the US tabling the initial CBD proposal. In effect, the use of 
ecological debt and similar radical environmental critiques by Southern states serves to 
belittle them as negotiating tactics and neutralize their local political potential. 
 
The CBD negotiations were exceptional in terms of depoliticisation. The continuous fight 
to secure jurisdiction and funding, while compatible with established practices of treaty law 
and international relations, ensured that any contentious issues raised by biodiversity as a 
pathology of the South, and the setting of the goals to be pursued in the process of 
governing this pathology, remain within a hierarchical and depoliticised (in terms of 
domestic perspectives) negotiation at state-level. This neutralisation of sensitive political 
questions leaves nothing other than the deployment of inflammatory rhetoric that turns 
negotiations into quasi-tort cases for attributing responsibility for environmental damage 
and sorting out financial compensation at the macro level of the state. Towards this 
misdirection, the addition to the ‘law of biodiversity’ of legal principles of good 
                                               
30 This crucial aspect is underlined for example in Ramachandra Guha, ‘Radical American Environmentalism 
and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique’ (1989) 11 Environmental Ethics 71 
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neighbourliness and state responsibility for biodiversity loss31 stemming from customary 
law would also subsequently play a significant role.  
 
For a time during the late 1980s negotiation of the CBD then, treaty negotiation became a 
refuse for avoiding the political question of biodiversity. In effect, with the tacit acceptance 
of both the North32 and the South,33 the multiple critique of ecological debt is degraded 
into a negotiating game of dare; a gauge of the seriousness, commitment and intentions of 
the North regarding environmental issues34. In addition, these early negotiating tactics, by 
confirming that conservation had been left behind, emphasized the (political) economic 
potential of biodiversity to a degree unforeseen by proponents of biodiversity as an 
environmental movement. 
THE IUCN PROPOSAL: EXPOSING THE NAIVETY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
From the above, it is clear that the idea of the biodiversity treaty that became the CBD did 
not originate fully formed in the text of UNEP Decision 14/26 and was continuously 
altered during the negotiations. That does not mean that preparatory work on the issue 
only occurred in North American academic circles prior to 1987. Already in 1981, the 
Secretariat of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) was tasked 
with analysing the ‘technical, legal, economic and financial matters relating to the 
conservation, accessibility and use of (genetic) resources, with a view to providing the basis 
                                               
31 Tinker, ‘Responsibility for Biological Diversity: Conservation under International Law’ 
32 Through neo-Malthusian demography, the North officially declared: the South is responsible for 
biodiversity loss due to overpopulation, but everyone’s responsible going forward, as long as the South 
adopts proper environmental conservation and management methods. 
33 By twisting environmental justice, the official stance of the South declared: the North is responsible for 
biodiversity loss due to overexploitation, but everyone’s responsible going forward, as long as the North 
adopts proper restitution methods. 
34 Although the South is argued to have engaged with international environmental fora in more constructive 
terms in recent years. See Najam 
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for an international arrangement’35. The result of this process was the first draft treaty on 
the topic conceived at the international level.  
 
Put together in 1989 by IUCN, this set of draft articles was included in the CBD 
negotiations and formed the textual, if not conceptual, basis of the eventual treaty. 
Presenting yet another approach to the biodiversity problematization, it proposed for the 
first time at international level a legal framework with the primary aim of securing a 
balanced exchange between conservation and access/use of biological and genetic 
resources. While the notion that the North would be asked to fund conservation efforts in 
the South was only challenged in relation to the level of funding required, the underlying 
idea of this IUCN draft text was to sidestep that debate in its entirety. Instead, it suggested 
that by placing restrictions on free access to these resources a market would be created for 
them, where Northern states would pay for access, and not conservation. Conservation of 
these resources would be funded only by extension, by the economic value of the resources 
to be protected36. 
 
This draft text was formally brought to the CBD negotiating table in 199037, and promptly 
and roundly dismissed as ‘naive’38. The draft treaty, deemed ‘idealistic and mandatory in its 
approach’ by the negotiators39, failed to include any precise mechanisms for realising the 
economic potential of these resources and conceived the proposed biodiversity market as 
centrally regulated by the global regime instituted by the proposed treaty40. This should not 
have been surprising as, for example, the Netherlands Committee of the IUCN was still 
conceiving, in 1991, the whole Rio UNCED as ‘a major step towards a global regime of the 
                                               
35 IUCN General Assembly resolution 15/10 (1981) 
36 John H. Barton, ‘Biodiversity at Rio’ (1992) 42 Bioscience 773, 773. On the general idea of ‘selling nature’ 
see McAfee 
37 In the First Meeting of the ad hoc Group of Legal and Technical Experts, Nairobi, November 1990.  
38 McConnell 26-7 
39 Ibid 26 
40 I.e. it was essentially another global environmental fund for biodiversity. 
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biosphere, which is both effective and fair’41. This conception was based on a firm belief in 
environmental protection as a common good that remained staunchly anti-neoliberal, going 
as far as positioning law against the market: 
 
‘The new system of world governance should be firmly rooted in law. The free 
market, successful as it may be in providing consumers with a certain range of 
goods and services, can never manage a collective good by its own’42. 
 
This spirit of promoting the rule of law as opposed to the rule of the market identified law 
with the law of the sovereign state. At its heart, it was an argument for more state 
regulation, promoting in situ conservation backed by international publicly-administered 
funding. It even attributed to biodiversity the legal status of common heritage of 
humankind, removing it from national jurisdiction. The few concessions given to market 
rationality, such as the idea of states paying for access instead of conservation, were not 
enough to divert that draft text from proceeding down the same path of a largely 
‘command-and-control’ approach. Since biodiversity was legally considered common 
heritage under this draft treaty, states would have to pay into a global fund for managing 
biodiversity. 
 
In the end, the draft treaty jarred with both the prevailing political economic climate and 
the stated official stances of the North and the South on biodiversity. Most articles 
appeared as a nostalgic anachronism and a nod to 1970s liberalism; an obsolete blueprint 
for environmental protection. As such, this preparatory work by IUCN was not warmly 
received by either negotiating bloc. The notion of legally defining biodiversity as common 
heritage contradicted with the principle of permanent sovereignty of natural resources that 





the South was seeking, while the constitution of an additional global environmental fund 
for a new conservation mega-treaty was rejected by Northern states already obliged to 
contribute to a sprawl of development and international aid funds, organisations and 
efforts. 
 
This first consolidated treaty proposal simply failed to sufficiently incorporate the most 
updated version of the interplay between biology, economics and politics that had begun to 
characterise biodiversity as a political problematization. As the first concerted response of 
classical international environmental law, the IUCN proposal appeared slow in its uptake of 
the realignments and the multiple trajectories of the concept of biodiversity. Nevertheless, 
IUCN, despite being a nongovernmental organization and thus a nonstate actor, did 
contribute the basic legal structure for the treaty, built on twin pillars; while the IUCN draft 
understood them as conservation and access, the CBD would eventually interpret them as 
sustainable utilisation and access. 
 
After the rejection of the IUCN text in 1990, the CBD ceased to be perceived as a unifying, 
rationalising instrument. It would not follow its language, mechanisms and objectives. As 
indeed the rest of the agreements signed at Rio in 1992, the CBD would constitute a break 
in the historical evolution of international environmental law and the setting off on a new 
trajectory of sustainable development, environmental managerialism and neoliberal 
subjectivity. Before that could occur however, more nonstate actors would become 
involved in the task of engaging with the political question of biodiversity, and in particular 
the setting of goals for governing the pathology of the South. 
THE ENTRY OF THE WORLD BANK 
 132 
 
The draft IUCN articles attempted to construct an international regime as a continuation 
or culmination of existing legal forms and mechanisms, envisaging the role of the CBD as a 
copy of existing treaties on a grander scale. Coming from the perspective of the outsider, 
the involvement of the Washington institutions, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), in biodiversity was much more aggressive and specific in terms of 
focusing on the governance of the South. 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, these major global economic institutions had been ‘purged’ of all 
‘Keynesian’ influences by 1982 43  and strictly adhered to the neoliberal rationalities of 
market liberalisation, deregulation and privatization in all development projects and loans 
administered. The World Bank had been one of the first global institutions to 
enthusiastically embrace sustainable development at least in terms of procedural standards 
and rhetoric44. The IMF, through the establishment of the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF) in 1991, would also play a crucial role in early funding arrangements for the CBD. 
The engagement of the World Bank and the IMF ensured that the particular strand of 
neoliberal economics would be the language by which all problematisations of environment 
and development, including biodiversity, would be framed. 
 
The first example of this engagement in the biodiversity field was the collaboration 
between the World Bank and leading environmental NGOs, which produced a jointly 
prepared policy report entitled Conserving the World’s Biological Diversity 45 . Michael Flitner 
commented in 1995 that ‘if Wilson’s book is the founding document of the biodiversity 
discourse, this is the basic policy paper of the global resource managers’46. The report’s 
starting position is that ‘the problems of conserving biological diversity [...] cannot be 
                                               
43 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism 26 
44 Gillespie 12 
45 Jeffrey A. McNeely and others, Conserving the World's Biological Diversity (1990) 
46 Flitner 148 
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separated from the larger issues of social and economic development’47. The targets were 
no longer the biologists’ old formulation of the ‘populace and politicians’; for this 
endeavour to succeed biodiversity would have ‘to compete for the attention of government 
and commercial decision-makers’48 and ‘to demonstrate in economic terms the contribution 
biological resources make to the countries’ social and economic development49. Compared 
to previous iterations during the CBD negotiating period, this conception of biodiversity as 
resource was tightly bound to the economic grid of neoliberalism, as well as being much 
closer to the notion of biodiversity as a developmental opportunity contained within the 
official negotiating stance of Southern states.  
 
The report represented a call to construct an additional form of combined biological, 
economic and managerial knowledge to be associated with the new goal of managing 
biodiversity as a resource. It was keen to point out the positive and enabling aspects of the 
new mentality being created. ‘Enacting laws, closing access to resources and declaring 
additional protected areas’ are characterised as ‘defensive and often confrontational 
actions’50 . Avoiding the polarisation inherent in traditional command-and-control ideas 
about how environmental law is to be implemented, the report argued for ‘cooperative 
efforts to address the social and economic foundations of resource depletion’51. For the 
first time, it was explicitly recognised that the ‘partners’ in this new cooperative project are 
manifold: the national governments, development and environmental agencies, the non-
governmental sector, but also the ‘marketplace’52, the private sector, as well as local and 
indigenous communities. Without excessive clarification or distributional/justice allusions, 
                                               
47 McNeely and others 11 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 12 
51 Ibid 
52 ‘Conservation should be supported to the maximum extent possible through the marketplace, but the 
marketplace needs to be established through appropriate policies from the central government’. Ibid 15 
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it was declared that ‘people form the foundation for the sustainable use of biological 
resources’53. 
 
The World Bank’s hybrid model of market environmentalism was more acceptable than the 
IUCN’s version of what essentially amounted to a continuation of a traditional 1970s 
liberal environmentalism. The political question was addressed directly for the first time 
and thus biodiversity was thus fully problematised as a governance issue; biological and 
economic rationalities put in the service of achieving the goal of sustainable development. 
Irrespective of whether ‘this document is traditional World Bank policy trimmed up with 
some remarks on the value of traditional knowledge’54, it did accurately set the direction 
that the globalisation of the biodiversity in the ensuing years; the general move away from 
state regulation and towards the market. 
 
The explosion of interest in the concept of biodiversity in the late 80s and early 90s 55 
brought about the involvement of new actors and new programmatic discourses that 
sought to specifically remake biodiversity as both a global environmental problematisation 
and a Southern opportunity. No longer the exclusive domain of conservation biologists, 
mission or crisis-oriented science or the environmental movement, it was now a field being 
populated by economists, lawyers and managers. Almost as haphazardly as an avalanche, 
biodiversity became an indispensable, common and self-evident term of environmental 
discourse, as think-tanks, international agencies and multinational corporations sought to 
take advantage and ownership of an emerging new regime of practices; to shape a new 
form of environmentalism. 
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When Wilson was declaring that ‘biological diversity must be treated more seriously as a 
global resource, to be indexed, used and above all, preserved’56, he did not envision that, 
once this call was answered, he would be the one left in the jungle to catalogue and 
measure, while others would dictate the policy terms of the use and conservation of this 
resource. 
AN AMERICAN PROJECT DERAILED 
As mentioned above, the first treaty proposal brought to the Nairobi Governing Council of 
1987 was organized around the objective of the rationalization of the fragmented mosaic of 
existing conservation treaties. A number of alterations and reconfigurations of this 
objective occurred between 1987 and the signing of the treaty in 1992. Sustainable 
development became more prominent, the South adopted a negotiating stance that focused 
exclusively on funding arrangements and sidestepped internal conflict, IUCN came up with 
a twin-pillared legal structure for the treaty, and the World Bank presented a technical 
manual that regarded the management of biological and genetic resources as the 
economically rational and self-evident method for protecting against further loss of 
biodiversity. The apparent final straw for the US, as the initiator of the original treaty 
proposal came with the inclusion of biotechnology57 into a legal instrument that had started 
out as a conversation treaty. In 1989 the negotiation working group was declaring that: 
 
‘The full implications of the new biotechnologies should be taken into account in 
any international legal instrument on the conservation of the biological diversity of 
the planet’58. 
 
                                               
56 Wilson, BioDiversity 3 
57 The link between biotechnology and biodiversity is further examined in Chapter 5. 
58 UNEP/GC Decision 15/34, Nairobi, 1989, Preamble. 
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The explicit inclusion of biotechnology would open the door for a debate of intellectual 
property rights over this biotechnology. Such an extension plainly contradicted the 
concurrent effort of the US administration to achieve a World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and to push for expansive and strictly enforced intellectual property regimes. This effort 
was concluded in 1995; by that time, the CBD had already been rejected by the US59. One 
of the reasons for this rejection was that the eventual text of the CBD60 was interpreted as 
‘code for forced transfer of technology and which relieves developing countries of the 
burden of protecting the intellectual property rights of US biotechnology companies’61. The 
biotechnology industry was additionally worried that the treaty’s lax treatment of 
intellectual property rights (i.e. lack of sui generis patent system) would allow the copying 
of inventions either through compulsory licensing systems or plain piracy. Other measures 
were also not warmly received. The proposed joint ventures in the South constituted 
‘anathema to some members of that industry who fear that those countries would 
expropriate the fruits of such research, just as some Middle East oil states expropriated 
American oil wells’62. Additional concerns over the control (voting rights) of the proposed 
financial mechanism were also expressed in the official US declaration made at UNCED63. 
This declaration outlined these multiple reasons for rejecting the CBD and lamented text 
that does not ‘reflect well on the international treaty-making process in the environmental 
field’, presaging the lament for the lost formalist culture of the international legal process64.  
 
This unpredicted turn in the CBD negotiations suggests that the primary proponent, at 
state level, of the concept of biodiversity had no control over it and was caught completely 
unaware of the directions others were taking the concept towards. Whatever the influence 
                                               
59  See the US declaration made at the UNEP Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, 22 May 1992, (1992) 31 ILM 848. 
60 And in particular Art. 16 
61 Coughlin 346 
62 Ibid 
63 See note 61 above 
64 See Chapter 1 
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of biodiversity’s established community of interest and concern within the state, in its 
withdrawal from the process of formulating a global biodiversity regime, the US 
administration clearly regarded biotechnology and intellectual property rights as something 
that should not be considered part of biodiversity or indeed environmental law. However, 
that is not the whole story. If one pays close attention to the dates, it is evident that the US 
proposal, made in 1987, was based on an understanding of biodiversity as part of a 
mission-oriented biological programme and conservation mentality, which was already 
receding within biodiversity discourse, as evidenced by the reworking of the concept in 
BioDiversity. 
 
As this short case illustrates, the consideration of the US as single, rational subject with a 
fixed view on biodiversity might constitute convenient shorthand for modelling state 
behaviour, but after a certain threshold it simply obfuscates any analysis that goes beyond 
the level of the state. This section as a whole sought to present more details regarding the 
involvement of various actors, predominantly from the North, in the final negotiation of 
the CBD, but also - through this presentation - expose some of the limitations of an 
exclusively macro, state-level analysis of the negotiating process. 
II | SOUTHERN DETOURS AND BREAKS 
The conception of a rational dialogue leading to state consensus on a common goal falls 
away when the CBD negotiations are examined in more detail. Both within the abstracted 
categories of the North and the South, there are many alternative and conflicting views on 
biodiversity, which clearly ‘do not sit easily with the largely accepted paradigm governing 
the biodiversity debate between the developed and developing countries, which focuses on 
the economic benefits to be reaped when plant and animal extracts are utilised for the 
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manufacture of new products’65. From the above presentation of the CBD negotiations 
interspersed with various contributions from outside the formal UN negotiation process, it 
is clear that there actually existed multiple versions of a biodiversity treaty and regime, 
simply because there existed different responses to the political question of biodiversity. In 
fact, arguably the most influential contribution to the form and content of the CBD and 
the present biodiversity complex came from a small Southern state, and not from any of 
the major institutions and states involved in the official negotiations. This section analyses 
this unique contribution. 
INBIO – A SOUTHERN INITIATIVE FOR ADAPTING THE BIODIVERSITY CONCEPT 
Costa Rica established the Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio) in 1989 to support 
research and sustainable utilisation of the country’s considerable biodiversity. Costa Rica’s 
favourable central America location and unique topography makes it a prominent 
biodiversity ‘hotspot’, where ‘perhaps 5 per cent of the Earth’s species’ can be found66. In 
his critique of this initiative, David Takacs argues that this image of Costa Rica as an 
ecological paradise, a ‘Canaan for biodiversity’, was perpetuated by biologists for decades, 
ultimately raising both the media profile and the funding levels for research and 
conservation in the country. This image of a well-funded and well-managed eco-paradise 
was instrumental in the choice of location for this experiment or ‘pilot project’ in 
environmental management67. INBio was instituted on the 24th October 1989 as a private, 
not-for-profit institute and placed in charge of managing the country’s considerable 
biodiversity reserves; this novel initiative was designed to both boost the country’s existing 
environmental credentials and attract foreign (primarily US) investment in biodiversity. The 
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mantra of INBio became the oft-used catchphrase ‘save it, know it, use it’ - alternatively 
‘study it, value it, utilise it’68. 
 
The founders of INBio were searching for alternative ways to best manage the large parts 
of Costa Rica’s territory that remained ‘undeveloped’, while sustaining the image of a 
unique eco-paradise. Since the linked problems of deforestation and industrial monoculture 
for export constituted the twin threats to the country’s rich biodiversity, an effective 
alternative policy would have to begin by introducing an alternative form of land use, 
complete with a commodity and a production line that would compete and outperform 
existing intensive uses. With this objective in mind, the president of INBio, Rodrigo 
Gamez Lobo, elevated bioprospecting69 to the level of ‘another type of... very sophisticated 
agriculture’70 producing a valuable - and commercially viable - genetic crop, and capable of 
competing effectively with any other agricultural or forestry product. 
 
In order to put into practice the hypothesis that bioprospecting can become an industry to 
rival agriculture, INBio secured one of the first benefit sharing arrangements71, signed with 
Merck & Co Inc. in October 1991. The agreed bioprospecting contract provided the 
pharmaceutical corporation with access to Costa Rica’s biological and genetic resources 
(specifically samples from plants, insects and microorganisms collected from Costa Rica’s 
protected forests) and the right to use those samples in the development of new patented 
pharmaceutical products, in exchange for an initial lump sum of approximately US$ 1 
                                               
68 http://www.inbio.ac.cr/en/inbio/inb_queinbio.htm 
69 I.e. the search for commercially viable plants, genes and biochemicals. Bioprospecting is analysed from 
multiple perspectives in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
70 Quoted in Takacs 292 
71 Certainly more discussed and analysed, if not the first. For example, the US National Cancer Institute 
(NCI) concluded a ‘source country agreement’, called a Letter of Collection (LOC) with Madagascar in 1990, 
one year before the Merck-INBio contract. The agreement contained many of the terms now employed in 
access and benefit sharing agreements. For more information see James S. Miller, ‘Impact of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity: The Lessons from Ten Years of Experience with Models of Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits’ in Charles R. McManis (ed), Biodiversity and the Law: Intellectual Property, Biotechnology and Traditional 
Knowledge (Earthscan 2007). 
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million (to cover start-up costs for the sample collection to be conducted by INBio and not 
Merck), as well as for future royalties from any commercial products that may arise from 
samples collected under this two year programme72. In this way, this contract was set up to 
provide funds and technology for the long term cataloguing of all Costa Rica’s biodiversity, 
the operation of INBio itself, as well as more traditional conservation activities 73 . A 
significant number of technical aspects and terms from that bioprospecting contract would 
eventually carry over into the subsequent emergence of the ABS mechanisms within the 
CBD74. 
 
Aside from realising the economic potential of genetic resources, there was a second 
objective to the INBio programme, which was initially encapsulated in the term ‘biocultural 
restoration’75. In its early formulations, this restorative axis of the project was somewhat 
unclear and plagued by the patronising narrative of ‘tropical people [...] experiencing [...] 
intellectual deprivation represented by the upcoming obliteration of tropical wildlands’76. 
INBio clarified this aspect of the programme by additionally setting out to affect more 
generally the way Costa Ricans view nature in line with the norms and values expressed 
through the concept of biodiversity itself. It argued that ‘biodiversity must again be a grand 
intellectual resource for rural tropical people, who otherwise lack intellectual challenges and 
cultural opportunities’77. 
 
The second strategic aim concerned more broadly the construction of an alternate form of 
development by adapting the general bioeconomic understanding of biodiversity of the 
                                               
72 Exact percentage initially kept secret as part of the confidential agreement, but later verified as 5% 
73 10% of the initial start-up fee and 50% of all royalties would go into conservation and protection. See 
Thomas Eisner and Elizabeth A Beiring, ‘Biotic Exploration Fund: Protecting Biodiversity through Chemical 
Prospecting’ (1994) 44 Bioscience 95, 97 
74 More detailed analysis of ABS to follow in Chapter 6. 
75 Daniel H. Janzen, ‘Tropical Ecological and Biocultural Restoration’ (1988) 239 Science 243 




World Bank to a Southern context, without deviating from the orthodoxy of neoliberal 
capitalism. This new form would be associated with the particular resource of biodiversity, 
much like what certain states accomplished with oil 78 ; a self-produced rationality of 
governing and code of conduct tailored for Costa Rican society. It is worthwhile to note 
that although it was linked to the environmentalist concerns, the two main objectives of the 
INBio programme focused on the political economy of Costa Rican society and on altering 
the relation between people and resources; in short, on the production of a Costa Rican 
subjectivity. 
 
Costa Rica chose a unique path of establishing INBio over the imposition of 
environmental laws regarding the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. INBio 
did privatise in part biodiversity as genetic resources by ‘packaging’ them as genetic 
information and selling them off, but it had no authority to sell off the public land where 
the biodiversity reserves were located. It also sought to educate as to the full potential of 
biodiversity, to work through the capacity of individuals to question and problematise their 
own conduct by reference to nature. Deforestation or industrial agriculture were not agent-
less conducts simply denounced as inimical to lofty environmentalist ideals or amorphous 
objects of regulation needing to be reined in. Costa Rican society and individuals engaging 
in those practices were to problematise them as directly detrimental to their livelihood and 
developmental aspirations, but even more crucially to their aspirations of a modern mode 
of living in line with the West79. 
 
                                               
78 Michael Watts, ‘Development and Governmentality’ 24 Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 6The 
details of this formulation will be further analysed in chapter 5 on genetic gold 
79 On similar processes of subjectivity self-formation in different regions see Arun Agrawal, Environmentality: 
Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects (Duke University Press 2005); Tania Murray Li, The Will to 
Improve: Governmentality, Development and the Practice of Politics (Duke University Press 2007) 
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This approach, which relies less on legal measures and more on training and 
incentivisation, is nowhere more apparent than in the practice of training so-called 
‘parataxonomists – former bartenders, housewives, preachers, poachers, park guards’80 to 
collect and sort the plant and organic samples required, initially for fulfilling the Merck 
contract. Takacs, through first-hand interviews, describes new ways of living that have 
emerged around the role and knowledge of the parataxonomist 81 . By this training of 
hundreds of taxonomists, the institute’s vision was further disseminated to ever more 
distant and rural localities and communities.  
 
The politics of biodiversity represented in INBio’s strategy and projects swiftly became a 
source of increased attention from many different quarters and remain relevant to the 
present day. The contract with Merck ‘was widely hailed as the example of what the 
Convention would do’82; as a ‘watershed’ in the history of bioprospecting83. A note on the 
Merck-INBio published shortly after the entry into force of the CBD underlines how ‘the 
cooperative spirit that encompasses [...] the transaction stands in stark contrast to the 
divisiveness between North and South which has characterized the negotiations on the 
Convention’84. 
 
As a prototype institution, INBio also fitted very well within the perceived wisdom of 
neoliberal doctrine regarding the roles of the state and the market. The institution of INBio 
signified the deregulation of biodiversity conservation and the privatisation of certain 
genetic resources, further enabling their sale in global markets and recognising the business 
contract concluded between two private parties as a legitimate instrument of environmental 
                                               
80 Takacs 293 
81 Ibid 296-300 
82 Coughlin 356 
83 See Reid and others 1 
84 Coughlin 357 
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law and policy. In the pursuit of a Western modernity dictated by ideals of sustainable 
development and the neoliberal agenda, Costa Rica had located a willing business partner, 
in the shape of a large multinational corporation, willing to actually pay for access to a 
resource that was previously considered a worthless, vague mixture of common heritage 
and common property. This success created expectations that others would follow, thus 
solidifying the creation of new global markets for genetic resources. 
 
The novelty of the INBio programme rested on the fact that it was being constructed and 
run in a Southern country, away from what had been the centres of environmental law and 
policy up to that point (academia, international treaty system, the large environmental 
Northern NGOs). It was advertised as a Southern state taking control of its natural 
resources, participating in global markets, and improving both its welfare and environment 
– achieving sustainable development by following down its own particular path. In direct 
contrast to the CBD, the endorsement by the biotechnology industry of the US85 further 
distinguished it as a pragmatic, practical, business oriented and biotech industry-friendly 
approach. 
 
INBio was particularly different from previous idealist models revolving around the image 
of the activist, ecologically-minded scientist trying his hand at lobbying for stricter 
environmental laws, or the top-down bargaining between Northern and Southern blocs at 
international fora. It should be noted however that the private emphasis of INBio also 
represented a challenge to the official negotiating stance of the South and its stressing of 
the long-standing state-centric principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
and demands for a new regulation of the global economy86. In short, the constitution of 
INBio created fissures and gaps, both in the North - where the US administration 
                                               
85 Ibid 
86 As developed in the New International Economic Order framework in the 70s, see Nayar and Ong 
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enthusiastically embraced and supported the initiative while the same time rejecting the 
CBD - and the South, where the market and neoliberal credentials of the institute jarred 
with more radical varieties of environmentalism that defined cultural diversity and 
restoration in terms of justice and political, rather than market, participation. 
THE IMPACT OF INBIO 
However, the somewhat rosy image of a Southern-led initiative ‘outperforming’ an 
international environmental treaty has evaporated on closer inspection and over the years. 
For a start, INBio has been thoroughly influenced by the ideas and work of American 
biologist Daniel H. Janzen, who was personally involved in its inception and is still very 
influential in its operation. Critics, such as Takacs, have been wary of this ‘American 
influence’, as well as its conspirational concealment: 
 
‘[...] His stamp is ineradicable. His language and ideas infiltrate the recesses of 
INBio. He designs and teaches the parataxonomists courses. He confesses to being 
INBio’s chief cheerleader and fundraiser – its link to the outside world, upon which 
INBio depends in its inchoate form for its operating budget [...] He has also kept 
himself somewhat under wraps in Costa Rica... most Costa Ricans, including 
newspaper reporters covering INBio, have never heard of Dan Janzen’87. 
 
The connections with the early, biological ‘community of interest and concern’ built 
around biodiversity do not stop here. The idea of prospecting for bioactive chemicals as a 
funding mechanism for conservation was central to the pioneering work of Thomas Eisner 
in the field of chemical ecology88. It was Eisner that organised the meeting, at Cornell 
                                               
87 Takacs 291 
88 Thomas Eisner, ‘Chemical Prospecting: A Proposal for Action’ in F.H. Bormann and S.R. Kellert (eds), 
Ecology, Economics, Ethics: The Broken Circle (Yale University Press 1991); Thomas Eisner, ‘Prospecting for 
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University in October 1990, which brought Janzen and Gamez from INBio at the same 
table with a Merck representative, resulting in the well-known agreement89. To this day, the 
international advisory board of INBio contains such luminaries of biodiversity discourse as 
Edward Wilson and Thomas Lovejoy. 
 
Such an amount of influence and guidance from specific strands of biological and 
environmentalist thought originating within American academia raise the question of the 
extent to which INBio represents a South-driven adaptation that can potentially obviate the 
need for the multilateral CBD, as hinted at by commentators at the time90. Additionally, the 
utilitarian and managerial rationality at play in this social experiment indicate a close 
relation to the biodiversity policies and measures proposed by the World Bank. Therefore, 
INBio is a hybrid institution from multiple perspectives. The specific proposition that a 
commercial contract can constitute an effective and sufficient tool for achieving 
environmental ends was undoubtedly a neoliberal challenge to the established forms, 
practices and principles of environmental law. Despite these caveats, that Merck-INBio 
contract did represent a tangible example of the shift from command-and-control 
environmental legislation to the more flexible era of sustainable development. A small 
Costa Rican institution opened up new fields and paths for legal discourse and undoubtedly 
influenced ideas of participatory development with its implementation of a hybrid 
public/private partnership for the environment. 
 
In the early years of the CBD’s operation in the mid to late 1990s, with the juggernaut of 
globalisation at its apex before Seattle and Doha, it seemed that the Merck-INBio contract 
                                                                                                                                         
Nature's Chemical Riches’ [1990] 6 Issues in Science and Technology 31; Thomas Eisner, ‘Chemical 
Prospecting: A Global Imperative’ [1994] 138 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 385; Eisner 
and Beiring, ‘Biotic Exploration Fund: Protecting Biodiversity through Chemical Prospecting’ 
89 Eisner, ‘Chemical Prospecting: A Global Imperative’ 387 
90 Or at least by the US biotechnology industry, as stated in Coughlin 341 
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would dominate as a blueprint for achieving sustainable development in biodiversity-rich 
states. This agreement legitimised and condensed existing bioprospecting practices into a 
single formula of market exchange91, which was further endorsed by the World Bank92. 
Major components of the bioprospecting contract (e.g. informed consent, benefit sharing) 
are subsequently present in the legal framework of the CBD. But differences remained: 
INBio was a mechanism created by market rationalities, while the CBD was a state-centric 
initiative attempting to adjust to the rule of the market. 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND BIOPIRACY: A CHALLENGE AGAINST BOTH THE STATE 
AND THE MARKET 
The derailment of the initial US treaty proposal and the creation of INBio already suggest 
that neither the North nor the South were the homogeneous entities and coherent 
negotiating groups depicted in environmental law literature. They continued to be 
abstractions crisscrossed by a number of dominant and resistant discourses seeking control 
of biodiversity. The South, containing the majority of population and states, is an especially 
heterogeneous group. Despite its unforeseen innovation and impact, INBio was rather 
close to the official negotiating stances and understandings of biodiversity. More radical 
resistance was organised by two different forms of civil society organisations forming a 
collaborative, but still fairly heterogeneous biopiracy movement93 . This movement did 
coalesce into yet another on-going project for constructing alternatives to state-led 
development, but in this case the alternatives were challenging rather than embracing 
neoliberal orthodoxy. 
 
                                               
91 This formula will be further analysed in ABS chapter. 
92 McNeely and others 
93 Hanne Svarstad, ‘Analysing Conservation-Development Discourses: The Story of a Biopiracy Narrative’ 
(2002) 1 Forum for Development Studies 63 72-5 
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First, various grassroots movements, farmers’ associations and indigenous groups were 
organised into networks, such as the very active Third World Network94, directed by Martin 
Khor and located in Penang. Their narrative was further popularised and disseminated 
widely by the work of Indian activist, social ecologist and feminist Vandana Shiva. The 
starting point has been the highlighting of the ‘bio-imperialism’95 and ‘green orientalism’96 
inherent in biodiversity and Western-produced environmentalism in general. Building on 
Said’s ground-breaking work97, this alternative perspective considered the polarising binary 
between North, as the source of knowledge, money and innovative environmental 
solutions, and South, as the source of raw material and the locus of poverty and 
environmental problems, and the resultant great game played by states based on these 
perceptions of each other as products of Western environmentalism’s construction of the 
‘Other’, i.e. a Northern understanding of the South’s role: 
 
‘For green orientalists, as for their colonial forebears, all real knowledge, 
consciousness and power rest with the North. In environmental matters, as in 
others, they assume it is up to the North not only to explain, inspire and lead the 
South, but also to power it and teach it about itself’98. 
 
The objective then becomes to resist and recast this imagining of the South constructed by 
Western environmentalism, implicitly accepted even by Southern states and their drive to 
profit from biodiversity. 
 
                                               
94 http://www.twnside.org.sg/ 
95 Vandana Shiva, Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives on Biodiversity and Biotechnology (Zed Books 1993) and 
Vandana Shiva, ‘Biodiversity, Biotechnology and Profit: The Need for a Peoples' Plan to Protect Biological 
Diversity’ (1990) 20 The Ecologist 44 
96 Larry Lohmann, ‘Green Orientalism’ (1993) 23 The Ecologist 202 
97 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (Penguin 1985) 
98 Lohmann 203 
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In this field, the work of Vandana Shiva, representative and constitutive of the narrative of 
these Southern networks, is central for an active refusal the pathology of the South 
constructed within the confines of the biodiversity discourse, and for proposing alternative 
environmental problematisations. The major element in this reversal is a switch in focus 
from the modalities and terms by which the South is to ‘supply raw materials for the 
North’s next industrial revolution’99, to the importance of biodiversity for both the basic 
livelihood and general mode of living of local and indigenous communities100. 
 
This duality in the argument stresses the link between biological and cultural diversity. It 
goes beyond the issues of subsistence and direct dependency on surrounding plants and 
animals, which inevitably cast local societies in the role of the rural poor. It articulates an 
environmental subjectivity that encapsulates and fosters varied understandings and uses of 
biodiversity, which will contribute in a mutually reinforcing way101 to the overall strategic 
aim of preserving it: 
 
‘Most communities that depend on intact nature are well aware of the importance 
of conserving natural diversity. In fact, such communities are far superior to 
modern industrial societies in terms of their relationship with nature, which is based 
on respect and a sense of community, instead of just viewing it as resources’102. 
 
It is important to observe that such calls resist the neoliberal notion of individual 
empowerment and economic growth, in favour of what is argued as a more stable, 
collective mentality symbolised by the idea of community; or more precisely the idea that 
                                               
99 Vandana Shiva quoted in Tinker, ‘Responsibility for Biological Diversity: Conservation under International 
Law’ 
100 Vandana Shiva and others, Biodiversity: Social and Ecological Perspectives (Zed Books 1991) 
101 Nayar and Ong 342 
102 Shiva and others, Biodiversity: Social and Ecological Perspectives 31 
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there should be multiple communities and biodiversities (cultural diversity), not the endless 
replication of the same form. Therefore, there is a rejection of the post-war, state-centric 
drive to ‘spread’ development, but in the case of these transnational movements this is 
coupled with an additional rejection of the neoliberal, INBio-style models of market 
participation and individual empowerment that were put forward as improvements upon 
the failure of the old development project. 
 
Leaving aside from the obvious romantic and pastoral themes of these critiques, the 
emphasis on the role of cultural diversity, which has been acknowledged in international 
environmental law103 , nevertheless introduces the concrete human element of the local 
community into a discourse that had been fixated with the image of the rainforests, a 
reductionist view of the famed biodiversity hotspots as essentially virgin forests devoid of 
human presence; the last remaining theatres where the great play of the evolution of nature 
still takes place. It is hard to counteract such a deep-rooted orientalism, since the obsession 
with this particular image of the tropics can be detected in all the texts that have influenced 
the evolution of the biodiversity concept from the very first beginnings within conservation 
biology104. Under the formulation of these transnational networks however, the biodiversity 
reserves are not a terra incognita explored by experts and parataxonomists for financial 
gain, but lived-in, everyday spaces supporting a different mode of living – often at odds 
with the very Western lifestyle that spawned environmentalism in the first place. 
 
Following on from this critique, Shiva and similarly-minded critics also directed the debate 
to the what constituted for them the core issue of agricultural practices, and namely the 
increasing contribution to biodiversity loss of export-led, industrial agricultural practices, 
such as the Green Revolution that have spread across the continents of the South since the 
                                               
103 Bilderbeek 9-11 
104 See Chapter 2 
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1960s105. Shiva maintains that, by prioritising the achievement of ever higher yields at all 
costs, without attention to the relation of agriculture to surrounding ecosystems and 
communities, such projects essentially replace traditional multi-crop agro-forestry systems 
with a limited number of select and genetically uniform crops. It is a type of agriculture 
actually promotes uniformity instead of diversity 106 , thus standing firmly against the 
environmental concerns collected under the umbrella of biodiversity. 
 
Instead of the vague and global problematisation of human encroachment or 
overpopulation, this discourse prioritises attention to the actual and real localities of the 
South where the loss of biodiversity is taking place. According to this critique, such loss is 
increasing not because a mindless mob of poverty-stricken people don’t know any better 
than to eat, burn and consume their way through the landscape like zombies in a film, but 
because the pressure to produce for export entails the clearing of forests and the spread of 
fields of industrially produced monocultures. 
 
These arguments are linked with the long-standing critique of the Green Revolution, of the 
general impact of industrial agriculture on the South and the privatisation of nature. This is 
articulated by a different set of Europe and US-based organisations, such as RAFI107 (now 
the Etc group) and GRAIN 108 , not considered a core part of mainstream 
environmentalism. The emphasis here is on the process by which seed exchange and crop 
development have become commercial activities with the abandonment of centuries-old 
                                               
105 Shiva, ‘Biodiversity, Biotechnology and Profit: The Need for a Peoples' Plan to Protect Biological 
Diversity’ 44, 44.  
106 Shiva and others, Biodiversity: Social and Ecological Perspectives 10 and Shiva, Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives 
on Biodiversity and Biotechnology 
107 Established in 1979 and based in the US and, the Rural Advancement Foundation International changed 
its name to Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (the ETC group) in 2001. It has 
recognised consultative status by the CBD, FAO and other international organisations 
[http://www.etcgroup.org/]  
108 Established in 1990 and based in Europe, Genetic Resources Action International, focuses on issues of 
plant genetic diversity. [http://www.grain.org/about/?org] 
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common property regimes109. While predating the invention of biodiversity, it is within this 
critique that the theft of predominantly plant genetic resources through intellectual 
property regimes was given the name biopiracy, as a counterpoint to the positive image 
attributed to bioprospecting110. This was later adapted within the context of the movement 
against the WTO enforcement of strong intellectual property regimes111. 
 
If we were to condense these two strands of critique into a single proposal for an 
alternative developmental model, a number of interesting rejections of previous 
developmental wisdom materialise: (i) it is a model anchored on the collective welfare of 
the local community, as opposed to state-led development linked to economic growth, (ii) 
it opposes the notion of biodiversity as raw material to which only financial investment and 
techno-scientific application can add value. To apprehend biodiversity one has to examine 
the traditional production methods, interactions and uses of nature developed by these 
communities in balance with the local environment, and (iii) participation in global markets 
does not matter as much as maintaining the small innovations introduced in the context of 
small-scale localised, subsistence economies112. Shiva even argues against the differentiation 
between the economic sectors of consumption and production and the environmental 
concern for conservation, because this differentiation is borrowed from the social 
organisation of Northern states113. The lack of such separation of sectors in certain rural 
societies is precisely what contributes to the external image of these rural societies as poor, 
lacking in knowledge, money and overall capacity to manage biodiversity appropriately, in 
need of ‘care’ and assistance.  
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If considered as constitutive of a rationality of government, this cultural diversity/biopiracy 
critique stands apart from everything else. It opposes the centralising tendencies of state 
development, the globalising tendencies of the neoliberal orthodoxy, as well as the 
managerial rationalities propagated by the altered market environmentalism of the World 
Bank after its encounter with both development and neoliberalism. In terms of 
biodiversity, the critique does not shy away from exposing that industrial agricultural 
production destroys both biological and cultural diversity114, which is often ignored in a 
discourse focusing on wild biodiversity. Or in other words, it exposes the paradox of a 
regime seeking diversity in nature, but requiring uniformity in society. 
 
In terms of methods and techniques of governing however, this model of government is 
strikingly similar to the INBio model. They are both concerned with devising the optimum 
ways to govern through the capacities and actions of the governed themselves, i.e. for 
environmental subjects to conduct themselves. However, only in the cultural diversity 
model are ‘counter-conducts’ constructed115 - in farmers’ associations, women’s rights, and 
indigenous movements - ‘whose objective is a different form of conduct, that is to say: 
wanting to be conducted differently, by other leaders [...], towards other objectives and 
forms of salvation, and through other procedures and methods’116. In their articulations, 
the biopiracy and related transnational networks do not revolt against the notion that 
biodiversity is either valuable or endangered per se, but they commence with a different 
valuation and problematisation of biodiversity; and they seek to be able to formulate their 
own methods of being conducted, of being governed, apropos or in the name of 
biodiversity. These movements were able to contend in earnest with the political question 
                                               
114 Ibid 9-12 
115 Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought 
116 Golder and Fitzpatrick 194-195 
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of biodiversity, thus managing to feed its problematisation into a broader narrative that 
emphasises the problems and injustices perpetuated on local and indigenous communities 
by both national administrations and international agencies and organisations. 
 
Subsequent changes in the legal text and the operation of the CBD (emphasis on local 
communities, the role of agricultural biodiversity, the protection of traditional knowledge 
etc.) can be attributed at least in part to these challenges posed by the cultural 
diversity/biopiracy critique. For example, the legal provision regarding the protection of 
traditional communities and knowledge was buried within what was initially considered a 
crucial treaty article regarding in situ conservation of biodiversity117, but the subsequent 
attention to that paragraph eclipsed the rest of the article118. 
III | CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICS OF BIODIVERSITY 
This chapter illustrates that during the negotiation and early operation of the CBD, 
multiple ideas of biodiversity and responses to its political question were being advanced at 
a variety of levels. When it came to the integration of this question of the governance of 
the South into existing development theories mechanisms, biodiversity became further 
entangled within the construction of actual alternatives to state-led development. Not all 
participants, either in the North or in the South, were satisfied with the results of this 
entanglement. Fissures materialised in both standard negotiating blocks of the North and 
the South. These fissures were created by the different methods of adapting biodiversity to 
the highly contested rise of neoliberalism and the internal conflict within Southern states.  
Of particular interest is the widening gap between the central authorities seeking to fence 
biodiversity off as the successor resource of oil in order to steal some steps up the 
                                               
117 CBD, Art. 8(j). 
118 E.g. a separate working group for the implementation of article 8(j) has been set up. For more information 
see communities chapter.  
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developmental ladder and the transnational networks working against both state and 
market. Despite this, the chapter illustrates that the whole endeavour to negotiate the CBD 
was not simply a fight over the control of another set of valuable natural resources, but a 
debate over the new object of governing (the South) and the goals to be pursued for this 
new object; essentially part of the development debate regarding the future of Southern 
societies within a globalised world. 
 
The last three chapters presented a history of biodiversity as a conceptual invention, novel 
conservation mentality, biological programme for social reform, environmental movement, 
political problematization and emerging development model. The purpose of this first part 
of the thesis was to locate and examine the history of biodiversity during the period leading 
to the adoption of the CBD. This history manifests as a series of instances where state and 
nonstate actors attempt to wrest control, to redefine biodiversity in their own image, 
perspective and objectives. The imprint of each instance can be found within biodiversity, 
but no single event exerts total control on the complex. 
 
By rereading the same chronological period, i.e. roughly between 1980 (publication of 
Conservation Biology) and 1992 (entry into force of the CBD), but from a different 
perspective in each chapter, the hybrid and heterogeneous character of biodiversity is 
established; an almost haphazard formulation always borne of different forms of thought 
with their own histories, analytical tools and problematising foci. The common element is 
the insistent political questioning that can be induced through biodiversity. Through its 
sociobiological descent, the essentialism of biodiversity as a natural category is used to 
shape social practice through the cyclical contingency between the natural and the normal. 
From the neo-Malthusian perspective, there is insistent call to focus on the inherent 
pathology of human population itself as an environmental problem, transforming the 
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South as the primary cause of the problem of biodiversity loss. To counter this bleak 
assessment, the South is offered a developmental promise, consigning ecological debt to 
the discursive margins, an inconvenient past for only radicals to bring up. Finally, the 
dominance of the neoliberal economic grid is observed in the immanence of the economic 
rationalities of managerialism, market exchange and financialisation that have been 
disseminated across every facet of biodiversity law and policy. 
 
Yet, in opposition to these dominant conceptions of biodiversity, paths of resistance and 
sites for the construction of Southern alternatives to imposed orthodoxies consistently 
remain an important part of biodiversity practices. In Part II of the thesis, it is argued that 
all these contributions amount to a mode or rationality of governance or governing in a 



















VECTORS OF BIODIVERSITY: ASSEMBLING 
THE BIODIVERSITY COMPLEX 
 
 
You think you are seeing one of these enormous 
contraptions, full of impossible cog wheels, of conveyor belts 
that don’t convey anything and of grimacing gears: all these 
things that “don’t work” end up making “it” work.1 
 
 
If the examination of its formative years teaches us anything, it is the inherent 
heterogeneity of the concept of biodiversity. Floating between strands of scientific enquiry 
and environmental politics, biodiversity has no essential truth to be grasped at the 
beginning, to be rediscovered in a single locus of origin. Its history consists of breaks and 
discontinuity, claims and counter-claims. In the preceding chapters, biodiversity has made 
appearances as a conservation standard, an organizing principle of ecology or 
environmental law, a popularization of the theory on the interdependence of life, a master 
narrative for rationalizing all existing ecological traditions, a sociobiological ‘total’ ethic of 
genetic determinism and reductionism, an aesthetic of rainforest wilderness, a human 
population control programme, a suitably neoliberal framework for managing a new kind 
of natural resource, or a Southern-led development model. 
 
At this crucial juncture in the analysis, the facile resolution of these multiple vectors by 
resort to legal closure and certainty must be resisted. Presenting the CBD as the complete 
collection and rationalization of the above heterogeneity into a single, coherent and unified 
whole underpinned by the authority of law would turn the history of biodiversity 
                                               
1 Michel Foucault, ‘Lemon and Milk’ in James D. Faubion (ed), Power: Essential Worls of M Foucault 1954-1984, 
Vol 3 (Penguin 2002) 
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undertaken so far into ‘more of the same’; a linear progress justifying the present 
inevitability. The CBD is not the context that codified all discourses into a uniform legal 
language, thus methodically preparing the conceptual and institutional ground for a 
centralised global regulatory regime. Any such regime implies closure, a coherent and 
homogeneous effort to combat a pre-defined environmental problem. By extension, any 
such definition of biodiversity is a static concept to be added to the existing 
compartmentalized typology, a narrowing, a reduction, and an illustration of one aspect of 
the whole leaving numerous blind spots behind. These vectors constitute the multiple 
knowledge, forms, objects, and ends associated with biodiversity. Imprints, traces and hints 
of these lines can be found to the present day. 
 
In order to proceed with the analysis of the present situation for biodiversity, the key point 
then becomes to apprehend the current heterogeneous functions of these vectors, without 
homogenizing them under the sign of the legal definition of biodiversity. Therefore, what is 
required for this task is a concept that would enable the transition between the historical to 
the functional analysis, or more precisely incorporate all the discursive and non-discursive 
elements of biodiversity - without eliminating them - into the analytical grid of power as set 
out in the first chapter of the thesis. 
I│THE BIODIVERSITY COMPLEX 
For this purpose, the wider term biodiversity complex (or biocomplex) is introduced. 
Relying on Foucault’s rather loosely defined concept of the dispositif or apparatus2 , the 
biodiversity complex is similarly understood primarily as a ‘thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble’ 3  or as ‘a tangle, a multi-linear ensemble’ 4 . It consists of the discourses, 
                                               
2  Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus and Other Essays (Stanford University Press 2009); Deleuze; 
Foucault, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’ 
3 Foucault, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’ 194 
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institutions, legal measures, policy reports, scientific propositions, ethical claims associated 
with biodiversity. In this sense, the social construction or invention of biodiversity outlined 
previously is a history of its construction as an apparatus. Deleuze’s attribution of a multi-
linear character to the apparatus is phrased thus: 
 
‘It is composed of lines, each having a different nature. And the lines in the 
apparatus do not outline or surround systems which are each homogeneous in their 
own right […] but follow directions, trace balances which area always off balance, 
now drawing together then distancing themselves from one another. Each line is 
broken and subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subject to 
drifting’5. 
 
The complex is thus the network6 or system of relations between these heterogeneous lines 
or elements. To assist in identifying and mapping the connections, the basic grouping into 
objects, ends, knowledge and modes is employed. Crucially, this complex or apparatus is 
not an aimless ensemble of disparate elements, but ‘has as its major function at a given 
historical moment that of responding to an urgent need’7. It is thus driven by a ‘strategic 
imperative’8, which indicates ‘a rational and concrete intervention in the relations of forces, 
either so as to develop them in a particular direction, or to block them, to stabilize them, 
and to utilize them’9. Through the notion of the apparatus, it is thus possible to elaborate ‘a 
set of practices and mechanisms […] that aim to face an urgent need and to obtain an 
effect that is more or less immediate’10. In this broad sense, an apparatus is a device for 
                                                                                                                                         
4 Deleuze 159 
5 Ibid 
6 Agamben 3 
7 Foucault, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’ 195 
8 Ibid 
9 Foucault, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’ 196 
10 Agamben 8 
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governing, existing within relations of productive power. That is to say, the subject to be 
governed is produced by the apparatus itself. 
 
Paraphrasing Foucault, the biodiversity complex ‘is neither a ghetto not a fortress; it is 
fragile, permeable, and transparent, in spite of its fogs’11. It is neither an a priori ecocentric 
nor an anthropocentric regime according to the well-rehearsed binary of environmental 
ethics. It is characterised precisely by a lack of the coherence and homogeneity inherently 
valued by and in law. Its strategic imperative is not to conserve, preserve or protect 
biodiversity; nor to further impose its utilisation, exploitation or degradation. Instead, the 
biocomplex produces environmental subjects, i.e. subjects capable of evaluating which of 
the above conducts to engage in and promote. This occurs, in Rose and Valverde’s 
colourful phrase, under the watchful eye of a ‘whole variety of petty judges’12, in the shape 
of managers, techno-scientific experts and administrators (e.g. World Bank), but that 
should not be taken as an inference solely to effects of normalization and imposition. 
Alternative modes of governing or resisting government can be articulated non-
hierarchically and from within the various lines of the complex13. As Giorgio Agamben 
interprets it: 
 
‘The “term” apparatus designates […] a pure activity of governing devoid of any 
foundation in being. This is the reason why apparatuses must always imply a 
process of subjectification, that is to say, they must produce their subject’14. 
 
Based on the Foucaultian conception of productive power adapted for this thesis15, the 
emergence of this biodiversity complex is witnessed by general transformations in the 
                                               
11 Foucault, ‘Lemon and Milk’ 436 
12 Rose and Valverde, ‘Governed by Law?’ 
13 Such as INBio, cultural diversity models and biopiracy narratives examined in Chapter 4  
14 Agamben 11 
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object or target of governance, the ends and goals sought by governing, the requisite 
knowledge to perceive these objects and articulate these goals, and finally in the forms and 
modes of governing employed to achieve these goals. The chapter establishes the basic 
elements of these transformations to lay the groundwork for the more specialized case 
studies in Chapters 6 and 7. 
II │ TRANSFORMATIONS IN OBJECTS AND GOALS 
The 20002 Cancun Declaration of the LMMC16, despite the short-lived and transient nature 
of that particular group of states, represents an instructive starting point for understanding 
these transformations. By the time of that declaration, the CBD had been in force for 
approximately ten years, ostensibly pursuing the triple goal of conservation, sustainable use, 
and equitable benefit sharing. Yet these Latin American, African and Asian states, holders 
– their own term - of nearly 70% of the planet’s biological diversity, offered through their 
declaration a different focus and approach to the problematization of biodiversity. In this 
approach, conservation and sustainable use were by-products of the pursuit of other 
primary goals, and equitable benefit sharing is turned into a new general ethic of equity17. 
 
This new ethic is not presented as a new principle of international law, but as a diffuse 
guide for action for both state and nonstate actors. Under this new ethic, conservation and 
sustainable use are ensured by ‘responsible attitudes’, with no reference to states in 
particular. The new ethic is paired with a new economy ‘associated with the use of 
biological diversity, genetic resources and biotechnology’. The ‘urgent need’ outlined is not 
related in any way to any perceived environmental or biodiversity crisis, but is a need ‘to 
develop human resources, institutional capabilities, as well as an appropriate legal 
                                                                                                                                         
15 See Chapter 1 
16 See Chapter 1 
17 See Chapter 1, note 27 above. All subsequent references are from this text of the Cancun Declaration 
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framework and public policies to enable our countries to take an active part in the new 
economy’ 18 . In another subtle twist of the standard expectations of international 
environmental law, concern is further expressed over the limitations of international 
instruments in terms of protecting - not biodiversity itself - but the ‘legitimate interests of 
the countries of origin of biodiversity’. 
 
While sustainable development appears now as self-evident truth, the above statements 
constitute a significant reconfiguration of the notion of ‘development opportunity’, at least 
in reference to biodiversity. It is a forceful statement of belief in the idea of biodiversity as 
valuable resource and of intent to utilize this realization in the pursuit of their self-defined 
socioeconomic trajectories, their articulation of development models. It appeared that, at 
least at the macro level of the state, the political question of biodiversity, along with its 
problematisations and pathologies was being enthusiastically embraced. 
 
In this enthusiastic embrace of biodiversity, post-colonial critics of the idea of development 
may observe a repeat of history. In 1949, the North asserted that the South was 
underdeveloped, an invention that, once accepted, spawned a series of strategies, projects 
and programmes to overcome this deficiency at great cost and with decidedly adverse 
results19. Forty years later, it was again convincingly explained to the South how it was 
underutilising its biological and genetic resources, and once more this was accepted, under 
a neoliberal equation of development with integration within global markets20 and this 
posited new economy of biodiversity. While not as charismatic as Truman’s well-recited 
declaration of ‘underdevelopment’ in 1949, there is a certain commonality in the similar 
themes that resurface and resonate: losing out due to not tapping into the full economic 
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potential of resources, a call to embrace different modes of thinking and living, the promise 
of a better future together in a world society. 
 
On the other hand, the Cancun Declaration viewed as an expression of the biodiversity 
complex outline above, is also a more ‘intimate’ proposition than the development project. 
Far from ushering in some new strategy understood as a ‘third way’ of state-led 
development leading to the formation of new ‘eco-states’ in the South under the control of 
the World Bank21, the biodiversity complex instead focuses on the production of individual 
and collective subjectivity. Such an operation can be gleaned from the references to ethics, 
responsible attitudes and training to participate in the new economy. The new perspective 
of the biocomplex is evidenced in the decisions of the declaration, which again conceive of 
biodiversity conservation and use as means to achieve other ends. For example, the Group 
decided to: 
 
‘Ensure that the goods, services and benefits arising from the conservation and 
sustainable use […] are utilized for the development of our peoples, seeking among 
other objectives to improve upon food safety, overcome health problems that 
affects us, and preserve our cultural integrity’22. 
THE IDEA OF GENETIC GOLD 
The manifestation of such specific goals, and progressively of an additional, nonstate 
‘micro’ level of analysis was part of a broader process by which biodiversity became 
intrinsically associated with the idea of genetic23 or green24 ‘gold’ during the first decade of 
                                               
21 This argument in relation to the World Bank is made in Michael Goldman, ‘Eco-governmentality and 
Other Transnational Practices of a "Green" World Bank’ in Richard Peet and Michael Watts (eds), Liberation 
Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements (2nd edn, Routledge 2004) 
22 Emphasis added. See note 17 above 
23 McAfee  146-8 
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the operation of the CBD. The ‘new economy’ alluded to in the Cancun Declaration was 
the market economy of genetic gold. This notion produced the greatest transformation in 
all aspects of biodiversity governance at all scales, from the global to the local. 
 
Already by the time of the 1986 Forum, the potential of advances in biotechnology that 
enabled the identification of genetic information, as well as the extraction and re-
combination of this code in an increasing variety of genetic modifications, was becoming 
clear25. The synergy between this technology, bioprospecting activities26 and biodiversity 
conservation envisaged a positive ‘feedback loop’ between successful drug or crop research 
and development based on genetic sample collection financing the further conservation of 
biodiversity reserves that would in turn yield new valuable genetic raw material and more 
profitable products27. Pilot schemes for the additional transfer of benefits directly to those 
local communities in the South closer to these reserves yielding the profitable raw material 
were already enacted in the late 80s and early 90s by botanical institutions in the UK28 and 
various research institutions in the US29, before and outside the remit of the CBD. 
 
The economic potential of these resources is the ‘hidden’ element that transformed the 
remaining areas of high biodiversity, into reservoirs of untapped natural resources, i.e. 
biodiversity ‘hot spots’. Tapping these resources requires realising their inherent ‘biovalue’ 
– to be ‘generated wherever the generative and transformative productivity of living entities 
                                                                                                                                         
24 Ulrich Brand and Christoph Gorg, ‘The State and the Regulation of Biodiversity: International Politics and 
the Case of Mexico’ (2003) 34 Geoforum 221 
25 ‘Science is discovering new uses for biological diversity in ways that can relieve both human suffering and 
environmental destruction’. See Wilson, BioDiversity 3 
26 For extended history and information on the concept see Asebey, Edgar J. and Kempenaar, Jill D., 
'Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention' (1995) 28 Vandenbilt Journal 
of International Law 703. Also Reid, Walter V., et al., Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Genetic Resources for Sustainable 
Development (World Resources Institute, USA, 1993). 
27 Eisner, ‘Chemical Prospecting: A Proposal for Action’; Eisner, ‘Prospecting for Nature's Chemical Riches’; 
Eisner, ‘Chemical Prospecting: A Global Imperative’ 
28 Specifically the National History Museum, Kew Gardens and the London Zoo. See McConnell:39 
29 The earlier National Cancer Institute programme for drug discovery began in 1986, while the International 
Cooperative Biodiversity Groups programme, sponsored by the National Institutes of Health, National 
Science Foundation, began in 1993. For more information see Miller 
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can be instrumentalised along lines which make them useful for human projects’30. Hence, 
a significant part of biodiversity became conceived as ‘tradable commodities which are 
subject to market exchange and the assumptions of neoclassical economics’31. 
 
This assumed feedback loop hinged upon a ubiquitous use of bioprospecting contracts or 
similar access arrangements to capture biovalue and return the benefits to the South. 
Despite the fact that these contracts were still relatively straightforward business 
transactions based on supply and demand 32 , basic agreements to ‘produce’ and sell 
biodiversity as genetic resources to the highest bidder, they were elevated to the status of 
primary instruments for allocating investment in environment and development, i.e. in 
both natural capital and human capital, with benefits envisaged across the local, national 
and global levels. They would be able to: 
 
‘Contribute greatly to environmentally sound development and return benefits to 
the custodians of genetic resources – the national public at large, the staff of 
conservation units, the farmers, the forest dwellers, and the indigenous people who 
maintain or tolerate the resources involved’33. 
 
The same arrangements would provide the raw material for a host of new medicines, crops, 
and other biochemicals benefiting the whole world, while delivering substantial profit for 
                                               
30 Stefan Helmreich, ‘Blue-green Capital, Biotechnological Circulation and an Oceanic Imaginary: A Critique 
of Biopolitical Economy’ (2007) Biosocieties 287 295-8  
31 Kathleen McAfee, ‘Neoliberalism on the Molecular Scale: Economic and Genetic Reductionism in 
Biotechnology Battles ’ (2003) 34 Geoforum 203 
32 E.g. No company or research institution would conclude a bioprospecting agreement with a locale that did 
not contain significant reserves of undocumented biodiversity, irrespective of how environmentally 
endangered it was, as the sample collection would not discover new and potentially useful or valuable 
organisms and genes. 
33 Reid and others 2 
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Northern companies and economies 34 . No other mode of environmental intervention 
could offer comparable social and economic benefits in the pursuit of sustainable 
development. With such promise, it is little wonder that the INBio model was broadly 
touted as a ‘newly established paradigm’ and ‘development model’ 35  for Costa Rican 
society. 
 
Under the conception of this positive feedback loop, the first ten years of the CBD’s were 
thus marked by the proliferation of policy and technical manuals on the topic of realising 
the full economic potential of this genetic resource aspect of biodiversity, but also of 
traditional knowledge 36  of uses of biodiversity (e.g. for medicinal purposes) 37 . These 
manuals were directed exclusively to the South and proposed blueprints for the ‘new kinds 
of organizations, contracts and laws needed to ensure that both human communities and 
their natural surroundings benefit from the bioprospecting boom’38. 
 
Biodiversity Prospecting39 , the first such manual, drew directly from the INBio model and 
partnership with Merck. Its subtitle announced the newly desirable emphasis: ‘using genetic 
resources for sustainable development’. The manual provided the first comprehensive set 
of guidelines specifically for managing biodiversity as genetic gold. The core of this new 
rationality is encapsulated in the clever heading of the first chapter, A New Lease on Life. A 
subtle play on words, the triple meaning of ‘life’ in the phrase - i.e. as genetic resources, the 
environment in general as well as the welfare of Southern society - implies that a new lease 
                                               
34 Swanson, ‘The Reliance of Northern Economies on Southern Biodiversity: Biodiversity as Information’, 
ten Kate, ‘Biodiversity and Business: Coming to Terms with the 'Grand Bargain'’ 
35 Rodrigo Gamez, ‘The Link Between Biodiversity and Sustainable Development: Lessons From INBio's 
Bioprospecting Programme in Costa Rica’ in Charles R. McManis (ed), Biodiversity and the Law : Intellectual 
Property, Biotechnology & Traditional Knowledge (Earthscan 2007) 
36 This aspect is further explored in Chapter 7 
37 An indicative list includes Reid and others; ten Kate and Laird, The Commercial Use of Biodiversity; Sarah A 
Laird (ed) Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: Equitable Partnerships in Practice (Earthscan 2002) 




on life (i.e. according to the manual, market-oriented reforms for attracting investment 
opportunities in bioprospecting) would be a new lease of life for both nature and society in 
the South. This promising rhetoric of the future was grounded in the ‘flurry of interest and 
enthusiasm in biodiversity prospecting’40, partly due to the perceived success of the INBio 
experiment. An overwhelming sense of a historic shift occurring was prevalent in the 
instructions; a promise that the ‘true economic potential’41 of biodiversity was on the verge 
of being realised. 
 
The core condition for this promise was that this genetic gold would generally be a 
worthwhile investment opportunity for the North and an important development 
opportunity for the South. This was based on the prediction that bioprospecting would 
consistently yield profitable commercial products, in the form of highly prized 
pharmaceuticals, modified crops or other chemicals. However, the categories North and 
South, in terms of inferring action at state level, were at the same time conceptually 
bypassed by genetic gold, which refers to predominantly private partnerships between 
companies, research institutions and local communities. Coupled with the additional 
prioritization of in situ conservation, any commercial value and benefits would have to also 
accrue to the people in close proximity to the resource to have any meaningful impact on 
the conservation of biodiversity as raw material and the sustainable development of the 
South, viewed from the perspective of welfare improvement. 
 
With its emergence in the 1990s, the idea of genetic gold can be viewed as the concrete 
response to the political question of biodiversity that took shape after the entry into force 
of the CBD. Encapsulating the genetic reductionism of sociobiology, a Southern focus, and 
the economic grid of neoliberalism, it proposed a mechanism of exchange that recognised 
                                               
40 Ibid 2 
41 Ibid 1 
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the South as the poverty-stricken holder of biodiversity and sought to mobilize this 
pathology to achieve the goals of sustainable development. Other vectors of biodiversity 
can also be discerned within this idea of genetic gold as presented above, such as the effort 
to present environmental intervention as a positive activity (‘a new lease on life’), the 
promotion of competitive individualism (competition for bioprospecting contracts) as a 
core technique of governing, the requirement to test and justify governmental action in 
economic terms (genetic gold as a development opportunity), or the cooperative 
public/private resource management espoused by the World Bank. In combining these 
vectors, genetic gold succeeded in altering the direction of the legal framework of the 
CBD, turning into an instrument considerably removed from the actual legal text of the 
treaty. 
THE ALTERED ROLE OF THE CBD 
To turn this promise of genetic gold into reality, an identified ‘policy vacuum’42 had to be 
filled in order to ensure that ‘the commercial value obtained from genetic and biochemical 
resources is a positive force for development and conservation’43. In the bioprospecting 
manuals cited above, this vacuum was filled with reform in the areas of contract and 
intellectual property law, and not environmental law. After all, the whole edifice was based 
on securing sufficient investment in genetic resources through bioprospecting contracts. 
 
Inherent in this strategy was the notion that the CBD is the one regime that has to adjust 
to the market reality of bioprospecting and genetic gold and not the other way around. The 
CBD is thus assigned a governance or regulatory role in overseeing the operation of this 
market for genetic resources. This was expected to be achieved not through direct 
regulation, but through the enforcement of the terms of the bioprospecting contracts and 
                                               




other commercial transactions, as well as the institution of an effective intellectual property 
regime that would secure the realisation of biovalue and protect investment44. 
 
The most foundational act of the CBD from the perspective of genetic gold was already 
completed at the moment of its entry into force; the removal of biodiversity from the 
commons and the confirmation of national sovereignty over it45. The legal basis for genetic 
gold, and by extension all the mechanisms and measures adopted based on that idea, is 
property rights, which have to be guaranteed by state law. The operation of the CBD was 
then tasked to devise and progressively guarantee these forms of property rights over 
biodiversity stemming from national sovereignty, a task partially achieved through the 
recent Nagoya Protocol. In view of the market rationality of genetic gold, it may seem 
paradoxical that its foundation was the enforcement the sovereign right of the state over its 
natural resources; that genetic gold would be grounded on national sovereignty, the most 
classical of the statist tropes of international law.  
 
This paradox fed into the general confusion over the altered role reserved for the CBD 
within the idea of genetic gold. For example, there was criticism of the CBD as ‘an 
initiative of the North to globalise the control, management and ownership of biological 
diversity so as to ensure free access to the biological resources which are needed as raw 
material for the biotechnology industry’46. This criticism both overestimated the capacities 
of the legal framework in its 1990s infancy and underestimated other public and private 
entities (e.g. research institutions, companies, communities, transnational movements, 
individuals) imbricated in the idea of genetic gold. 
 
                                               
44 More analysis on these aspects in Chapter 6 
45 CBD, Art. 3 
46 Shiva, Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives on Biodiversity and Biotechnology 151 
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In fact, the dissemination of the idea of genetic gold brought the opposite result. It 
produced a proliferation of regional, national and sub-national biodiversity laws, 
regulations and practices that did not always follow the market economy of genetic gold. 
Within a seven-year span from 1995 to 2002, over 100 states, possessing the majority of the 
world’s remaining biodiversity, introduced various regulations regulating and de facto 
restricting access to genetic resources47, often in explicit and direct contrast to the CBD 
provision requiring them to facilitate access 48 . These largely protectionist laws –in 
economic terms- produced an additional heterogeneous tableau of divergent use provisions 
and access requirements tailored to regional, national and local perceptions of the correct 
path for fostering development through genetic gold. It is important to note that these 
were ostensibly specialised environmental laws referring to the treatment of genetic 
resources, a rather specific biodiversity component, and largely bypassed the other standard 
components, such as species and ecosystems. They were clearly motivated by the need to 
secure national sovereignty over these genetic resources, from which private ownership and 
market profits would flow. Hence, they were not protectionist in environmental terms, in 
the sense of protecting that biodiversity component from perceived threats or destructive 
practices. 
 
Thus, the CBD, as the de facto soft regulator the market economy of genetic gold, did not 
actually bring about the rationalization of conservation practices, globalisation of control 
and ownership of natural resources or the advent of some form of centralised development 
planning. Nevertheless, genetic gold instigated a proliferation of laws that effectively 
accepted the particular pathology of the South set out by biodiversity. This is the precisely 
the global situation that the Cancun Declaration spoke to in 2002. 
                                               
47 Kerry ten Kate, ‘Science and the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2002) 295 Science 2371, 2371 and 
note 4 
48 CBD, Art. 15(2): ‘Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic 
resources... and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the objectives of the Convention.’ 
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III │ GOVERNMENTAL METHOD 
While it would be comforting to have the CBD as a fixed anchor and a steady fort against 
this hovering maelstrom of laws, strategies aspirations, markets and contracts, the above 
transformations, driven by the idea of genetic gold, suggest the biodiversity complex, i.e. 
biodiversity as an arrangement for governing, has travelled far from the traditional borders 
of international environmental law into unknown territories, incorporating ‘an analysis of 
what happens and a programme of what should happen’49. From the above it can be argued 
that the object of governance has been transformed, from biodiversity in general to the 
specific market economy of genetic gold. As a result, the goals of the biocomplex have 
equally changed to energizing, supporting and overseeing this economy, and to fostering 
competition and market participation. However, the most crucial transformation remains 
the governmental method by which these goals are to be pursued, as this section illustrates. 
 
Under a model of sovereign power, the operation of an environmental treaty regime 
depends on the distinction between lawful and unlawful action in relation to the specific 
environmental problem at hand. For example, CITES concentrates on the trade of wild 
animals and wants to isolate and prevent its more destructive manifestations by establishing 
the illegality of trade in a number of globally listed endangered animals. The Montreal 
Protocol to the Ozone Treaty likewise establishes and enforces the illegality of the use of 
certain ozone depleting chemicals. The treaty breach in such regimes is easy to verify based 
on their system of prohibition; their future success is ‘what remains when everything that is 
prohibited has in fact been prevented’50. Under the influence of the law of treaties, this 
search for the codified division between the permitted and the prohibited always leads back 
                                               




to the text – the legal code – in order to define the internal legal rationality working 
towards the commonly agreed goal. 
 
In the post-genetic gold period, this juridical model for encoding power (permission-
prohibition and breach-enforcement) is insufficient when used on the biodiversity 
complex. There is no future eclipse of biodiversity loss as the common good that sovereign 
power pursues. Instead, following the notion that an apparatus that ‘grasps the point at 
which things are taking place, whether or not they are desirable [...] at the level of their 
effective reality’51, the biocomplex is a dispositional mechanism for ‘getting a hold’ on (i.e. 
arranging) the reality of biodiversity (i.e. history, uses, effects on human society etc.), as 
opposed to eliminating biodiversity loss. Foucault observes the following regarding 
mechanisms regulating grain and the phenomenon of scarcity, which can equally be said of 
the governmental approach to biodiversity and the phenomenon of biodiversity loss: 
 
‘For arranging things so that, by connecting to the very reality of these fluctuations, 
and by establishing a series of connections with other elements of reality, the 
phenomenon is gradually compensated for, checked, finally limited, and in the final 
degree cancelled out, without it being prevented or losing any of its reality’52. 
 
Since the ‘strategic imperative’53  of this disposition or arrangement in the biodiversity 
complex is not strictly the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, but the general 
improvement in the South, the ‘urgent need’54 that biodiversity as an apparatus is currently 
responding to is not actually a global biodiversity crisis, but rather the lack of development 
or poverty of certain localities.  
                                               
51 Ibid 46-47 
52 Ibid 37 
53 See this chapter, note 8 above 




Therefore, this broad strategic project, of spiralling trajectories and multiplying directions, 
functions through the disposition or arrangement of the relations between people and 
resources towards the improvement of conditions in the South. Thus, this mode of 
operation precludes the establishment of law or the state as the privileged source of 
authority and, ultimately, power. Instead of producing and enforcing environmental laws to 
prevent destructive behaviour leading to biodiversity loss, the objective is to arrange and 
guide, to ‘conduct the conduct’ towards the strategic aims adapted from sustainable 
development. The reversal in this complex is not solely its near-exclusive Southern focus, 
but that it constitutes a form of environmental governance that considers human 
population as a collection of subjects to be governed according to ends related to them as 
individuals and collectivities, rather than as targets of regulation in relation to hierarchically 
predetermined environmental aims. 
 
From a Foucaultian perspective, the goal of the biocomplex is not to simply manage 
biodiversity as a genetic resource, i.e. according to a set of updated bioeconomic 
rationalities of the World Bank, but to manage biodiversity-related phenomena at their 
intersection with the market and society; to govern all three, by irrevocably linking the 
physiology of biodiversity loss with the pathology of the South; to articulate a form of 
biopolitics of ‘the perpetual conjunction, the perpetual intrication of a geographical, 
climatic, and physical milieu with the human species’55, and to ultimately ‘exercise power at 
that point of connection where nature, in the sense of physical elements, interferes with 
nature, in the sense of nature of the human species’56. 
 
                                               




In terms of techniques employed within this biodiversity complex to bring these goals 
about, it has already been mentioned that subjectification is increasingly the preferred 
choice. Subjectification posits a kind of alternative Kuznets curve leading to sustainable 
development. A ‘curve of normality’ is hypothesised, where the genetic gold-influenced 
environmental management is simply distributed along a continuum with other forms of 
hard and soft environmental intervention. In place of prohibitive environmental laws or 
binding standards, it is simply through the overwhelming promise of genetic gold that ‘the 
most unfavourable, deviant normalities are to be brought back in line with the more 
favourable ones’57. In this way, the promise of genetic gold itself can also be interpreted as 
a governmental technique that entails: 
 
‘positing of an optimal model in terms of a certain result... and trying to get people, 
movements, and actions to conform to this model, the normal being precisely that 
which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal that which is incapable of 
conforming to this norm’58. 
 
There is no longer reliance on the imposition of external rules ‘in relation to an extrinsic 
standard of authority, morality, virtue, order, duty or obedience’ 59 , but a notion of 
subjectification emerging ‘out of the very nature of that which is governed’60. If biodiversity 
is accepted as a genetic resource, it also becomes normal that it should be managed as such. 
If the majority of biodiversity is located in the South, then it also becomes normal that 
such managerialist approaches should adopted in the South. Genetic gold appears to 
quietly remove the need for enforcement, replacing it with an incitement to conduct 
oneself normally, i.e. according to the goals set by an analysis of the object to be governed. 
                                               
57 Ibid 62 
58 Ibid 57 
59 Rose and Valverde, ‘Governed by Law?’ 544 




At the micro, nonstate level, the biodiversity complex thus incites individuals in the South 
to attain a particular subjectivity, and not simply to implement, enforce or obey a new set 
of environmental laws. By calculating their conduct according to a set of bioeconomic 
norms, by aligning themselves with the normality curve set by the biodiversity complex, 
individuals, groups, communities, societies can grow, develop and improve. It is not a task 
for the state or an international institution like the CBD to accomplish, but the individual 
and community who –if successful – will have turned themselves into self-governed 
subjects in addition to targets of regulation. This process includes proposed Southern-
based counter-conducts, such as, for example, those envisioned by Shiva or the biopiracy 
narrative61, which are directed towards the modification of individual and communal ways 
of living against the state and the market without rejecting the concept of biodiversity itself. 
Thus, they remain part of the complex.  
 
Under this different rubric, it is not surprising that one of the first acts of INBio was the 
training of a cadre of informal ‘parataxonomists’ to assist in the production of genetic 
information62 . It certainly highlights that even the grandest possible strategic vision of 
genetic gold will invariably have to start with people on the ground physically going out 
and collecting samples of plants, insects, other animals and organisms and returning them 
to a lab where they can be studied, catalogued, measured and turned into biological and 
genetic information, the input format for the biotechnology industry. 
 
However, the important function of this training is not the transfer of the rudimentary 
technical know-how related to preserving, transferring and identifying samples of biological 
and genetic resources required for the preparatory phase of sample collection and database 
                                               
61 See Chapter 4, page 129 
62 See Chapter 4, page 127 
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creation. It is the dissemination of ‘responsible attitudes’, eco-managerial norms, 
environmental ethics and perceptions of Costa Rican identity, i.e. of subjectivity in general, 
that differentiates this seemingly small-scale taxonomic activity from long-standing and 
socio-ecologically catastrophic export-led industrial agricultural production, where the local 
population represents nothing more than untrained, menial, less than minimum wage 
labour. It is also –in Foucaultian terms – a political technology of individuals, i.e. ‘a way by 
which, we have been led to recognize ourselves as a society, as a part of a social entity, as a 
part of a nation or of a state’63. 
 
Whether this knowledge and skills will coalesce into a hyper-economic rationality, where 
the search for the next bioprospecting contract organises a new form of neoliberal 
enterprise society or – in contrast - into a political rationality of devolving resource 
management to the local level and adopting decentralised and community-based decision 
making is left completely open and is indeed a site of conflict and struggle64. The point 
remains that through such forms of training, the biodiversity complex can alter the relation 
between nature and society at a very ‘intimate’ level - one individual or community at a 
time. The lesson of genetic gold is simply and subtly delivered, without resorting to overt 
legal acts. 
 
Therefore, the reduction of genetic gold to an ideology belonging to the capitalist North, 
neoliberal globalisation or the equation of the biodiversity complex with the programmes 
of the old developmental state of the 1970s and 1980s should be resisted. The idea that 
biodiversity may be valuable or indeed that the South should profit from it is not rejected 
outright even by the discourse of biopiracy. Vandana Shiva noted that ‘the Third World 
must urgently take stock of its genetic resources, particularly those contained in tropical 
                                               
63 Foucault, ‘The Political Technology of the Individuals’ 404 
64 As analysed in subsequent Chapters 6 and 7 
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forests’65. It is the particular methods of commercialisation and commodification primarily 
for export in global markets that are resisted as ‘working inherently against justice and 
ecological sustainability’66, and will usher in ‘a new era of bio imperialism built on the 
biological impoverishment of the world’ 67 . The conflict here resides seems to mimic 
phenomena from similar governmental methods arising out of other natural resources. For 
example, Michael Watts notes that oil, aside from being a biophysical entity and a market 
commodity, also ‘harbours fetishistic qualities [...] [as] the bearer of meanings, of hopes, of 
expectations of unimaginable powers’68. 
 
As a final point regarding the governmental method of the biocomplex, it is important to 
note that the necessary resistance to dominant forms of genetic gold within the biodiversity 
complex largely occurs at the micro level; the processes and techniques for the production 
of subjectivity; over the distribution of normal conduct along the curve; over the ways in 
which individuals, communities and societies would employ genetic gold to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their actions and the appropriateness of their conduct. It does not refer 
solely to government as the structuring of the field of action for others, but also to self-
government as the conduct of conduct, to the individual as an acting subject ‘tied to his 
own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’69; not only to how biodiversity was to be 
used sustainably, but also politically and metaphorically as the founding image of a 
community of governable subjects. 
IV │ DISSASSEMBLING BIODIVERSITY 
                                               




68 Watts 17 
69 Foucault, ‘Omnes et Singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political Reason’ 
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Striking at the heart of the environment versus development binary, the call of genetic gold 
emerged as a strategy that clearly attempted the cut to the Gordian knot of economic 
development and environmental protection. It led to the reorientation of the CBD from 
the very first years of its entry into force, further and further away from the treaty text. 
Genetic gold signifies the transition from biodiversity as an idea or a concept to 
biodiversity as a device, an apparatus, an arrangement through which governing is possible. 
 
Although this aspect has been consistently underplayed in the largely political and 
economic history presented in this thesis, certain observations regarding the operation of 
this biodiversity complex in relation to environmentalism (as the general movement for 
more environmental protection) are in order. First and foremost, the term biodiversity 
complex appears almost a euphemism, as the focus rests almost exclusively on the genetic 
component of biodiversity to the point that the two became synonymous. After all the 
holistic ethics, variants of synthesis and rationalizations proposed in the history of 
biodiversity up to the signing of the CBD, it appears that the transformations driven by 
genetic gold have in effect succeeding in disassembling the host of environmental concerns 
housed under the umbrella of biodiversity. 
 
Secondly, the understanding of biodiversity as genetic gold has become increasingly 
divorced from the rest of the environmental legal framework. In particular after the 
forthcoming entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol70, genetic resources will possess their 
own, specialised regime that bears little resemblance to international environmental law. 
This reduces the importance of both the other biodiversity components (species, 
ecosystems) and the part of the CBD that refers to them. 
 
                                               
70 Presented in Chapter 1, further analysed in Chapter 6 
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Thirdly, this disassembly of biodiversity has inevitably derailed to a certain extent the 
pursuit of environmental goals within the biocomplex. If biodiversity is nothing more than 
genetic resources, only biodiversity ‘hotspots’ matter. There is no incentive, norm or ethic 
to protect habitats, areas and regions that do not contain unexplored, undocumented and 
untapped irrespective of their possibly precarious ecological status. In cynically blunt terms, 
no one cares - under a narrative of genetic gold - if the United Kingdom or Germany are 
preserving or destroying their biodiversity. Every component is doubly documented and 
preserved already. Again, this line of reasoning is very far from the legal text and principles 
that underpin the CBD. 
 
Despite these questionable environmental credentials, a community or a state holding the 
correct type of biodiversity which refuses to manage its biodiversity or govern its 
population according to the bioeconomic knowledge of genetic gold and sustainable 
development respectively is bound to be considered as acting irrationally, rather than 
committing an unlawful act under international environmental law. It has become 
‘abnormal’, an environmental deviant with a problematic sense of identity, irrational 
choices, expounding an illegible narrative that cannot be understood. This abnormal does 
not require punishment, the enforcement of court decisions and penalties, but is in need of 
care, in need of the provision of the tools and knowledge to become normal again. By 
extension, legal and policy reform are mobilised through a pervasive fear of failing to 
participate, of being left out of a global system of opportunity, of becoming fixed and 
immobile as opposed to dynamic and improving; ultimately the fear of the failure to attain 
the desired norm, change environmental behaviour and construct a legible identity through 




To conclude, the decisive difference of the biodiversity complex over other forms of 
environmental regulation or governance rests in its ability to be implemented and operate 
through the technique of empowering individuals, communities and other social groups as 
actors. Against perceived environmental regulatory wisdom, it is a form of government that 
accepts and works through the freedom of individual subjects to destroy the natural 
environment, calibrating this capacity towards alternate ends but not seeking to forbid it 
outright. Within a broad context of liberal environmentalism, it also has to accept that 
these governed subjects will have to be capable of ‘thinking otherwise’71, problematising 
biodiversity loss and environmental governance in unforeseen ways and administering their 
biological and genetic resources accordingly. 
 
It is evident that the idea of genetic gold confirms the biodiversity complex’s place within 
the Western tradition of liberal modes of government, irrespective of how this may be seen 
in some quarters of the South. Although such rationalities of governing have produced the 
neoliberal subject of the profit-maximising individual in an Anglo-American society, this is 
not a priori necessary the case for the biodiversity complex in its particular context of 
Southern society. The exercise of power in the biocomplex can be about not adopting the 
American environmental aesthetic centred on national parks and wilderness, or the 
European view of sustainable development as an administrative ethic, but about 
recombining them in order to eventually construct different versions and adapted Southern 
subjectivities. The empowerment of individuals and communities in the South entails the 
possibility of new actors and partnerships forging new composite environmental subjects. 
Examples of such counter-conducts are examined in the next two chapters. 
                                               




GOVERNING IN THE BIOCOMPLEX I: THE 
ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING MECHANISM 
 
 
On the 2nd February 2011, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity was opened for signature at the United Nations headquarters in New 
York, subsequent to its adoption at the Convention’s tenth COP on the 29th October 2010, 
in Nagoya. This last step – until its predicted entry into force - signifies the end of a long 
negotiating process, primarily through the format of ad-hoc working groups within the 
framework of the CBD, which formally commenced in 2002 with the call to negotiate an 
international access to genetic resources and benefit sharing (ABS) regime in the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development’s Plan of Implementation1. This was a culmination of 
a smaller scale process that had already been taking place within the CBD since the very 
first meetings 2  and had already led, by 2002, to the adoption of the ‘soft-law’ Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
arising out of their Utilization3. 
 
This chapter examines the recent Nagoya Protocol, the Bonn Guidelines and the current 
ABS mechanisms as envisaged by the joined reading of these two instruments. It outlines a 
verdict of failure over its environmental outcomes and then proceeds to examine the 
factors driving this perception. In the process, the reform of the ABS mechanism of the 
                                               
1 Par. 44(o). Available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm 
2 Note for example that the complexity of the mosaic of different access regimes, intellectual property 
systems, and approaches to benefit sharing is already debated in COP3/Decision III/15 on Access to 
Genetic Resources (1997), in terms of the need for the harmonization of national ‘legislative, administrative 
and policy measures’ and the development of best-practice guidelines 
3 Adopted through COP 6 Decision VI/24 (2002) 
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treaty as mandated by the Protocol is also presented. The chapter observes a confusion in 
terms of the role and objectives of a perceived, but never materialised, ‘international ABS 
regime’ and traces this back to the limitations of the market economy for genetic gold that 
underpins the biodiversity complex. The discrepancy between the Protocol’s stated goals, 
the presumed environmental aims attached to any environmental instrument, and the 
strategic goals identified within the biocomplex are used throughout the chapter to analyse 
the effects of ABS as a technique of governing. 
I | HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE FAILURE OF THE NAGOYA 
PROTOCOL 
The initial language and conceptual construction of the treaty did not explicitly envisage the 
creation of a separate international ABS regime, as was the case with the protocol 
governing the transfer of genetically modified organisms4. The ABS acronym was not even 
used in the first COPs, as there was no decision yet on the national procedures for 
implementing this provision or even on the constituent elements of what subsequently 
became ABS5. What was of great importance for the South6, however, was that the COP 
affirmed, even at that early stage, that ‘the CBD is grounded on mutual reliance on fair and 
equitable sharing for the prosperity of all humankind’7. This affirmation was repeated in the 
Cancun Declaration’s aspiration of a universal ‘new ethic of equity’8. 
 
                                               
4 Or living modified organisms (LMOs) in the language of the CBD. See CBD, Article 19(3), which explicitly 
envisages the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (1999) 
5 For example see COP Decision II/12 (1995), which dealt solely with intellectual property rights and their 
impact on biodiversity conservation, without reference to access to genetic resources or benefit-sharing 
6Mainly expressed though the -then- newly formed negotiating Group of 77 (G77) and China, also active in 
the context of WTO negotiations. See CBD, Report of the Second Meeting of COP to the CBD (UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19, 1995), par. 107 
7Jakarta Ministerial Declaration on the Implementation of the CBD (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19, 
1995), Appendix, par. 5 
8 See Chapter 5 
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Before Nagoya, there was Bonn. In 2002, the Convention adopted the voluntary ‘Bonn 
guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising out of their Utilization’9. These guidelines applied to both genetic resources as 
genetic material10 and their derivatives11, assigning limited property rights over them12. The 
guidelines were drafted as a ‘soft-law’ instrument, marking the first concerted multilateral 
contribution towards assisting the achieving the CBD’s fair and equitable benefit sharing 
objective. The main legal task was to elaborate and expand upon primarily CBD Article 15, 
laying the groundwork for a future introduction of a standardized process for granting 
access to genetic resources and sharing of benefits arising from their utilization. The Bonn 
guidelines were thus designed as model legislation to assist primarily Southern states in 
‘constructing national regulatory capacity’13, and for this reason included detailed provisions 
regarding the elaboration of ABS provisions at various levels. 
 
Therefore, the legal objectives of this initiative were multiple: (i) the harmonization of 
national and regional law and policy regarding ABS, after the legislative explosion of ad hoc 
regimes during the years 1995-2002 in line with the idea of genetic gold14; (ii) the provision 
of a ‘model law’, assisting states with limited legislative capacity regarding the complex issue 
of regulating the new genetic resources markets and; (iii) creation and gradual enhancement 
of a customary or legal obligation of states to always provide some form of ABS measures 
or mechanism within their jurisdiction, acting as a source of new international 
environmental law. 
 
                                               
9 COP Decision VI/24 (2002), Annex. [Bonn guidelines] 
10 I.e. containing functional units of heredity as defined in CBD, Art. 2 
11 I.e. biochemicals. On derivatives see page 186 below 
12For more information on the additions to standard CBD ‘doctrine’ see Stephen Tully, ‘The Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing’ (2003) 12 Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law 84, 86 
13Phrase used by the influential LMMC 
14 As outlined in Chapter 5 
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Building on the Bonn guidelines negotiations commenced on a new international ABS 
regime in 2004, ‘with the aim of adopting instrument/instruments to effectively implement 
Article 15 and Article 8(j), and the three objectives of the Convention’15 . This would 
eventually lead to the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol. 
 
In addition to the Bonn guidelines, some form of centralized, global ABS mechanism or 
‘joint regulatory framework’ 16  had been understood as a response to the legislative 
proliferation induced by the acceptance of genetic gold17. The adoption of ad hoc national 
biodiversity legislation focussing on access to genetic resources was expected to foster 
destructive regulatory competition, especially between neighbouring states with similar 
genetic resources. The fear of a ‘race to the bottom’, a reciprocal lowering of standards in 
order to attract the desired foreign investment, initially led to a number of regional 
initiatives as attempts to eradicate the perceived limitations inherent in national approaches 
to ABS legislation18. Most prominent amongst those was the Andean Pact’s Decision 39119, 
as well as the more broadly-themed African Model Law20. The Bonn guidelines initially 
brought a similar harmonizing logic to the global stage, further confirmed by the Nagoya 
Protocol. The ‘race to the bottom’ phenomenon could have been negated with the 
institution of a ‘biodiversity cartel’21 of price control and trade quotas, similar to the OPEC 
arrangement for oil-producing states. The Bonn guidelines and the Nagoya Protocol did 
                                               
15 COP Decision VII/19 (2004), Article 1 
16  Timo Goeschl and others, ‘Incentivizing Ecological Destruction? The Global Joint Regulation of the 
Conservation and Use of Genetic Resources’ (2005) 38 Indiana Law Review 619 
17 Shamama Afreen and Biju Paul Abraham, ‘Bioprospecting: Promoting and Regulating Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit Sharing’ (2009) 36 Decision 121 
18 For more on the “race to the bottom” scenario and the proposals to counter it see Cabrera, Jorge and 
Garforth, Kathryn, 'Global Access, Local Benefits: An International Access and Benefit Sharing Regime?' in 
Cordonier Segger, M C and Weeramantry, C G (eds), Sustainable Justice: Reconciling Economic, Social and 
Environmental Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden; Boston, 2005) 223 
19 Andean Pact, Decision 391, Common System on Access to Genetic Resources (1996). [Decision 391]. The decision 
instituted minimum rules to be applied by all member states 
20 African Model Law for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of 
Access to Biological Resources (2000) by the (then Organization of African Unity) African Union. [African Model 
Law]   
21 Tilford, David S., 'Saving the Blueprints: The International Legal Regime for Plant Resources' (1998) 30 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 373, 436-40 
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not follow this trajectory of monopolization, due to the incompatibility with the 
individualist and market rationality of genetic gold dominating the biocomplex. 
 
Interestingly, the advance text of the Protocol contained a synthesizing, umbrella definition 
of a new international ABS regime that: 
 
‘Is constituted of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Protocol on Access 
to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
from their Utilisation, as well as complimentary instruments, including the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and the 
Bonn Guidelines’22. 
 
This statement comes fairly close to constituting a legal acknowledgement of the existence 
of the broader governmental framework termed the biocomplex, where the CBD is simply 
one of many legal instruments, measures and tactics for achieving strategic goals. However, 
this inadvertent confirmation has subsequently been removed from the final text of the 
Protocol now open for signature due to jurisprudential reasons. First, it is very difficult to 
argue, as will be explained further on in this chapter, that the Protocol is actually instituting 
a new international legal regime. Secondly, such a statement obviously raised jurisdictional 
issues in terms of the interactions of the different legal regimes under the synthesis. 
 
The Nagoya Protocol was concluded as the presumed final piece of a legal jigsaw 
consisting of a succession of legal instruments expected to coalesce into a fully-fledged 
international ABS regime. However, on closer reading the Protocol has largely failed in this 
crucial legal task. For practitioners hoping for the untangling of the web of conflicting 
                                               
22 Protocol, Preamble. 
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access legislation, intellectual property systems and benefit sharing mechanisms referring to 
genetic resources overlapping at national, regional and international levels, this is certainly 
not the ambitious legal text to achieve the particular goal of legal clarity. For legal analysts 
hoping for a rationalization of the conflicting strands of legal thought imbricated within the 
ABS mechanism, the Protocol is still meant only to accompany, rather than supersede 
existing legal regimes addressing property rights, access, use and protection of genetic 
resources, such as those created under the auspices of the WTO, the International Union 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants and FAO. 
 
In a move echoing the negotiation and signing of the CBD itself23, the effective function 
falls short – strictly from a legal perspective - of the aspirational conceptual function (in 
this case an international ABS regime) that drove the Protocol negotiations in the first 
place. The protocol is instead modestly identified as ‘the instrument of implementation of 
the access and benefit-sharing provisions of the Convention’24. Recognising that it pursues 
the CBD’s third overall objective of fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from 
sustainable utilisation25, the scope of this new international regime is equally limited to 
precisely those genetic resources already within the scope of Article 15 of the Convention26. 
 
In international relations terms, the Protocol cautiously ventures into areas and 
jurisdictions already claimed by other international organizations and regimes. Even before 
setting up an institutional framework and instituting any procedures, the text of the 
Protocol addresses first this contentious issue of the position of the CBD’s potential ABS 
regime in relation to other international instruments in the maze of overlapping 
                                               
23 On the never-realised proposal for the CBD to be an amalgamated nature conservation treaty, see Chapter 
4 
24 Protocol, Art. 4.4 
25 Protocol, Preamble 
26 Protocol, Art. 3. With the slight exception of derivatives discussed below 
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jurisdictions over genetic resources. This sensitive issue is filed away by recourse to the 
standard statements and treaty provisions. Therefore, rights and obligations from existing 
international agreements are not affected by the Protocol27 , and no hierarchy is to be 
created between the Protocol and other international agreements28. There are no structural 
changes to the either pre-existing CBD framework or the broader international 
environmental law relating to biodiversity. Thus the Protocol emerges as yet another 
standard addition to the vast legal mosaic of international legal instruments dealing with 
environmental issues, and follows the pattern of the altered role of the CBD as the market 
regulator within the biocomplex, as instructed by the idea of genetic gold. 
 
In fact, it can be argued further that the wording of Art. 4 on institutional relations seems 
engineered to make any international regime as inconsequential and irrelevant as possible. 
The perception of a de facto no-effect clause is further strengthened by the future pre-
emption that ‘nothing in the Protocol shall prevent Parties from developing or 
implementing relevant international agreements, including other specialized access and benefit-
sharing agreements’ 29 . The particular emphasis on the possibility of replacing the ABS 
mechanism with newer ‘specialised access and benefit-sharing arrangements’ is a reference 
to the current Doha round of trade talks for reforming the WTO, and thus seeks to 
prevent the use of the Protocol to influence or alter the intellectual property arrangements 
of that regime,30 as was the case with the CBD and the initial TRIPs agreement. 
 
While this submissive approach is qualified by clauses regarding existing rights and 
obligations not ‘causing serious damage or threat to biodiversity’ and new agreements that 
                                               
27 Protocol, Art. 4.1 
28 Protocol, Ibid. 
29 Emphasis added. Art. 4.2 
30 Protocol, Art. 4.3: ‘Due regard should be paid to useful and relevant on-going work or practices under such 
international instruments and international organizations.’ 
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have to be ‘supportive and not run counter to the objectives of the Convention’, it is 
obvious that compliance with the Protocol is somewhat provisional and optional; in any 
case, any eventually instituted regime will function in parallel (or ‘mutually supportive 
manner’31) to other existing and future related instruments, without being able to affect or 
impinge upon them in any way. To a certain extent, the Protocol assigns a wholly 
subsidiary role for the much-advertised international ABS regime; it becomes dependent on 
a lack of overlap with other agreements - past, present and future - for it to have any effect 
on the utilisation of genetic resources and achieve any form of sharing or redistribution of 
benefits. 
 
In terms of the institutional framework, it is important to reiterate that the Nagoya 
Protocol does not establish an international ABS regime, as advertised and mandated 
during the negotiations and following the example of FAO’s multilateral system for plant 
genetic resources32. For example, the Protocol’s preamble recognizes that: 
 
‘An innovative solution is required to address the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits [...] associated with genetic resources that occur in transboundary situations 
or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent.’ 
 
However, this innovative solution is not provided in the rest of the text. Furthermore, the 
gratuitously named ‘global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism’ is not actually instituted 
by the article of the Protocol bearing the same title33. Instead, the ‘need and modalities’ of 
such a mechanism are to be further considered by the Parties, with the added restriction 
that it will only cover benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and 
                                               
31 Ibid 
32 This related regime is examined in Chapter 7 below. 
33 Protocol, Art. 10. 
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traditional knowledge ‘that occur in transboundary situations or for which it is not possible 
to grant or obtain prior informed consent’34. Hence, even if instituted, such an ABS regime 
would not be a centralized management system akin to FAO’s regime, but would only 
apply to specific categories of genetic resources not covered by national legislation or 
bilateral trade agreements; the leftover resources not valuable or significant enough to be 
claimed. The overall smoke and mirrors character of this provision is the clearest 
illustration of the effective failure of the negotiations for an international ABS regime being 
hidden in plain sight within the legal text purporting to be an agreement on the very topic. 
 
This failure of the Protocol to achieve its mandated legal objective is further reflected in 
the immediately following weak provision regarding this ‘transboundary cooperation’35. As 
genetic resources or indeed traditional knowledge or indigenous communities may not fall 
neatly inside the lines of national jurisdictions, the cases of overlap and competition 
between different jurisdictions having sovereign rights over the same resource or 
knowledge are common occurrence. However, the Protocol simply asks the Parties where 
the same resources or traditional knowledge are to be found to ‘endeavour to cooperate, as 
appropriate... with a view to implementing the Protocol’. The transboundary character of 
biodiversity would be precisely the major gap, incentive and primary target of regulation for 
an actual global ABS regime, but no such mechanism is forthcoming in the Protocol. 
 
There are no new international institutions or authorities being created by the Protocol, 
except the specialised ABS clearing house mechanism for information sharing being added 
to the existing clearing house mechanism of the treaty36. The Protocol will generally use the 
existing Conference of the Parties, Secretariat, financial mechanism and the rest of the 
                                               
34 Protocol, Art. 10 
35 Protocol, Art. 11 
36 Protocol, Art. 14. For more information on institutional see Section II below 
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existing institutional structure of the Convention, in similar fashion to the previous 
Cartagena protocol to the Convention. As regards implementation, monitoring and 
compliance, the Protocol on the whole follows the format of the Convention itself and 
relies exclusively on national ‘legal, administrative and policy measures’ to achieve its 
objectives. 
 
The verdict of qualified failure reserved for the Protocol37 is of course based on a standard 
legal analysis that is based on the internal legal rationality of the text and external standards 
derived from international environmental law under Lyster’s constant fear of the sleeping 
treaty. Within this doctrinal framework, it is clear that the Protocol is engineered to create 
the least amount of reform of the CBD, international environmental law, the jurisdiction of 
FAO over certain types of genetic resources, the control of all property rights regimes by 
the WTO rationality, or indeed existing domestic ABS legislation38. It is thus rather a waste 
of an expansive negotiating mandate. The aim of harmonization was already being 
accomplished via the Bonn guidelines and other regional initiatives. The Protocol simply 
applied a veneer of binding form and occasionally more direct and forceful legal language39. 
 
If the Protocol is considered as nothing more than the Bonn guidelines redux, then it is a 
very poor return for eight years of complicated negotiations. Furthermore, such a 
Sisyphean exercise exemplifies the current blackmail of environmental law, as even without 
state consensus on primary substantive provisions – such as whether a global ABS regime 
                                               
37 E.g. Stuart R. Harrop, ‘'Living in Harmony With Nature'? Outcomes of the 2010 Nagoya Conference of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2011) 23 Journal of Environmental Law 117 
38 See for example, in Art 4.4, the condition that: ‘where a specialized international access and benefit-sharing 
instrument applies that is consistent with, and does not run counter to the objectives of the Convention and 
this Protocol, this Protocol does not apply to the Party or Parties to the specialized instrument in respect of 
the specific genetic resource covered by and for the purpose of that special instrument.’ 




should actually be constituted – the CBD must move forward at all costs, presenting the 
image of progress in law and policy to counteract biodiversity’s continuing decline. 
II | THE ABS MECHANISM AFTER THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL 
To complete this standard normative analysis, the second element to examine would be the 
substantive provisions regarding the regulation of access to genetic resources and the 
mechanisms for benefit sharing. In this part of the Protocol, novel contributions to the 
CBD regime are in fact identifiable. These include a new legal definition guiding the 
benefit-sharing provisions of the Protocol, an elaborate transnational monitoring and 
compliance mechanism, the detailed integration of local and indigenous communities and 
their traditional knowledge throughout the text of the Protocol, and the resetting of the 
directions and goals of the ABS regime. 
 
The following section identifies and analyses the operation of a transnational ABS 
mechanism gleaned from the Protocol’s provisions, as opposed to the formal global ABS 
regime envisaged but never materialized by the Protocol. Emphasis is placed on changes 
on three fronts: (i) scope of application, (ii) the process of signing ABS agreements, and (iii) 
the new decentralised monitoring and compliance system. 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
Although it has proven difficult to distinguish effectively, genetic resources are defined in 
the CBD as ‘genetic material of actual or potential value’40, whereas genetic material is 
defined as ‘any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional 
units of heredity’41. Genetic resources are further distinguished from the broader category 
of biological resources, which are defined as including ‘organisms or parts thereof, 
                                               
40 CBD, Art 2  
41 Ibid  
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populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or 
value for humanity’42. 
 
Utilization of genetic resources is specifically defined in the Nagoya protocol as ‘to conduct 
research and development on the genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic 
resources’43. This type of utilization gives rise to a legal obligation to share the benefits with 
the provider of these resources44. Biotechnology is explicitly included in this obligation as a 
specialised sub-category of utilisation defined as ‘any technological application that uses 
biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or 
processes for specific use’45. The Protocol specifically mentions that biotechnology can 
make use of a derivate - i.e. ‘a naturally-occurring biochemical compound resulting from 
the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources’, even if it 
constitutes genetic material without functional units of heredity, and thus not legally a 
genetic resource according to the CBD - and still create such benefit sharing obligations. 
 
This arsenal of legal definitions of utilization and biotechnology indicate efforts at 
clarifying the benefit-sharing function of the CBD. The syntax of the original Convention 
article relating to benefit-sharing is convoluted, resulting in conflicting interpretations of 
the scope of application. Note especially the phrase: 
 
                                               
42 Ibid 
43  The CBD only included a definition of the broader term ‘sustainable use’, which was essentially an 
adjustment of the sustainability/sustainable development definition of the 1987 Brudtland Report. See CBD, 
Art. 2: ‘"Sustainable use" means the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does 
not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs 
and aspirations of present and future generations’ 
44 CBD, Art. 15.3, 15.7. Protocol, Art.5 
45 CBD, Art. 2. Protocol, Art. 2 
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‘ [...] with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and 
development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of 
genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources’46. 
 
In the above wording, there is a series of confusing choices in language. First, research and 
development is distinguished from utilisation, which in turn produces a second undefined 
distinction between results and benefits, which was depicted at the time by the US 
government as a ‘ploy’ by the developing world to interfere and circumvent the emerging 
intellectual property regime being negotiated at the WTO by forcing the transfer of 
patented biotechnology; i.e. the ‘results’ of research and development 47 . Secondly, the 
open-ended nature of the term ‘other utilization’ of genetic resources, too close to the 
more general, but wholly different term ‘sustainable utilization or use’ that constituted the 
second objective of the Convention, also created confusion as to what kind of activities 
would create an obligation for benefit-sharing, fuelling additional fears over forced 
transfers of technology and compulsory licensing regimes. 
 
The Protocol replaces this muddled provision with a clearer structure that recognizes three 
distinct categories of use: utilization (general R&D), application (biotechnology) and 
commercialization that all create an equal obligation to be accompanied by a written benefit 
sharing agreement with the provider48. 
 
In another major innovation of the Nagoya Protocol, the scope of application of ABS is 
specifically extended to local and indigenous communities. This is a significant change 
from the original treaty text that worded their concern over these communities in 
                                               
46 CBD, Art 15.7 
47 See Coughlin and page 119 above 
48 Protocol, Art. 5 
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protectionist terms and placed them under the in situ conservation article, and thus the 
biodiversity conservation objective of the CBD49. In contrast, the Protocol conceives of 
community involvement as an integral element of the ABS mechanism. They are 
recognised as holders of genetic resources, provided this recognition stems from ‘domestic 
legislation over [their] established rights’50, and thus entitled to benefit sharing. At the same 
time, the utilization of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, instead of 
resources themselves, is equally and separately recognised as a category of utilization also 
creating a full benefit sharing obligation for the user51. If the rights of these communities to 
control their resources and knowledge associated with them are established in domestic 
law, then access to their resources is dependent on their ‘approval and involvement’52, 
which may be subject to separate ‘criteria and/or processes’ compared to the standard 
process of obtaining prior informed consent53. 
 
The same requirements generally apply to accessing the traditional knowledge of these 
communities54, although special attention is afforded to the issue of traditional knowledge 
as it relates to these communities’ customary law and practices. The Protocol supports the 
idea that these communities should develop their own community protocols, minimum 
mutually agreed terms and model contractual clauses for ABS specifically in relation to 
traditional knowledge 55 , while existing ‘customary laws, community protocols and 
procedures’ have to be taken into account in the implementation of ABS legislation56. It is 
important to note that this special treatment is attached solely to ABS provisions regarding 
                                               
49 CBD, Art 8(j) 
50 Protocol, Art 5.2 
51 Protocol, Art. 5.5 
52 Protocol, Art. 6.2 
53 Protocol, Art. 6.3(f) 
54 Protocol, Art. 7 
55 Protocol, Art. 12.3 
56 Protocol, Art. 12.1 
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traditional knowledge, inferring that ABS on genetic resources will have to follow the more 
standardised process outlined in the Protocol. 
 
Additionally, in a clear reference to the practice of seed exchange between farmers, it is 
stated that the Protocol ‘shall [...] not restrict the customary use and exchange of genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge within and amongst indigenous and local 
communities’57. But this commitment only stretches to ‘as far as possible’ and does not 
preclude the implementation of other international agreements (i.e. TRIPS) actually 
restricting such practices. The role of local and indigenous communities in biodiversity 
governance will be more fully examined in Chapter 7. 
 
In contrast to the extremely broad definition of biodiversity adopted by the CBD, the ABS 
provisions have a significantly reduced scope of application. ABS currently applies to the 
utilisation of genetic resources (based on the Treaty text) and traditional knowledge 
(addition of the Protocol). The following section presents the processes and practices to be 
followed in the fulfilment of the benefit sharing obligation. 
THE ABS PROCESS 
As already stated, the sharing of benefits is not centrally managed at international/CBD 
level. The conception of the ABS mechanism in the Nagoya Protocol remains largely 
unchanged compared to what had already been achieved with the Bonn guidelines; they are 
to be instituted at the national level through the appropriate legislative, administrative, and 
policy measures of each state; benefit sharing must be fair and equitable and upon mutually 
agreed terms58; benefits to be shared can be both monetary and non-monetary59; again 
                                               
57 Protocol, Art. 12.4 
58 Protocol, Art. 5.1. These terms should be agreed in writing before the access permit is granted. An 
indicative list of such terms is included in Art. 6.3(g) 
 196 
 
following the template of the Bonn guidelines, an indicative list of potential benefits is 
included in an annex to the Protocol60. The ‘provider’ of genetic resources is identified at 
the level of the state, i.e. ‘the Party providing such resources that is the country of origin of 
such resources or a Party that has acquired the resources in accordance with the 
Convention’61. 
 
Despite the textual clarification in the Protocol of a number of terms previously elusive in 
legal doctrine, a continuing difficulty is that the terms ‘fair and equitable’ remain undefined, 
aside from the tautological solution that fair and equitable sharing is sharing under mutually 
agreed terms 62 . Since there continues to be no clarification included in any of the 
international texts discussed and adopted within the framework of the CBD, it is safe to 
argue that these terms are determined by the authorities assessing access applications, as 
well as the private parties to specific ABS arrangements in the context of the mutually 
agreed terms. A 1999 report63 advanced a somewhat procedural definition of the terms, 
proposing that fair should relate to a process that achieves ‘a proper balance of needs, 
rights, or demands’ and equitable should be associated with an outcome that is based on 
criteria and indicators for equity. Of course, the complexity of ABS arrangement means 
that flexibility is always crucial; the Bonn guidelines recognize that the benefits to be shared 
will ‘vary depending on what is regarded as fair and equitable in light of the 
circumstances’64. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
59 Protocol, Art. 5.4 
60 Ibid. 
61 Protocol, Art. 5.1 
62 Meaning that the sharing will be fair and equitable if completed under terms that both parties have agreed to 
beforehand. This is of course circular, self-fulfilling and open to abuse. 
63 Marie Bystrom, Peter Einarsson and Gunnel Axelsson Nycander, Fair and Equitable: Sharing the Benefits from 
Use of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge (1999) 
64 Bonn guidelines, Article 45 
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Regarding the benefits themselves, the types of benefits to be shared, as well as the method 
and the timing of the sharing process 65  are open to negotiation. The perception of 
biotechnology is one of huge profit attached to exclusive patents based on advanced R&D, 
a pillar of the idea of genetic gold. This creates an assumption and expectation that the 
benefits to be shared must equally take the form of a monetary windfall. Instead, the ABS 
working group considered capacity building, i.e. the transfer of legal, scientific and business 
skills, as the ‘essence of ABS under the CBD’66. This is also in line with the bottom-up 
policy approach promoted by the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. Capacity-building 
is considered necessary for adequately negotiating ABS arrangements, particularly when it 
builds up the negotiating and entrepreneurial capacity of individuals, institutions and 
communities as an element of their overall managerial capacity. The recognition of the 
importance of capacity-building can be observed from the outset in the fact that the COP 
decision mandating the constitution of the ABS working group also includes an action plan 
on capacity building specifically for ABS67. 
 
A controversial type of non-monetary benefit is what can be broadly included under the 
label of technology transfer68. While it is acknowledged as one of the ‘essential elements for 
the attainment of the Convention’69, it has also been historically acknowledged as one of 
the main reasons for the US continued rejection of the CBD70 . More specifically, the 
inclusion of biotechnology in the technology transfer and ABS provisions71, along with the 
                                               
65 Bonn guidelines, Article 45 
66 CBD, Report of the Panel of Experts on Access and Benefit Sharing on the Work of its Second Meeting (UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/1/2, 2001), par. 47, 112 
67 UNEP/CBD/COP Decision VII.19 (2004), Annex 
68 Protocol, Art. 23 
69 CBD, Art. 16.1  
70 See US Declaration on the CBD, 31 ILM 848 (1992). Also Klaus Bosselman, ‘Poverty Alleviation and 
Environmental Sustainability through Improved Regimes of Technology Transfer’ (2006) 2 Law, 
Environment and Development Journal 19 
71 CBD, Art. 19 
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requirement that any technology transfer must be ‘under fair and most favourable terms’72, 
i.e. below market prices, proved a ‘bridge too far’ for the country with the most advanced 
biotechnology industry in the world73. 
 
The basic principle that underpins the ABS process is that access is granted subject to the 
prior informed consent of the country of origin or in general of the owner of the genetic 
resources74 . This is relatively straightforward when research takes place in public land 
owned by the state, but a significant number of the remaining areas of high biodiversity are 
located in the South and in locales predominantly inhabited by traditional or indigenous 
communities75 . The Bonn guidelines explicitly illustrate the inadequacy of a completely 
state-centric ABS model by ‘recognizing that Parties and stakeholders may be both users 
and providers’76. The Protocol goes further by explicitly extending the ABS mechanism to 
the sub-national level, where this right to grant or refuse access is devolved to the local and 
indigenous communities 77 . For these communities, prior informed consent can be 
substituted by the more pro-active ‘approval and involvement’78, indicating the institution 
of a different, more detailed, direct and participatory process compared to the granting of 
access by the relevant competent authority at the national level79. However, any such right 
of local and indigenous communities has to be established in domestic law and is not 
guaranteed in the text of the Protocol80. 
 
                                               
72 CBD Article 16(2) 
73 For more information on the problems with the interpretation of the CBD’s technology transfer 
provisions, see Biswajit Dhar, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity and the TRIPS Agreement: 
Compatibility or Conflict?’ in Cristophe Bellman, Graham  Dutfield and Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz (eds), 
Trading in Knowledge: Development Perspectives on TRIP, Trade and Sustainability (Earthscan 2003); Coughlin 
74 Protocol, Art. 6.1 
75 R.V. Anuradha, ‘In Search of Knowledge and Resources: Who Sows? Who Reaps?’ (1997) 6 Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law 263; Glowka 257  
76 Bonn guidelines, Article 16.  
77 Protocol, Art. 6.2 
78 Protocol, Art. 6.2 
79 Protocol, Art. 6.3(f) 
80 Protocol, Art. 6.2 ‘...where they have the established right to grant access to such resources.’ 
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The prior informed consent requirement is a reflection of a modicum of participatory 
ideals being incorporated into the largely market-oriented ABS construct. The term 
‘informed’ implies that consent must not be a procedural formality, but instead must be 
based on as complete as possible information on the process of collection and utilization of 
the genetic resource and on the negotiation of mutually agreed terms. This information 
might include the environmental impact of the collection process or the envisaged uses that 
might arise from research on the genetic resource to be accessed. It is the responsibility of 
the user, seeking to secure prior informed consent, to provide all relevant information to 
the authority designated to make the access determination, as well as to the local 
community that must consent, if such a community is directly involved in the access 
arrangements81. 
 
The granting of access to genetic resources or traditional knowledge based on prior 
informed consent and mutually agreed terms, as well as the subsequent compliance of the 
benefit sharing obligations outlined in the access permit is to be enforced through domestic 
legislation in both provider and user states. Generally, they are to take measures ‘to provide 
that genetic resources utilized within its jurisdiction have been accessed in accordance with 
prior informed consent and that mutually agreed terms have been established, as required 
[...] by the regulatory requirements of the other party’82, including ‘measures to address 
situations of non-compliance’83. This enforcement also applies to traditional knowledge84. 
COMPLIANCE AND MONITORING 
This reliance on domestic measures does not mean that the ABS process is to be 
completely divorced from the international milieu of the CBD. In place of a classical 
                                               
81 Bonn Guidelines, Art. 36.  
82 Protocol, Art. 15.1 
83 Protocol, Art. 15.2 
84 Protocol, Art. 16 
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centralised international institution collecting reports and producing knowledge, the 
Protocol aims to institute a decentralised transnational network of institutions performing 
reporting and compliance functions. This loosely harmonized regulatory framework is 
closer to the objectives of the Bonn guidelines than to what would be expected of an 
environmental treaty.  
 
Compliance is achieved by first setting out the general principles for issuing access permits, 
including those of ‘legal certainty, clarity and transparency’85, as well as the more functional 
commitment to actually have information available for users regarding the process of 
application itself86. It is also important to note that in general applying for access to genetic 
resources has to be governed by ‘fair and non-arbitrary rules and procedures’87, leading to ‘a 
clear and transparent written decision [...] in a cost-effective manner and within a 
reasonable period of time’88, thus precluding outright blocking of applicants, unreasoned 
rejections of applications, or de facto rejections through inordinate delays in reaching a 
decision. 
 
There are two types of national institutions assigned to this process in provider states. 
Initially, the availability of information regarding the access legislation has to be maintained 
through the designation of a ‘national focal point’, where interested applicants can direct 
their enquiries89. The decision to issue an access permit, verifying that access requirements 
(prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms) have been met, is to be made by the 
                                               
85 Protocol, Art. 6.3(a) 
86 Protocol, Art. 6.3(c) 
87 Protocol, Art. 6.3(b) 
88 Protocol, Art. 6.3(d) 
89 Protocol, Art. 13(1) 
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designated ‘competent national authority’ 90 , which may not necessarily be the same 
institution as the ‘national focal point’91. 
 
The sole international aspect of this compliance network calls for both the information on 
national ABS legislation and issued access permits to be made available to the ABS 
Clearing-House established by the Protocol as part of the CBD’s clearing house 
mechanism 92 . Once this notification occurs, the permit is then recognised as an 
‘internationally recognised certificate of compliance’93 . These centrally-issued certificates 
form the basis of user state monitoring through an additional decentralised and 
transnational network of multiple ‘designated checkpoints’ 94  for collecting information 
regarding the utilization (as opposed the access procedures) of the genetic resources. 
Information to be collected and made available through these checkpoints includes ‘inter 
alia, any stage of research, development, innovation, pre-commercialization or 
commercialization’95. 
 
This system aims at enhancing transparency in the journey of these resources from 
collection to utilization, i.e. the question of how genetic resources are actually utilised and 
the benefits that accrue from this utilization, by creating a network of information nodes 
not tethered to the formal administrative apparatus of the state-centric treaty regime of the 
CBD. Hence, this chain of monitoring and reporting is not solely envisaged at the inter-
state or inter-authority level. Users of genetic resources may be required by law to provide 
such information to designated checkpoints directly96. It is also worthwhile to note that in 
contrast to provisions regarding the national focal points and the competent national 
                                               
90 Protocol, Art. 13(2) 
91 Protocol, Art. 13(3) 
92 Protocol, Art. 6.3(e) and 14 
93 Protocol, Art. 17(2) 
94 Protocol, Art. 17 
95 Protocol, Art. 17.1(a)(iv) 
96 Protocol, Art. 17.1(a)(ii) 
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authorities, there is no designated adjective characterising these checkpoints; therefore, 
aside from the national level, they may also be constituted at sub-national (e.g. for a single 
indigenous/ethnic group across national borders) or regional levels (e.g. a single point for 
the European Union). 
 
This alternative system of monitoring and compliance does alter the basis for 
transboundary cooperation on ABS, by focusing on guaranteeing market transactions as 
opposed to sovereign rights. By essentially pairing the granting of an access permit by the 
provider with requirement on the user to secure a certificate of compliance97, a certain 
legislative, administrative and policy homogeneity is required, so that private actors assume 
centre stage in a global market for genetic resources and traditional knowledge. This may 
appear expedient given the failure to reach consensus on an actual multilateral benefit 
sharing mechanism, but it still makes odd reading in a binding international agreement put 
forward as a tool of implementation of global environmental policy. 
III | THE GOALS OF THE ABS MECHANISM 
In this section, the above standard textual reading of the Nagoya Protocol and the ABS 
mechanism is placed within the broader biodiversity complex, as outlined in the previous 
chapter. The verdicts of failure and innovation returned for certain parts of the Protocol 
and the mechanism are assessments based on either an internal legal rationality of the text 
or certain external standard of the effective environmental legal instrument. However, the 
ABS mechanism can also be considered a small strategic project still driven by the idea of 
genetic gold, a technique of governing within the apparatus of biodiversity, contributing to 
the establishment of a new market economy of genetic gold. In this guise, its primary goal 
is to produce the subject of the provider/seller of genetic resources capable of navigating 
                                               
97 Protocol, Art. 16.2. 
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this new reality. This is achieved by constructing the normality of the market for genetic 
resources, replacing any environmental goals and aspirations with a general incitement to 
manage resources for development. However, this function now takes place amidst 
growing uncertainty over the specifics (i.e. beyond the generalities of the economic grid of 
neoliberalism) of this new market economy as an object of biodiversity governance 
established by the idea of genetic gold. 
OBSTACLES AND CONFUSION 
The genetic material traded in this market refers mainly to non-domesticated and non-
documented varieties of plants and other organisms located in situ, in the last remaining 
biodiversity hotspots. Thus, the ABS market is a market for wild biodiversity descended 
from the bioprospecting practices popularized with the creation of INBio. It is thus a very 
specific market that is centred on only one type (wild) and one component (genetic) of 
biodiversity. A number of obstacles to its smooth hypothesized operation can stem from 
this character. 
 
The first obstacle in the envisaged operation of this market and the materialisation of all 
the benefits promised by the idea of genetic gold is that for the purposes of R&D 
conducted by the biotechnology industry a much more accessible raw material is the ex-situ 
holdings of documented genetic material that were collected before the entry into force of 
the CBD. These collections are located predominantly in the North98, under the care of 
institutions such as botanic gardens, gene banks etc. Due to the old collection methods, 
most of this genetic material held ex-situ is of unknown origin, so benefit-sharing with a 
                                               
98 An actual 75% of genetic material held in ex-situ collections are located in either the US or Europe. Stated 
in Tully 97 
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providing country or local community cannot proceed99, even if the CBD or the Nagoya 
Protocol were somehow endowed with retrospective application. The practical 
consequence of this lack of benefit-sharing obligation, coupled with the additional access 
requirements for in situ collection of genetic samples, makes these resources much more 
attractive, to the extent that resorting to these ex-situ collections is fast becoming preferred 
research practice100. This in effect circumvents and short-circuits the adoption of further 
ABS legislation in the South. 
 
Secondly, it is a market largely dominated by the decisions and behaviour of private actors 
of considerable force, such as multinational pharmaceutical corporations or the 
biotechnology industry, but the genetic resources to be traded are very often publicly 
owned. Since the technologies for screening, genetic manipulation and modification 
became increasingly available, it is these actors, as well as various research institutions and 
universities that are the buyers and ‘users’ of these resources. They undertake commercial 
and non-commercial (applied and academic) research projects for the collection and testing 
of new biological and/or genetic samples of plants, animals or other micro-organisms. On 
the other hand, the sourcing of the genetic material takes place mostly in public lands, 
designated as protected areas - the so-called, untapped biodiversity hotspots, as well as in 
locations where the competing claims and rights of local and indigenous communities 
against the central state authority are wont to play out. Almost by default, ABS contracts 
are not actually ‘just’ written contracts for the procurement of genetic material. They often 
have to be hybrid public/private arrangements touching upon a multiplicity of social, 
economic, political and environmental issues, in addition to making some form of business 
sense. This phenomenon places a significant burden on these agreements, while placing 
                                               
99 In fact, only 25% of the genetic material collected before the entry into force of the CBD is of known 
origin. Ibid 
100 On present practice in this area see McManis 
 205 
 
them firmly within a series of politically-charged questions, at the very least regarding 
ownership of lands and resources, that exceed the regimented confines of environmental, 
property and contract law101. 
 
Thirdly, the possibility of a global ABS regime, however remote it has remained after the 
Nagoya Protocol, is actually an additional obstacle or at least source of confusion for the 
operation of this market. The path of decentralization and transnational networking 
currently preferred is at its logical conclusion against the institution of a centralised benefit-
sharing mechanism, the mandated objective of the negotiations. This is a problem of future 
direction for the whole market and the CBD, which aims to mimic the basic elements of 
benefit sharing under the FAO treaty. 
 
In the FAO system, a central benefit-sharing mechanism is a well-suited addition because 
the plant genetic resources under the scope of that system are actually held in the public 
collections of the global CGIAR network, which is in turn controlled by FAO102. So there 
is a conceptual and structural correspondence between a type of global and publicly held 
resource and its utilization through public, non-commercial R&D103. The circumstances of 
the genetic resources under the scope of the CBD’s ABS mechanism are so different – in 
terms of resource ownership, legal status, and type of research amongst other factors - as 
to make a wholesale copying of the regime from one legal context to the other impractical. 
One is a centrally controlled economy, while the other aspires to be deregulated and 
‘liberalised’. 
 
                                               
101 Some of these questions are further explored in Chapter 7 
102 The FAO system is also helped in its operation by its reduced complexity due to limited scope. There is a 
list of about 60 specific varieties for food and agriculture that are managed through the system. A CBD-based 
system by necessity would have to be much more open-ended 
103 Patents are not granted on products developed based on CGIAR genetic resources 
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Even if presented to the South as an escape route out of the denigrating ‘banana republic’ 
status as primary provider of cheap natural resources, there is no escaping the fact that, 
both as a policy and as a market, ABS remains heavily dependent on the biotechnology 
industry of the North. Biovalue is constituted when the genetic resources are utilized, when 
commercial products materialise, but only a limited number of multinational corporations 
across the world engage in such cutting-edge, applied genetic research. There is also the 
inescapably neoliberal argument that additional regulation of the sector as attempted by the 
Nagoya Protocol and the rising costs of securing access permits and certificates of 
provenance will push these corporations towards different research paths, such as 
channelling R&D investment towards ex situ collections rather than ABS arrangements. In 
addition, a wholesale copying of the FAO model would possibly remove some of these 
private actors currently involved in the genetic gold market. 
 
A different form of confusion is related to the environmental outcomes expected to 
materialize out of this market. Bilateral private ABS contracts are at the very least 
unconventional tools of environmental law and policy 104 . According to a certain legal 
taxonomic orthodoxy, they can be classified as incentive mechanisms belonging to the 
broader category of market-based environmental regulation 105 . The incorporation of 
strands of environmental or ecological economics 106  clarifies the question of capturing 
biovalue and can predict the level of incentives required to achieve behavioural 
modification. There are two main issues with this economic theorising: first, it is unclear 
what kind of behaviour is being incentivized and whether it is in fact conducive to 
environmentalist goals; secondly, it is questionable whether there is significant biovalue in 
                                               
104 For example they are not mentioned at all in the nomenclature of available market-based environmental 
measures in Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law 57-85 
105 Joseph Henry Vogel, ‘From the 'Tragedy of the Commons' to the 'Tragedy of the Commonplace': Analysis 
and Synthesis through the Lens of Economic Theory’ in Charles R. McManis (ed), Biodiversity and the Law : 
Intellectual Property, Biotechnology & Traditional Knowledge (Earthscan 2007) 
106 Nick Hanley, Benjamin White and Jason F. Shogren, Introduction to Environmental Economics (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 
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the narrow economic sense for such incentives to materialize. What one ends up with is 
that ‘like so much economic theorizing, the logic is impeccable as long as one buys into the 
assumptions’107. 
 
The non-environmental focus of ABS mechanism as it currently stands is further enhanced 
by the legal terminology employed in the Protocol, derived largely from contract and 
property law. The market, buyers, sellers, contractual clauses, dispute resolution proliferate 
throughout the Protocol, to the extent that it is difficult to see the contribution of this 
mechanism to environmentalism. The connection with the other two objectives of the 
CBD, i.e. conservation and sustainable use, has grown so distant in nearly two decades of 
debates and conflict over the sharing of profits that the Nagoya Protocol includes a 
reminder in case it has been forgotten that ABS is still part of the CBD: 
 
‘The Parties shall encourage users and providers to direct benefits arising from the 
utilisation of genetic resources towards the conservation of biological diversity and 
the sustainable use of its components’108. 
 
Despite this textual reminder, it is still very difficult to see the Nagoya Protocol as an 
environmental instrument and not simply as a trade instrument, an agreement more at 
home in the ‘stable’ of the WTO, rather than that of UNEP. The ABS mechanism of the 
CBD is still traversed by the logic of the bioprospecting contract, and thus by default ABS 
arrangements will continue to accrue in areas where there is a better chance of striking 
‘genetic gold’, rather than areas that suffer from environmental degradation. ABS contracts 
are in essence private arrangements between parties that quite possibly may not be 
motivated by environmental concerns. The market expects that contracts to be negotiated 
                                               
107 Vogel 121 
108 Protocol, Art. 9 
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according to economic and not conservation priorities. They would more often than not be 
confined within national borders, a practice which might constitute an obstacle to any 
regional environmental conservation initiatives. Lastly, the predictability and flow of 
financial and/or non-monetary benefits is ultimately contingent on negotiating skills, and 
not on the national or local needs. In short, ABS offers nothing to biodiversity that has 
been or is in danger of being irrevocably destroyed, but can improve the already sustainably 
managed parts of it. It remains unclear why a system of focusing exclusively on the limited 
number of areas of high biodiversity should be translated into environmental policy for the 
very diverse whole that is trapped under the label the ‘South’. 
FORGETTING EQUITY AND ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
The perception of the ABS contract as a win-win exchange consistently obscures the 
consideration that the concept of fair and equitable sharing, even if not defined in legal 
text, has a clear redistributive connotation. There is of course no mention of collective, 
social or environmental justice in the ABS mechanism or any other legal texts of the CBD, 
as that would be an overtly political gesture. Although this oversight may be explained away 
as simply being outside the remit of environmental law, Cancun Declaration’s ‘new ethic of 
equity’ has not aged well. Access to justice is given only token consideration109, and then 
only in relation to a strict juridical definition of justice as dispute resolution, mediation or 
arbitration. 
 
Another long-standing objective mishandled in the Nagoya Protocol is the clarification of 
distinct access and benefit sharing requirements for academic and applied research110. It is 
obvious that success in bioprospecting is not measured in the same way in academic and 
                                               
109 Protocol, Art. 18 
110 Sylvia I Martinez and Susette Biber-Klemm, ‘Scientists - Take Action for Access to Biodiversity’ (2010) 2 
Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 27 
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applied fields. For academic research programmes, success is measured in terms of building 
knowledge on life, what has been termed biodiscovery, or at least increasing taxonomic 
precision. Industrial or commercial programmes aim to develop marketable products, in 
the form of new natural products, pharmaceuticals and/or crop varieties; to 
‘commercialize’ biodiversity. Different criteria for success also imply different types and 
levels of funding. Applied research is privately funded by large multinational corporations, 
while academic research has to rely at least to a certain extent on some form of public 
funding or grant. 
 
Despite such obvious differences, the Protocol continues to regard the ABS mechanism as 
equally applicable to all types of biodiversity research. The only ground ceded is the 
restatement of the principle that ABS legislation is not meant to fence off and block access 
to genetic resources, but to promote research and development, especially of the type that 
contributes to the other two objectives of the CBD (conservation and sustainable use) in 
the South111. However, there is no specific allowance made for academic research to be 
subject to simplified measures compared to commercial R&D. Given the discrepancy in 
financial resources and the differing objectives, excessively onerous access requirements 
will invariably continue to stifle any form of non-commercial and public good-oriented 
research that is not native to the market economy of genetic gold. 
 
ABS, like the bioprospecting/biopiracy labels before it, can serve to make such distinctions 
unclear, and to homogenise the varied purposes for sample collection and genetic research. 
The multiplying joint ventures and links between business and academia further blur the 
lines between the two types of research112. By not addressing this distinction, the added 
irony is that the current, post Nagoya-mechanism ABS mechanism will stop public projects 
                                               
111 Protocol, Art. 8(a) 
112 For example, INBio and Merck were brought together by Cornell University. 
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benefiting the South, while leaving commercial projects that benefit private corporations 
and individuals in the North largely intact. This would constitute another blow to the 
reasoning that drove the adoption of the protocol in the first place, not to mention 
completely obviating the goals of the CBD itself. 
GOVERNING THROUGHT THE CONTRACT 
The ABS mechanism, if understood solely as a mode of regulation, is geared primarily 
towards improving the operation of the market for genetic resources, but more broadly 
towards assisting the documentation, indexing, commodification and commercialisation of 
these resources. It initially appears that we have not moved on from structural, macro level 
explanations; an abstract logic dictates that these goals are to be achieved by facilitating 
exchanges between the South, possessing genetic gold that the North requires for further 
developing its biotechnology industry, and the North, possessing the scientific, technical 
and financial means that the South requires for sustainable development 113 . Already in 
1996, even before the ABS acronym even existed in the terminology and conceptual 
horizon of the CBD, a concept paper presented at the third COP put forward this idea of 
the CBD: 
 
‘The Convention can be interpreted broadly as an instrument to promote the 
equitable exchange, on mutually agreed terms, of access to genetic resources and 
associated knowledge for finance, technology and participation in research’114. 
 
The standard analysis of the Bonn guidelines, the Nagoya Protocol and the ABS 
mechanism undertaken in this chapter does not challenge this conception. However, within 
this simplistic quid pro quo there is clearly a more nuanced understanding of the micro level 
                                               
113 Swanson, ‘The Reliance of Northern Economies on Southern Biodiversity: Biodiversity as Information’ 
114 UNEP/CBD/COP/3/Inf. 53 (1996). 
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as well; a producer and a buyer for this raw material or in the terminology of the CBD a 
‘provider’ and a ‘user’115 to be brought together through a market transaction. 
 
If the ABS mechanism is then to be understood differently, as a technique of governing 
within the biocomplex, then it would be geared towards arranging the details of this 
coming together so as to produce the desired effects and contribute to the goals of the 
biocomplex. The main instrument for this task of arrangement is the written contract, the 
ABS arrangement as the conceptual descendant of the bioprospecting contract. The 
quantity of these contracts is of paramount importance for sustaining this market and the 
provider-user relation on which the operation of the biocomplex is based. 
 
Provided they follow the internationally developed standardized material transfer and 
benefit sharing agreements116, these contracts are deemed to have a number of advantages 
in achieving the strategic goals of the biocomplex: (i) they directly empower local 
communities as stakeholders, provided there is sufficient capacity-building for them to take 
advantage of their stake at the negotiating table; (ii) they lower negotiation costs and 
enhance legal certainty and clarity; and (iii) they simplify dispute settlement with the 
inclusion of resolution clauses. More generally, they establish a base of reciprocity by 
outlining a choice of fair and equitable returns for the sale of genetic material.  
 
However, there are also acknowledged drawbacks. In the ABS contract, the provider of 
genetic material is still left with the preparatory tasks of the process, such as collection, 
initial screening or taxonomy, while the user is tasked with the task of utilization and 
commercialization that will yield the requisite benefits. By standard economic theory and 
                                               
115 E.g. CBD, Art. 15 
116 Such as for example those outlined in Bonn Guidelines, Article 42(b)(iv).  
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trade practice in this area117, the majority of these benefits, at least financially, should accrue 
to the user as opposed to the provider of the raw material. In this light, the differences 
between the market economy of genetic gold and the agricultural export-oriented model 
are not as significant as initially advertised. 
 
Despite these drawbacks, the ABS mechanism implies that the award of stakes and the 
creation of incentives for modifying behaviour are replacing the constant financial, juridical 
and operational struggle to enforce top-down environmental legislation. The major shift in 
the mode of governing brought about by the dominance of the ABS contract and the idea 
of genetic gold is nowhere more apparent than in the treatment of nature reserves and 
protected areas in the South. The pre-genetic gold round of designations of protected areas 
as a method for conserving the dwindling reserves of high biodiversity across the world 
lacked the support, input and participation of the local groups and communities closest to 
the resource or the area being protected118. Instead of excising persons and communities 
from the environmental management – if not physically barring from these areas - the ABS 
mechanism focuses on their active involvement in this process as producers of genetic 
resources and holders of traditional knowledge. Without resorting to the ‘persisting myth’ 
that tends to romanticize these communities and their transcendental wisdom119, a general 
rationality or ‘idiom’120 of inclusion is disseminated. This means that they are not only 
encouraged and trained to participate in the new market economy of genetic gold, but they 
also aspire and conduct themselves accordingly in order to participate in these processes. 
IV │ THE MANY GUISES OF THE ABS MECHANISM 
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As a legal output of the CBD, a legal regime steeped in the narrative of sustainable 
development, the Nagoya Protocol follows the general direction of balancing social, 
environmental and economic concerns. In turn, the Protocol further positions the CBD as 
the regulatory watchdog of the global market for genetic resources, with a responsibility to 
ensure its continued smooth operation and growth. 
 
At its most progressive, ABS could be characterised as a mechanism for participatory 
decision-making through the involvement of local and indigenous communities as 
stakeholders. In this guise, the ABS mechanism must facilitate the coming together of 
‘providers’ and ‘users’ – sellers and buyers - as distinct entities at the micro level, outside 
the realm of interstate relations and agreements that produced the concept of ABS in the 
first place. 
 
At its most pragmatic, as an expression of environmental economics, ABS could be 
interpreted as an innovative funding mechanism that further consolidates the restructuring 
of conservation finance; abandoning the model of development assistance from the North 
to the South and adopting market-based approaches. However, the location and type of 
beneficiaries offers only indirect and hazily understood benefits in terms of environmental 
protection. It remains unclear whether these ABS arrangements are supposed to procure 
funding predominantly for the environment or for development, once outside the facile 
closure of the assumptions underpinning sustainable development. 
 
At its most aspirational, ABS has been advertised as the core of an alternative development 
model121, but the size of finance created exclusively by ABS arrangements over the past two 
decades cannot compete with the profit of other biodiversity-related sectors, such as 




industrial agriculture. Doubts were expressed about the viability of the emerging market for 
genetic resources as early as in 1988, even before genetic gold was disseminated as a win-
win scenario of environmental management for the South122. For these genetic resources to 
act as a source of significant benefits and sustained income for the providers of genetic 
material, bioprospecting programmes and ABS arrangements have to attain a unreal level 
of success that has simply not yet materialised since the CBD’s entry into force and the 
adoption of the bioprospecting/ABS contract as a tool of environmental policy123. 
 
At its most legalistic, ABS is the first detailed legal interpretation of some of the 
rationalities and goals of the broader biocomplex constructed based on the idea of 
biodiversity as genetic gold, and not as an environmental ideal. Perhaps due to this 
originality, the mechanism appears to be caught between the highly competing paradigms 
of neoliberal win-win scenarios and redistributive social justice. In most parts it reads like a 
technical regulatory instrument or policy manual more at home in the WTO stable instead 
of the UN, while in other –far fewer- parts the reader can discern nostalgia for the 
simplicity of command and control. This is simply a continuation of the struggle over the 
extent of the plurality of the goals pursued in the context of the CBD, which has already 
led to the US rejection of the regime. 
 
In the end, the continuing confusion over the function, goals, implied and overt politics of 
the ABS mechanism strengthen the notion that the formation of another binding 
multilateral mechanism is not the correct governmental method for the pursuit of the 
plurality of goals of the biocomplex. This fixation with evolving the legal regime through 
binding law appears to ignore fundamental aspects of the history of the regime itself and of 
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the concept of biodiversity more generally, while making a considerable amount of 
assumptions regarding the genetic resources market that it seeks to regulate. 
 
The many guises of this ABS mechanism also imply the blackmail of environmental law in 
action. National sovereignty over biodiversity and private enterprise have been consistently 
reinforced throughout the operation of the CBD, yet significant resources and six years of 
negotiations went into devising a global scheme that would be better suited to the previous 
- and forcefully rejected by all - legal status of the resources as belonging to a global 
commons. The existence of such a variety of roles attributed to the ABS mechanism has 
loaded the process with the huge weight of failed development ideologies and 
environmental policies in the South. It appears as ABS is frantically trying to escape from a 
maze of environmental and developmental concerns and aspirations. 
 
In all the versions of ABS outlined above, the common element is the necessity of a non-
state, ‘localised and localisable’124 entity for the whole conceptual mechanism to make sense 
and operate as envisaged. As the provider/seller of genetic resources or information in the 
form of traditional knowledge, as the target of an incentives policy located close to the 
natural resource to be protected, and as a local group given a stake in the management of 
its own natural capital, community is further confirmed as an essential institution and 
concept in the operation of the biocomplex. 
 
Given the conflicts of different trajectories coursing through ABS, community has become 
a place of solace, a briefly sketched guiding principle, an ideological attachment not 
requiring definition or clarification, a political buzzword capable of motivating support 
without too much analysis; virtually, the biodiversity field’s own particular sustainable 




development. The following chapter attempts to analyse some of the implications of this 





GOVERNING IN THE BIOCOMPLEX II: THE 




Biodiversity has created – through its varied global, transnational, regional and national 
manifestations and the idea of genetic gold - paths of interaction between the local and the 
global. The symbol of this interaction is the enhanced role for local and indigenous 
communities within the biocomplex. In a 2007 message, the executive secretary of the 
CBD characterised indigenous and local communities as ‘environmental managers with 
immense ecological knowledge’ (i.e. not wise stewards, environmentalists, ecologists or 
rural poor) and ‘crucial partners’ in both conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.1 
More recently, the preamble of the Nagoya Protocol on ABS took note of: 
 
‘The interrelationship between genetic resources and traditional knowledge and 
their inseparable nature for indigenous and local communities, the importance of 
traditional knowledge for the conservation of biological diversity and the 
sustainable use of its components, and for the sustainable livelihoods of these 
communities’2. 
 
The Protocol then proceed to formally recognise that these communities hold certain 
property rights over both genetic resources and traditional knowledge of biodiversity use, 
                                               
1 See ‘Message from the Executive Secretary, Ahmed Djoghlaf, on the Occasion of the International Day of 
the World’s Indigenous People’ (2007). Available at: 
www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/MessageSCBD07_es.doc  
2 Protocol, Preamble 
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which give rise to benefit sharing obligations from the part of the users/buyers of these 
resources or knowledge3. 
 
Such statements indicate that these communities are clearly approached with an integrative 
goal. This strategy further confirms the biocomplex’s immanent shift towards the South, 
the grafting of an overlay of local communities onto the pre-existing global map of 
biodiversity that highlighted the pathology of the South. The chapter examines this full 
realization of the entry of community into biodiversity. This most recent shift in the history 
of biodiversity has changed both the conceptual and physical geography of the field, and 
has been widely heralded as creating more balanced and inclusive governance 
arrangements, predominantly in the shape of the ‘equitable partnership’4 within the ABS, a 
form of biodiversity enterprise. 
 
At the same time, these newly included environmental subjects are taking advantage of this 
role attributed to them, by providing sites of resistance within the biocomplex. Positioning 
themselves as the concrete counterpoint to the forces of global markets, they delineate in 
themselves a real locality to counteract the abstract globality. In this way, governing 
through the community in the biocomplex fluctuates between two images; of community 
as a dynamic source of an economic enterprise, and of community as a fixed destination of 
benefits. 
I | COMMUNITY IN THE BIOCOMPLEX 
After a long history of environmental rhetoric oscillating in a futile manner between the 
competing state and market-based paradigms, community-based approaches have emerged 
                                               




generally as a ‘third way’ of sorts in environmental regulation. Past failures of both state 
and market approaches have led to a certain level of cynicism and resignation: 
 
‘Communities could not do a worse job than corporations, states, multilateral 
agencies and development experts who have caused an extraordinary amount of 
human and environmental damage’5. 
 
The potential of a community-based approach to conservation was acknowledged in 
international environmental law as early as 1992, when Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration 
completely redefined the role of indigenous and local communities6; Agenda 21 further 
dedicated a separate chapter on the issue, calling for the ‘empowerment’ of indigenous 
communities, their ‘participation in the national formulation of policies’, and their 
‘involvement, at the national and local levels, in resource management and conservation 
strategies’7. The promise of sustainable development appeared to infuse this ‘third way’ 
with the goal of regeneration of economic, political and historical agency previously denied 
to these communities. This recharged agency was broken down in the more specific 
mechanisms of empowerment, participation and involvement. 
 
This attention to local and indigenous communities has emerged on the basis of what has 
been called the ‘founding assumption’: 
 
                                               
5 J. Peter Brosius, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing and Charles Zerner (eds), Communities and Conservation: Histories and 
Politics of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (AltaMira Press 2005) 1 
6 ‘Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a vital role in environmental 
management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize 
and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the 
achievement of sustainable development’ (UNCED 1992, Principle 22) 
7 CSD 1992: Paras 26(3)(a)-(c) 
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‘[P]eople who live close to the resource and whose livelihoods depend on it have 
more interest in sustainable use and management than do state authorities or 
distant corporations’8. 
 
Environmental NGOs can be added to that list by someone of a cynical disposition. 
Irrespective of the precise targets of comparison, this claim to truth is fairly basic: simple 
proximity to biodiversity increases knowledge of it and reinforces an interest in its 
sustainable use due to the relation of immediate dependency between people and resource. 
 
The CBD initially adopted a heavily qualified9 provision for ‘protecting and respecting the 
knowledge, innovations and practices of local and indigenous communities’ solely as an 
additional policy component of in-situ biodiversity conservation10. Furthermore, as regards 
this ‘knowledge, innovations and practices’, states are also asked to ‘promote their wider 
application’11. Traditional knowledge has been described as the ‘body of knowledge built up 
through generations, by a group of people living in close proximity to nature and 
manifested by practices in which tradition filters human innovation’12, although the term is 
not legally defined in the legal text13. This first CBD provision is much more limited and 
restrained compared to the expansive wording of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, if 
only because it implies that community constitutes another passive ‘outside’ to protected in 
conjunction with biodiversity, the environment and nature. 
 
                                               
8 Tania Li, ‘Engaging Simplifications: Community-Based Natural Resource Management, Market Processes, 
and State Agendas in Upland Southeast Asia’ in J. Peter Brosius, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing and Charles Zerner 
(eds), Communities and Conservation: Histories and Politics of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (AltaMira 
Press 2005) 428 
9 Qualifications included in CBD Article 8 include ‘subject to national legislation’ and ‘as far as possible and 
as appropriate’. 
10 CBD Article 8(j).  
11 Ibid 
12 Tully 93 
13 Or in the more recent Nagoya Protocol 
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The first step towards expanding the role of the local and indigenous communities was 
their recognition as stakeholders in the context of the Bonn Guidelines in 2002. In 2004, 
the CBD adopted the voluntary Akwé: Kon Guidelines14, which introduced the concept of 
a wide environmental, social and cultural impact assessment in the design and 
implementation of development projects taking place on or near indigenous lands. This 
holistic impact assessment included measures for enabling the participation - and 
consideration of the needs and concerns - of local and indigenous communities in the 
process. Again, close proximity to the harmful effects of these projects is the major 
criterion for taking advantage of these legal provisions. 
 
After two decades of CBD operation, and the rise of the idea of genetic gold, a more active 
role for local and indigenous communities was ultimately formally recognised in the 
Nagoya Protocol. Under the reformed ABS process, local and indigenous communities, as 
recognised stakeholders, join national governments and public institutions as possible 
providers of genetic resources and traditional knowledge and recipients of benefits from 
their utilization. This was still achieved somewhat indirectly, by the incorporation of 
traditional knowledge as a separate form of resource to be accessed and utilized through an 
ABS contract. These limited fragments of a community-based approach are still removed 
from the processes of empowerment, participation and involvement described in Agenda 
21 or the ‘devolution to local polities’ frequently cited in the ‘communities and 
conservation’ literature 15 . Nevertheless, the link between community and biodiversity, 
however rudimentary, is clearly being formed. 
                                               
14 Akwé: Kon: Voluntary Guidelines For The Conduct Of Cultural, Social And Environmental Impact 
Assessments Regarding Developments Proposed To Take Place On, Or Which Are Likely To Impact On, 
Sacred Sites And On Lands And Waters Traditionally Occupied Or Used By Indigenous And Local 
Communities. Available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/akwe-brochure-en.pdf  
15 Justin Rose, ‘Community-Based Biodiversity Conservation in the Pacific: Cautionary Lessons in 
"Regionalising" Environmental Governance’ in Michael I. Jeffery, Jeremy Firestone and Karen Bubna-Litic 




FROM CONSERVATION AREA TO STAKEHOLDER LOCALITY 
In terms of the history of biodiversity, this process by which traditional knowledge and 
local concerns are being recognised and incorporated in biodiversity governance represents 
additional evidence of the complete abandonment of the idea of biodiversity as a 
conservation mentality, since that understanding of biodiversity largely equated the 
designation and protection of nature reserves with the removal of the human element. This 
direct manifestation of state power, whereby certain territories are ‘walled–off’ and granted 
special legal protection from human intrusion, remains one of the most direct ways by 
which environmental law can influence both the physical environment and human society.  
 
Additionally, the idea of separating and recapturing pristine nature from degraded and 
degrading humanity has a long history as an ethical edict belonging to an ecocentric belief 
system that conceptualises the health of the nature as independent from, or in conflict 
with, humanity16. The conservation area thus represents a conceptual walling-off of nature, 
an attempt to preserve a single conception of nature as a repository of nebulous values 
associated with the natural. As these values are deemed lost to urban populations, it is 
almost an exercise in nostalgia, and ultimately an impossible attempt to rid nature of social 
and cultural elements, in order to locate within the means by which human alienation can 
be reduced. Thus, it can be argued that the cultural and social origins of the practice of 
designating of protected areas are avowedly Northern and urban. Conservation areas also 
require specific forms of ecological knowledge and managerial practices to re-establish their 
natural character and maintain this separation. 
 
                                               
16 John Alder and David Wilkinson, Environmental Law and Ethics (Macmillan 1999); James G. Cantrill and 
Christine L. Oravec (eds), The Symbolic Earth: Discourse and Our Creation of the Environment (The University Press 
of Kentucky 1996) 
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From the perspective of international environmental law, the designation of protected 
areas remains at the core of a state-centric model. A number of environmental treaties 
traditionally were delegated the international authority to hold national governments 
responsible for designating and maintaining a sufficient number of protected areas as an 
essential component of national environmental policy on that specific issue. Indeed, the 
environmental credentials of national governments are often still measured by the extent of 
these conservation areas. This state-centric process often inferred that the strict laws and 
boundaries required for these protected areas are to be directed against the local and 
indigenous communities seen as resisting environmental protection17 . More specifically, 
both environmentalists and administrators in the past depicted local and indigenous 
communities as short-sighted, incapable of sustainably harnessing the economic value or 
realising the intrinsic environmental value and of their land, too poor and uneducated to 
understand; obstacles to the institution of rational resource management18. 
 
In effect, the idea of genetic gold had brought with it the rejection of the designation of 
conservation areas as the measure of first resort when taking action on biodiversity – as a 
part of the model where the state was the primary actor. As the notion of community 
entered into biodiversity discourse, so the previously walled-off protected area is 
transformed into a multi-stakeholder locality, the site of multiple interactions between 
nature and humanity. The natural landscape can now include the local human element, 
which can in turn interact with nature in different ways and not only as the destructive 
encroacher. As analysed already, genetic gold additionally proposes that this new locality 
can also be a profitable enterprise if the reserves of genetic resources were managed 
                                               
17 Mark Dowie, Conservation Refugees: The Hundred-Year Conflict Between Global Conservation and Native Peoples (MIT 
Press 2009) 
18 Arun Agrawal and Clark C. Gibson, ‘Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in 
Natural Resource Conservation’ (1999) 27 World Development 629 For similar perceptions encountered by 
local communities in a US setting see Timothy P. Duane, ‘Community Participation in Ecosystem 
Management’ (1997) 24 Ecology Law Quarterly 771 
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correctly. Conceptual and physical boundaries around these protected areas are torn down, 
opening them up to the possibility of sustainable utilisation and drawing the South into 
environmental governance that had previously sought to keep local and indigenous 
communities at arm’s length. 
 
The rediscovery of these communities within the biocomplex is a foundational political-
economic act in support of the functions of genetic gold. Benefit sharing requires 
community as a physical place in order to create ‘an “uninterrupted” chain of transactions 
– starting and ending with resource providers as benefit recipients, and to be guaranteed, as 
it were, by the benefit-sharing contract’19. For this chain of transactions to function as 
theorised and benefit-sharing practices to become established and widespread, these 
communities by necessity have to conduct themselves in certain ways as part of the 
economic model being advocated. They have to be territorialised as a bounded source of 
genetic material and a destination of benefits, each role articulating a different form of 
environmental subjectivity. By becoming delineated conceptually and geographically, by 
being made to fit the rationality of the ABS process, these communities are included as 
targets of government within the biocomplex. 
 
The next sections examine this dual role (as source and as destination) required of 
community within the biocomplex. This duality is apparent in the ABS mechanism, which 
at the same time ascribes a political and cultural ‘otherness’ to the community - stemming 
from its characterization as indigenous and symbolised by the image of the biodiversity 
‘steward’ – as well as forcibly requiring an entrepreneurial approach when managing the 
‘stake’ that such communities are holding. This duality can be traced to the confusion 
created when community is indiscriminately and interchangeably considered both a 
                                               
19 Hayden 366 
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physical location, signifying proximity and locality, and a conceptual principle, signifying 
alternative collectivities and the ‘third way’ of governing. 
 
The following sections of the chapter illustrate that community empowerment, 
participation and involvement manifest as governmental techniques for enhancing the 
dissemination and adoption of managerialist and entrepreneurial practices in relation to the 
environment, based on the specific perception of biodiversity as genetic gold, leading to 
widespread financialisation of conservation. As governmental techniques however, they 
have also been appropriated in varied ways for the re-attribution of rights and 
responsibilities between the local level and central state authority. 
II | COMMUNITY AS SOURCE: AN INVITATION TO THE BIODIVERSITY 
ENTERPRISE 
As analysed in the preceding chapters, the biodiversity complex has promulgated a 
‘managerialist’ understanding of biodiversity in which biological and economic theories are 
combined to conceptualise biodiversity as a system of primarily genetic resources, under 
the sign of genetic gold. When it enters into force, the Nagoya Protocol will add a 
decentralised and transnational component to the ABS mechanism that expands the role of 
communities away from its original protectionist character in the text of the CBD. More 
rights are offered and more responsibilities assigned; a model behaviour by which they are 
to be evaluated and through which they will be included in the ABS mechanism. From the 
perspective of the economic grid of genetic gold, the task for these communities is quite 
simply to effectively manage biodiversity as genetic gold, i.e. according to the tenets of 
neoliberal economics, and sustainably, i.e. so that this resource is maintained and further 
developed. In short, they have to reform themselves in order to be recognisable, legitimate 




However, their active involvement and participation in the market economy also has to be 
placed within a broader, and not CBD-specific, reform agenda that has targeted traditional 
agricultural societies and farming practices, such as seed exchange. This agenda, which 
includes such non-environmental instruments as the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture and 
TRIPS20, has precipitated, in the CBD context, a bundling together of agricultural and wild 
biodiversity (the ‘original’ genetic gold), despite their obvious differences21. As a condition 
for achieving market participation - referring to genetic resources (wild biodiversity) - 
certain aspects of the agricultural biodiversity market are also to be reformed, despite the 
rationale for this latter change being less clear. This will inevitably expand once more the 
scope of the biocomplex, already far beyond the remit set out in the treaty text, towards 
governing the rural and indigenous character of the communities themselves. It is the 
social organization, the economic life of these communities in proximity to biodiversity 
that is to be worked on by the biocomplex. A further transition is occurring; from the 
market economy of genetic gold as the principle of intelligibility and decipherment within 
the biocomplex to a broader market economy covering other types and biodiversity 
components. The specifics of this transition are outlined below. 
 
The attraction to sweeping reforms, indicative of classical developmental thought22, has 
meant that the local and indigenous communities now stand more firmly than ever in the 
midst of a confusing proliferation of predicted new biodiversity markets. Genetic gold is to 
be pursued like a phantom at the exciting global markets for genetic resources, while the 
life and livelihood of such local communities is more associated with the more mundane 
                                               
20 For more information on the complex relationship between the CBD and the WTO see Cabrera and 
Garforth 
21 Despite acknowledgements such as in Protocol, Preamble: ‘Recognizing the special nature of agricultural 




agricultural biodiversity. In short, the ABS process actually requires them to be providers 
of wild biodiversity for global markets, while seemingly ignoring that they may already be 
competent providers of agricultural biodiversity for local, national and regional markets. 
This creates a huge contradiction at the heart of the link between biodiversity and 
community. 
 
As the next section illustrates, agricultural biodiversity markets are very different in terms 
of economic performance, as well as in relation to how they contribute to biodiversity loss, 
when compared to their wild biodiversity counterparts. To treat them as indistinguishable 
or as a single entity obfuscates the dangers for the welfare of the communities involved in 
these markets’ operation. 
AGRICULTURAL BIODIVERSITY 
Current plant varieties used for agriculture are the product of a long history of building 
knowledge, stewardship and interaction with nature. The domestication and cultivation of 
specific varieties of plants for food goes back to the beginning of human civilisation. Since 
prehistory, the practices of seed collection and exchange under a largely common heritage 
regime23, present even today in traditional farming systems, have been a major factor in the 
establishment of certain crops as food staples in certain regions of the world (e.g. wheat in 
Europe, rice in Asia etc.). Innovation has been achieved through the infusion of various 
forms of existing knowledge of plants with technological advances, such as during the 
Green Revolution or more recently through genetic modification. The colonial expansion 
of Europe had expanded the practice of sample collection and innovation on a world-wide 
scale, across continents and oceans, leading to the establishment of large collections of 
plants, seeds and eventually germplasm, such as botanical gardens. Due to these long-
                                               




standing practices, the aim of preserving diversity in agriculture is greatly assisted today by 
the maintenance of a number of these ex situ collections. The obvious discrepancy here is 
that while such collections are descended from informal practices and localised barter 
economies, they have long been systematised in the 20th century and organised by formal 
institutions holding property rights over the collected plant resources. 
 
At a global level, certain plant genetic resources of importance to food and agriculture are 
currently held by the network of International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) 
around the world, essentially seed banks managed by the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)24, which is in turn governed by FAO25. The 
plant varieties held in these research centres are in the public domain and available without 
restriction or access fees, but access terms and benefit sharing obligations are regulated by 
FAO Treaty’s multilateral system through standardised material transfer agreements 26 . 
Since the providing country cannot be identified because of past collection methods, 
financial benefits accrue to a multilateral trust fund, managed by FAO, for the benefit of 
the international community, and the purpose of strengthening public sector research on 
food and agriculture. It is important to note that even this system does not extend to all the 
genetic material held by these seed banks: the FAO Treaty has adopted a list of plant 
varieties in an appendix to the Treaty. The appendix does include all the major food crops, 
which thus become easily available for research towards the FAO objective of food 
security. This is a centralised system of collective management of genetic resources for the 
international community that contradicts the idea of genetic gold by retaining elements of a 
common heritage regime, at least for the specific list of 64 crops. 
 
                                               
24 CGIAR holds 12% of the world’s collected genetic material. 
25 See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (FAO Treaty) 
26  FAO Treaty, Articles 10-13, 15-16.  
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Thus, the history and current status of the global agricultural biodiversity market is quite 
different from the wild biodiversity one, even though they are often conflated and 
confused. Most importantly, it is not solely through recent scientific and technological 
advances that some form of biovalue has been realised, bringing with it private property 
rights, restriction of access and the creation of a market over resources previously 
considered free. The value of agricultural biodiversity as a source of food and sustenance is 
as old as human society. 
 
This crucial difference in the two markets is better illustrated by the difference in source 
areas. Historical research indicates that all essential food crops have originated from very 
few identifiable and well-known ‘domesticated’ plant varieties found within specific ‘cradle’ 
areas around the world, the so-called ‘Vavilov’ centres. These centres are different from 
biodiversity ‘hotspots’, which constitute much wider areas. The smaller Vavilov centres 
represent critical repositories of the evolution of all food crops27, as well as a much more 
restricted gene pool of raw material for the development of new varieties of food crops 
(compared to the ‘hotspots’ of wild biodiversity). 
 
The conception of biodiversity hotspots is deeply utilitarian, but in a conditional manner: 
They have the character of untapped reserve with unidentified and unrealised value until a 
specific plant, organism and gene is located and successfully turned into commodity, 
mostly by chance. It is value based on questionable future potential rather than present 
economic utility. The idea of genetic gold relies precisely on the enhancement of this 
potential biovalue, by always counteracting the tendency to consider them as simply 
                                               
27 Stephen R. Brush, ‘The Demise of 'Common Heritage' and Protection for Traditional Agricultural 
Knowledge’ in Charles R. McManis (ed), Biodiversity and the Law: Intellectual Property, Biotechnology and Traditional 
Knowledge (Earthscan 2007) 297 
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‘undeveloped’, empty lands, at best possessing an aesthetic or ecological value that is 
worthless from an economic perspective. 
 
On the other hand, the much smaller Vavilov centres have no such running battle with 
‘underdevelopment’ to contend with. Theirs is a more direct and tangible economic value 
and social utility, easier to comprehend. They constitute a form of backup warehouse for 
global food supply. If a new disease, pest or natural phenomenon harms, for example, the 
most widely used variety of wheat, global wheat production is going to be severely affected. 
In all likelihood, the advantages of that specific variety mean that it will be planted in every 
continent, and all yields will have been severely damaged. Vavilov centres and seed banks 
make it possible to develop a variant resistant to whatever calamity befell the original crop. 
In the case of such a disaster, the poorer countries and segments of population in the 
South will be the first to be unable to afford the increased prices as formulated in the 
global markets. Therefore, the continued existence of these Vavilov centres is bound to 
have a significant positive impact for global food security. 
 
Secondly, as indicated above ‘plant genetic resources for food and agriculture’, to use the 
FAO terminology, have a long history of being exchanged, not necessarily traded according 
to the neoclassical or neoliberal economic theory, and of being improved, not necessarily 
through advanced scientific methods. The practice originated from the tradition of free 
exchange of seed between farmers and was subsequently structured around the idea of 
common heritage and property. These crop genetic resources belonged to the public 
domain, could not be owned or monopolised and their exchange was covered by a general 
principle of reciprocity28. Conversely, traditional crop breeding methods traditionally relied 




on promoting combination of traits29 , located within multiple genes, through selective 
breeding so as to maintain both the quantity and quality of food supply. In pulling genes 
together instead of apart, it bore no relation to the isolated search for the next wonder 
genetic sequence of pharmaceutical research. Thus, a fully-fledged alternative –by today’s 
economic standards - bio-economy was already in place long before the invention of 
biodiversity, the introduction of environmental politics and the market economy of genetic 
gold. 
 
In plain terms, wild biodiversity is provisionally valuable because of its future potential, 
while the value of agricultural biodiversity is perpetually valuable due its continuous utility 
as food source. If a successful new crop is developed, then this can change farming 
practices worldwide. Conversely, there is little doubt that this ancient economy of freely 
moving seeds based on principles of reciprocity, instead of market exchange, was altered 
significantly by the advent of industrial farming in the South, made possible after the 
success of modern industrial agriculture programmes (such as the Green Revolution of the 
60s), as well as the more recent use of genetically modified crops in the US and elsewhere. 
Regarding farming as industry invariably leads to the adoption of monocultures, in pursuit 
of an ever-increasing yield, and has become another economic production sector. It 
presently depends on a limited number of domesticated varieties of staple crops (such as 
wheat, rice etc) that have been selectively bred over time, or genetically modified more 
recently, with the specific purpose of increasing productivity through yields, as well as 
resistance to various pests and diseases. 
 
Thirdly, the output of agricultural research (i.e. industrial crops) directly affects agricultural 
biodiversity itself, which is not the case of wild biodiversity. The wide adoption of these 
                                               
29 Ibid 304 
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crops in monocultures and industrial methods of farming mean that wild biodiversity, 
along with all forms of natural and cultural diversity are reduced, primarily through 
deforestation. Forests become agricultural lands, and small and diverse farms are 
abandoned in favour of vast industrial farms cultivating a single crop. Under present 
human needs and conditions then, the successful utilization of agricultural biodiversity thus 
leads to the reduction of the wild biodiversity available for the pursuit of genetic gold. In 
some ways, it is the success of agricultural biodiversity markets that has contributed 
significantly to the general loss of biodiversity on a global scale, to the point where the 
limited number of plant varieties turn the term of agricultural biodiversity into a misnomer, 
as diversity has given way to uniformity. 
ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY 
These reforms of the agricultural economy are external to the operation of the biocomplex 
or international environmental law per se, but they do impact significantly upon the role of 
local and indigenous communities within it. A series of practices belonging to rural 
societies are being forcibly phased out or abandoned, while the gap is being filled with 
notions such as CBD’s objective of sustainable use or the more market-oriented pursuit of 
genetic gold. In this context, the introduction of sustainability and environmental 
management is not an addition in the shape of a general understanding of biodiversity as 
natural resource system that can be utilised ‘in ways that can relieve both human suffering 
and environmental destruction’30; it is instead a substitution in favour of globalization. 
 
Genetic gold suggests that the life of the community is – or should be - interwoven not 
with the local environment, but primarily with environmental markets and guided by the 
belief that the profits from participating in these markets will benefit both conservation 
                                               
30 Wilson, BioDiversity 3 
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and rural economic development31. In aspiring towards this goal, it is not radically different 
from any other modernizing or developmental project. But genetic gold refers to wild 
biodiversity and is built upon bioprospecting practices, whereas the majority of practices 
being reformed in order to enable the pursuit of genetic gold actually concern agricultural 
biodiversity. 
 
As one examines the expanding role of community in biodiversity, non-CBD and non-
environmental law elements and issues proliferate. This is another clear indication of what 
separates the legal regime of the CBD from the broader biodiversity complex being 
explored in this thesis. The chapter began by discussing early treaty provisions regarding 
the protection of communities as a form of picturesque addition to the landscape or at 
most a cultural diversity component to be added to biological diversity. After two decades 
of regime operation, it has now reached a point where the process of the complete 
reorganisation of the social and economic life of these communities is being discussed. 
Before continuing, more detail is needed regarding how the economic life of these 
communities is to be organised under the biocomplex. 
 
The requests that genetic gold makes of these communities as sources of biodiversity are 
several. Biodiversity ‘managerialism’ focuses on biological and economic interpretations of 
biodiversity as genetic gold and its mobilisation and accumulation as biocapital. It is a 
direct simplification of a multi-layered environmental concern over the loss of a specific 
interest in promoting the appropriate management of a newly discovered capital32. So, an 
‘invitation’ to participate in the discourse of biodiversity such as that extended by the 
                                               
31 Hayden 361 
32 On the notion of ‘discursive works-ups’ that transform broad environmental concern into resource 
managerialism see Timothy W. Luke, ‘Eco-Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge 
Formation’ in Maarten Hajer and Frank Fischer (eds), Living with Nature: Environmental Politics as a Cultural 
Discourse (Oxford University Press 1999). Luke expands this notion to include the ‘three Rs’: resources, 
recreation and risk. 
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Convention’s secretary in the beginning of this chapter can be read as an invitation to 
effectively become a biodiversity entrepreneur – to make use of the available capital 
through enhanced technical and market knowledge and skills.  
 
This biodiversity enterprise is to be organised along the lines of any other production 
sector, as per Gamez’s dream of devising a new sophisticated industry to replace 
agriculture. All the procedural rights and stakes granted to local communities by the 
Nagoya Protocol require the building of capacity and the development of requisite 
technical skills. For example, marketing is needed to attract the next ABS arrangement and 
investment in scientific collection and taxonomic methods will improve the quality and the 
price of the ‘product’. In short, if a local community is to be recognised as a legitimate 
source of genetic gold within the biocomplex, it has to adopt a neoliberal economic model, 
viewing everything from the perspective of the market and organising itself, individually 
and collectively, as the hybrid environmental subject of the biodiversity 
manager/entrepreneur33. 
III | COMMUNITY AS DESTINATION: THE NECESSITY FOR 
BIODIVERSITY STEWARDSHIP 
At the opposite end of the ABS process, the same communities also have to be formulated 
as a destination for the benefits being shared under ABS arrangements. For this role, they 
have to remain resolutely local and indigenous; to embody a nostalgic ideal of ‘small, 
localised communities that can operate in harmony with nature’34 and ‘reified models of 
cohesive, village-located societies with tight tribal structures’35 . This notion of local or 
                                               
33 McCarthy and Prudham 
34 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Absent Environments : Theorising Environmental Law and the City 
(Routledge 2007)  Chap 5 
35 Lisa Wilder, ‘Local Futures? From Denunciation to Revalorization of the Indigenous Other’ in Gunther 
Teubner (ed), Global Law without a State (1997) 222 
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indigenous community is habitually used to remind and warn the outside ‘observer’--usually 
urban societies in the global North and South--of their own alienation from their 
environment. As Wilder observes, this ‘tendency to thematize indigenous peoples is a 
phenomenon that is peculiar to advanced world societies’36. 
 
Much of the discourse around ‘communities and conservation’ assumes that a local 
community consists of a small spatial unit, with a homogeneous social structure, guided by 
shared norms 37 . This is a timeless and de-contextualised entity, existing in parallel to 
mainstream history, linked to a static, local environment and characterized by rigid and 
unchanging social and cultural structures. Traditional practices of resource management 
are, by extension, thought to be small-scale, homogenous, not resource-intensive, isolated 
from external influences and naturally geared towards self-sustainability. The result is a 
‘persisting myth that tends to romanticize human communities and their abilities to apply 
wisdom and foresight in their relationships with their resources and each other’38. 
 
The nostalgic construction of community as a biodiversity stewardship leaves little scope 
for change. Paradoxically, its members must remain within the nostalgic ‘stewardship’ if 
they are to continue to be recognised as this specific form of (local, indigenous or rural) 
community, while at the same time adopting the managerial approach required by the 
biological and economic understanding inherent in biodiversity discourse. These 
communities are ‘required to play on the ethnicity attributed to them’ and adhere to their 
homogeneous, ecologically-wise stewardship39. Being bound to the image of the traditional 
steward and an externally-constructed, continuously imposed, history of harmonious local 
co-existence with nature, they also remain on the outside of modern and urban societies, 
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38 Baland and Platteau 183 
39 Wilder 242 
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despite the promises of genetic gold. In contrast to Rio and Agenda 21’s promises of 
empowerment, their political and historical agency remains severely hampered, when they 
are asked to conform to the image of a fairly passive benefit recipient unable to influence, 
and even less likely initiate law and policy-making. 
 
This community ‘nostalgia’ for a localised past in harmony with nature40 is encapsulated in 
the image of the biodiversity ‘steward’: ‘what is blessed in the “other” is nothing but the 
opposite of our own society; it is the hidden solution to our own anxieties’41. Community is 
defined as in perpetual opposition to the past failures of the state and the market. This 
valorisation is one-sided. Local communities enter into the field of biodiversity as partners 
in the biodiversity enterprise, not on the strength of their ecological knowledge, but in 
order to be reconciled and integrated into the pre-existing neoliberal economic rationality. 
To achieve the status of genetic resource provider (source), they should be modern 
entrepreneurs; to achieve the status of benefit recipient (destination), they have to be some 
form of premodern stewards of lost ethics and landscapes. 
 
In order for the whole edifice of ABS to function as envisaged, these same communities 
are asked to adopt a conflicted, to the point of schizophrenia, subjectivity – the appropriate 
hybrid between market expertise and cultural otherness so that the economic models make 
sense. Ultimately even at the moment of their participation, of the arrival of promised 
modernity, these communities become trapped in a historical limbo, unable to shed their 
traditional subjectivity or move completely forward into constructing a modern one. 
Despite all the steps achieved in engineering community participation, they remain 
excluded; ‘noble savages’ locked outside the city gates of environmentalism. 
                                               
40 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Absent Environments : Theorising Environmental Law and the City 




THE ALTERNATIVE COMMUNITY OF THE AFRICAN MODEL LAW 
The above examination of the function of community within the ABS mechanism should 
not be taken as suggestive of a repressive neoliberal prison from which community cannot 
emerge, despite the persistence of certain contradictory and stereotypical perceptions 
regarding indigeneity and community. While it is indeed the dominant conception of 
community within the biocomplex, the idea of community cannot always be limited in this 
economic construction and restrained by the confines of physical geography. 
 
An example of an alternative use of community in the biocomplex has been the 
Organization of African Unity (subsequently African Union)’s Model Legislation for the 
Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the 
Regulation of Access to Biological Resources 42 , drafted collaboratively by the OAU’s 
Scientific Commission, the Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority and Institute of 
Biodiversity Conservation and Research, and NGOs active in the politics of biopiracy 
(Third World Network, RAFI and GRAIN) over a period of four years, from 1996 to 
2000, at the height of the rise of the idea of genetic gold. 
 
Anchored by the need to make sense of and implement the contradicting, and overlapping 
on the issue of genetic resources, legal frameworks of the WTO and the CBD, and 
influenced by the collaborative nature and active NGO participation in its drafting, the 
Model Law is an ambitious and expansive legal text conceived at the boundaries between 
soft-law declaration, regional harmonizing instrument, sui generis IP system and benefit 
sharing mechanism. The Model Law opens generically enough by stating that: 
 
                                               
42 (African Model Law). Available at http://www.opbw.org/nat_imp/model_laws/oau-model-law.pdf  
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‘The main aim of this legislation shall be to ensure the conservation, evaluation and 
sustainable use of biological resources, including agricultural genetic resources, and 
knowledge and technologies in order to maintain and improve their diversity as a 
means of sustaining all life support systems’43. 
 
This opening statement is very similar to the objectives and legal rationality of the CBD, 
perhaps the more explicit references to the inclusion of agricultural genetic resources and 
potential transfer of technologies being indicative of the particular realities of African 
biodiversity. It is the more than dozen ‘specific objectives’ in Part II that follow on from 
that initial broad statement that differentiate the tone and establish the unique 
comprehensive approach of the Model Law. These objectives place the promotion of both 
substantive and procedural community and farmer rights on the same level as more 
traditional objectives borrowed from the CBD, such as fair and equitable benefit sharing 
and conservation and sustainable utilisation of biological resources. 
 
This has led analysts to the conclusion that the Model Law’s overall strategic aim is to 
constitute ‘a comprehensive regional framework governing all aspects of biodiversity 
management, intellectual property rights, and protection of indigenous knowledge’44, thus 
attempting to supersede the divisions of jurisdictional scope between the benefit sharing 
functions of the CBD, the FAO system covering plant varieties for food and agriculture, as 
well as the TRIPS provisions regarding intellectual property protection. 
 
The Model Law is neither a faithful adaptation of CBD principles and legal framework to 
the African experience nor a radical wholesale rejection of market principles and state law 
                                               
43 African Model Law, Part I 
44 Noah Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, ownership and indigenous knowledge: Exploring legal frameworks for 
community, farmers, and intellectual property rights in Africa’ (2005) 53 Ecological Economics 493 494-5 
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signifying a romantic return to community. It is an attempt to articulate a viable alternative 
to the then still being debated ABS regime being drafted in compliance to the TRIPS 
agreement by virtue of combining them, and without resorting to an outright rejection of 
either frameworks (WTO and CBD). Such rejection would constitute a defiant gesture that 
would have obviously doomed the legislative effort to hardship and irrelevance from the 
outset. In a drafting choice to be mimicked in the Nagoya Protocol, this alternative 
framework is transnational as opposed to interstate/international; the institutional 
arrangements concern the establishment of a network of institutions working towards the 
achievement of the Model Law’s objectives45. 
 
The underlying logic and strategic goals of this transnational network are more important 
than the legal objectives and institutional arrangements. For the ABS mechanism as 
formulated within the CBD, the core of the framework is the ABS contract and the 
relations it engenders; it is a regime developed out of transactions, requiring community to 
be a physically and conceptually bounded place and fulfil the role of destination of benefits 
arising out of these transactions, so that the market is aligned with the objectives of 
sustainable development. Any rights afforded to this community, coming in the more 
subdued legal term of ‘stakes’, are thus regarded as an incentive based on a classical 
economic analysis of the merits of private over common property. 
 
On the contrary, the core of the Model Law’s conceptual framework is the community 
itself, which ‘reflects the historical centrality of the community in African societies’46. It is 
thus a regime that emerged out of ‘participatory decision-making through local 
consultation’47 and the exercise of and struggle for community rights, as opposed to the 
                                               
45 Part VII, Art. 57-66 




conclusion of a market transaction. In addition, this alternative community-based model 
articulated in the Model Law is based on a very specific understanding of community 
compared to generality of legal language in the CBD/Nagoya Protocol. Zerbe states that: 
 
‘The recognition of the central role of smallholder farmers in the provision of food 
security in Africa is one of the key principles of the African Model Law and [...] sets 
it apart from the CBD and other instruments governing access and benefit sharing 
in the context of biodiversity’48. 
 
This establishes an understanding of the characteristics of the community participating in 
the legal mechanism, which are specific to small-scale agriculture instead of the provision 
of raw material and management of traditional knowledge with their implications of a 
modernised stewardship role integrated within the workings of the global market. These 
communities are primarily agricultural producers, not managers and providers of genetic 
material. The Model Law recognises an active role (smallholder farming) and objective 
(food security) for these communities within their particular context and scale, as opposed 
to their recognition as a seller in a global market afforded to the same communities under 
the CBD. Secondly, this different version of the local community is further understood to 
be participating in a different economy - that of informal seed exchange - compared to the 
local community of the ABS regime, which participates in the formal economy in the basis 
of legally enforceable, written contracts. Thirdly, the rights granted to farmers and by 
extension these local communities are not conceived as compensation or incentive to 
manage biodiversity using generally sustainable methods, but as ‘a central component of 
food production and food security’49. 
 
                                               




Whether ‘economic production in rural Africa remains firmly rooted in the social networks 
of community’50 remains a question for further analysis and possibly a topic for political 
economists to dispute over. For the purposes of the discussion of community in the 
biocomplex undertaken in this chapter, it is even irrelevant whether the above statement is 
true or false. What matters is that the African Model Law engages with diversity and 
locality in a direct manner, actively searching for the synergy between cultural and 
biological diversity without burying it in a preamble. More importantly, the local 
community is not regarded as an afterthought, an abstracted factor required to make the 
economic modelling work, an addition to a law that worships at the altar of economics. In 
the Model Law, it is the locus of interpretation and governing, and thus leads the 
biocomplex into new directions, expanding its horizons in the process. 
 
The African Model Law is now clearly superseded by other legal developments and 
instruments, such as the FAO treaty already analysed, the widespread if not grudging 
acceptance of the TRIPS approach to intellectual property, the Nagoya Protocol to the 
CBD, and possibly sometime in the near future by the changes introduced to this very 
same TRIPS model by the conclusion of the ‘Doha development round’ of trade 
negotiations at the WTO. The effect of the Model Law as a harmonizing legal instrument 
for national ABS legislation across Africa is minimal, as lack of political stability and 
technical capacity precluded its widespread adoption, while international pressure from 
WTO and UPOV further reduced the legislation’s chances of implementation51 . By all 
accounts it is a remnant of a future that never happened. Irrespective of its failure as 
mainstream law and policy, the importance of this Model Law for biodiversity governance 
and environmental law lies in its innovative use of the concept of community. It offered a 
glimpse of an alternative understanding of power relations built by fragmented, regional 
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and transnational networks of communities; a different base for the apparatus of 
biodiversity to be built upon. 
IV | SITES OF CONFLICT 
The entry of community into biodiversity represents a further customisation of the project 
of sustainable development under the banner of genetic gold. To fulfil the promise of 
genetic gold and share in the benefits localities in the South have to change, but they also 
have to remain the same or more accurately to remain the ‘other’. The further inclusion of 
the interests of local and indigenous communities into the CBD by way of ABS 
mechanisms can be considered an initial achievement from the perspective of social 
movements in Southern parts of the world52. In terms of the biocomplex itself on the other 
hand, this institution of flexible, multi-stakeholder regulatory processes, as well as the 
‘infusion’ 53  of the local with sustainable development - indicative of a progressive 
decentralization of biodiversity legislation - is also an additional technique of governing 
directed to the South.  
 
As such, this inclusion necessitates a certain engagement with non-environmental realities 
in the design of this environmental governance. Community is irrevocably linked to 
complex webs of political, economic and social relations between localities and central 
authorities in the South. The size of this task seems to at times overwhelm a legal regime 
and discourse descending from an ecological concern over species extinction. This occurs 
mainly when the CBD attempts to remove itself from the biocomplex, and strives futilely 
to control some form of legal territory from interdisciplinary excursions and to rely on 
successive uncritical acceptances and steadfast idealizations of concepts. Early 
                                               
52 Arturo Escobar, Dianne Rocheleau and Smitu Kothari, ‘Environmental Social Movements and the Politics 
of Space’ (2002) 45 Development 28 
53 Hayden 361 
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environmental law focused on the protection of a nebulously defined environment, 
idealizing the intrinsic value of the natural landscape and life devoid of human intervention, 
as exemplified by the state-sponsored designation of protected areas and natural reserves. 
Under the influence of sustainable development, environmental law aimed to create the 
conditions for the sustainable management of a natural capital as a panacea to the woes of 
the preceding state-sponsored environmentalism. The last step in this process of uncritical 
adoption appears to prioritise ‘generic, model-type ideas’ 54  of local and indigenous 
communities, idealizing a perceived local relationship with nature as an environmental 
solution to alleviate the failures of both the State and the market55. 
 
In any case, this evolving trend towards localization is currently unfolding. There are still 
conditions attached to all these changes in the role of community. As analysed above, the 
CBD continues to reserve a limited role for these communities, specifically at the 
beginning (source) and at the end (destination) of the transaction chain. ABS requires the 
market to create profits and the community to be the recipient of these profits; and more 
importantly, it requires both them to be distinct, clearly delineated and separable. 
Additionally, only specific economic stakes on the distribution of benefits from the 
sustainable utilisation of biodiversity are recognised, which keeps a host of political and 
social problems and claims at arm’s length. The extent of that ‘stake’ remains unclear, but it 
is certainly understood as something less than a political or legal right. Being trapped in the 
legal procedural limbo of recognition as stakeholders - but not right-holders – appears to 
be what the CBD has offered these communities so far. 
 
 
                                               
54 Brosius, Lowenhaupt Tsing and Zerner 2 
55 Throughout these shifts in legal discourse, the reductionisms are clear; from the reduction of nature initially 
to a beautiful landscape and subsequently to natural capital, to the reduction of complex localities to a rigidly 
structured and un-evolving traditional community. 
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In the end, the manager of the community as source and the steward of the community as 
destination are equally external constructions that characterize participatory initiatives. Lisa 
Wilder has discussed a similarly problematic duality in relation to the granting of native 
titles to Aboriginal communities. She concludes that ‘if an indigenous people is successfully 
to claim surviving rights and interests in land, it must clothe itself with the requisite 
authenticity’, presenting an alternative, traditional conception of land that nevertheless 
persists in today’s modern society 56 . However, by articulating such land claims in an 
accessible, ‘modern’ form or even resorting to proceedings in a court of law, claimants can 
do damage to them: ‘it is not clear how much change a society can tolerate before the court 
will regard it as insufficiently authentic to support a claim of surviving title’57. The more 
modern they become, the less indigenous, the less worthy of the ‘privileges’ allowed under 
community participation mantras they will appear. However, local communities are also 
fluid structures that can co-evolve according to changes in the local environments and 
perceptions.58 Indeed, there are many parts of the world where, far from being a timeless 
enclave of authenticity, the indigenous community has been subjected to the power of 
numerous globalising and centralising discourses (colonialism, imperialism, 
cosmopolitanism, economic globalisation), resulting in violence, assimilation and 
dispossession. 
 
Until a balance between the role of manager and the steward is found and communities can 
construct and implement their own imagined future, the link between community and 
biodiversity will continue to create a tension at the local level, and to allow that tension to 
filter up to the global level. As long as the manager is described as global, rational and 
                                               
56 Wilder 240 
57 Emphasis added. Ibid 
58 This is an argument put forward by ‘grassroots’ social movements that link different localities. The social 
movement literature is significant, but for some representative examples see Flitner; Arturo Escobar, ‘Beyond 
the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality and Anti-Globalization Social Movements’ (2004) 25 
Third World Quarterly 207; Escobar, Rocheleau and Kothari, ‘Environmental Social Movements and the 
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scientific and the steward as the opposite, i.e. local, spiritual and traditional, the entry of 
community into biodiversity will remain provisional. Left unchecked, enforced 
managerialism and tribalism will eventually institutionalise communities as opposite, un-
evolving and un-evolved ‘other’ to our modern selves; an addition to the beautiful 
landscape. 
 
Under this rubric then, the biocomplex generally stands on a precarious perch on top of a 
binary between market and community. This is a binary, which has been already ‘well-
rehearsed’ within the fields of anthropology and sociology59, of: 
 
‘The market as the site of abstraction, commodity transactions, rational actors, and 
disembedded and disentangled relations; community as bearer of the gift, home to 
barter, shared values, and embedded relations’60. 
 
This also implies that communities constitute sites of conflict over the different meanings 
of the market and the state. The simple polarity of market as standing for individualism, 
capitalism, modernity and progress versus community standing for tradition, collectivity, 
justice and the endangered other is a conceptual schema, with a decidedly mixed political 
and legal history, that inherently creates and requires these opposites, or at least a 
conception of truth regarding them, to function. 
 
To add to the complexity of the link between community and biodiversity, it is obvious 
that community and indigeneity are treated as roughly the same idea, as evidenced by the 
widely employed ‘local and indigenous community’ shorthand. It may be argued that the 
community is the geographical term signifying the need for a local and intimate scale, while 
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indigeneity is the cultural term signifying the existence of a traditional knowledge associated 
with that locality, but this is a fine distinction.  
 
In general, the enforced duality of community as source and as destination is a truly 
disheartening observation. It indicates that even after decades of consensus-driven 
international environmental law, widening participation in law-making, multi-level 
regulation and governance, manuals on bioprospecting practices and critiques of biopiracy, 
the whole discourse is still guided by ‘the iconic twin images of plant-based drug discovery 
– the intrepid explorer crashing through the jungle and the ethnobotanist as shaman’s 
apprentice’ 61 . This observation in then end simply betrays the Western origins of 
environmental law; two hundred and forty years later, it is still standing outside the hut, 
ignoring the savages and politely remarking ‘Dr. Livingstone, I presume?’ 
 




CHAPTER 8: THE BIOCOMPLEX: A 
TRANSNATIONAL SPRAWLING FAVELA 
 
 
The thesis was conceived as an investigation into the events that shaped the present legal 
understanding and status of biodiversity. This investigation was regarded as the primary 
starting point for undertaking a full reassessment of the existing global biodiversity regime 
of the CBD after two decades of operation. The project was understood as an open-ended 
critique, in the sense that it was a critique willing to consider and engage with the spectre of 
failure.  
 
However, as recounted in the first chapter of the thesis, the possibility that biodiversity has 
failed as either an environmental concept or a legal regime is completely lacking from an 
existing biodiversity literature that offers either facile explanations of the concept or 
carefully restricted assessments of the law. This phenomenon is unrelated to the well-
trodden separation between mainstream and critical legal studies, but originates within an 
environmental law currently in the grip of a blackmail that forbids different modes of 
thought and analysis. This blackmail of environmental law is a violent act perpetrated 
against every environmental scholar and forces him or her essentially to choose sides. 
Quite simply, in order to maintain a place at the table of environmental scholarship, one 
has to be ‘for’ environmental law by offering a standard prescriptive/normative analysis 
that improves the legal edifice by recourse to pre-delineated methods of 
compartmentalization and incrementalism. Other approaches, such as the constructivist 
critique of biodiversity undertaken in this thesis, run the risk of being assigned the position 
of being ‘against’ environmental law, which intimates irrationality and illegitimacy; the 




Consequently, the particular choices of theoretical framework and methodology for 
conducting the investigation of biodiversity are driven by the need to confront this 
blackmail. This confrontation is not understood as a grand theoretical battle to be waged in 
the abstract plateau of environmental law, but a running skirmish across many small fields 
of environmental problems with the aim to destabilize the certainties of this blackmail. 
Therefore, beneath the layer of the primary task of the thesis, which is the historical 
analysis of biodiversity and an assessment of the operation of the CBD, there is also the 
undercurrent of a critical engagement with this blackmail. Each chapter advances both 
tasks, seeking the pathways by which the history of biodiversity becomes a critique of 
environmental law. A full confrontation with the blackmail of environmental law will have 
to be the subject of a separate study. 
 
Going back to the primary analytical, to trace the complex history of ideas and practices 
relating to biodiversity, this thesis has assumed the perspective of the nomad, a traveller 
across many domains but belonging to none. The only guide has been the dual edict that 
biodiversity has no truth to be discovered in the original meaning and that the CBD has no 
essence to be discovered in the legal text. The thesis as a whole can indeed be read as an 
environmental history of the transformation of biodiversity from idea to law, but did not 
aspire to a systematised, sequential legal history of laws, treaties and cases formulating a 
specific legal doctrine specific to biodiversity. There are some segments where a ‘black 
letter’ lawyer will be able to engage with the article-by-article analysis of legal texts, but the 
goal was not to discover the underlying principles of an environmental jurisprudence. The 
thesis has an affinity with the field of socio-legal studies, as it examined the context and 
impact of certain biodiversity laws on the ground, particularly in the South; but it did so 
without meeting the empiricist guidelines prized by that field of legal scholarship. The 
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thesis also addresses the global and national policy implications arising out of the 
acceptance of the concept of biodiversity, but was not driven by the need to articulate 
concrete, applied proposals for policy reform. While the nature of the human-nature 
relation is discussed, it was not a philosophical exploration of nature and being. Lastly, 
there is a concrete bias to be maintained throughout, a bias which in effect consists of 
avoiding both the ecocentric and anthropocentric biases as defined by standard 
environmental analyses. Therefore, the text of this study is in itself a commentary on the 
different ways we write about environmental law. 
 
The above transient character is acknowledged here, before the presentation of the 
conclusions, so that the thesis is not read as a return to forms of postmodern relativism 
where analysis can only ever be a descriptive cataloguing of the different methods by which 
the phenomenon of biodiversity (and its loss) has been perceived, understood and 
redeployed in discourse and practice. Biodiversity is neither a discursive fiction without real 
basis nor an unimportant, illusory emergency produced by alarmist green politics. It is 
indeed a concrete reality and a crisis of serious, advancing environmental degradation; but 
it has also become an expansively political problematisation, irreducible to the 
incrementalism and compartmentalisation of environmental law; in that sense it is even 
more urgent presently as a crisis of environmental thought, as opposed to an 
environmental crisis. 
 
Therefore, in contrast to analyses perpetually striving to separate and transform the ‘global 
biodiversity regime’ into the a legal entity that conforms to the image of the environmental 
treaty regime under the blackmail of environmental law, the thesis consistently argues for a 
reassessment of the CBD based on criteria that are particular to the biodiversity 
problematisation, as opposed to uniform, generic jurisprudential principles. With this goal 
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in mind, this final chapter gathers the limits of the CBD discovered in the previous 
chapters and employs them in a functional reassessment of the CBD as strategic 
transnational framework promoting heterogeneity and polycentricity. 
I │ A SHORT HISTORY OF BIODIVERSITY 
In the 1980s, biodiversity emerged as a new conservation mentality aspiring to challenge 
established conservation practices by the application of biological theory. A ‘new 
community of interest and concern’ was formed - consisting mainly of American 
conservation biologists - that shared a holistic environmental vision for overcoming two 
primary obstacles in nature conservation: the fragmentary designation and non-scientific 
management of conservation areas and nature reserves and the negative perceptions 
attached to the activity of conservation. 
 
After a few hesitant first steps, the 1986 Forum on Biodiversity produced the first strategic 
formulation of biodiversity as a crisis-oriented biological programme aiming to influence 
the ‘real world’ of institutions, states and environmental management. This articulation was 
influenced by sociobiological theories which took biodiversity down an altered path 
compared to the goal of the unification of ecological traditions that conservation biology 
aspired towards. This altered path consisted of the introduction of a techno-scientific 
understanding of both nature and society, an emphasis on the genetic component of 
biodiversity, and the widening of the problematization of biodiversity. This was also a far 
more ambitious path. It was no longer conservation practices that were to be submitted to 
biological theory, but all political, social and economic organization. 
 
However, this broad and ambitious movement housed under the umbrella of biodiversity 
was also proven to be politically naïve after the fact. It was targeting the environmental 
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truth and decision-making processes of a liberal political-economic system that was already 
being dismantled from a different angle, through the rise of neoliberalism; it was an 
attempt at infiltration and a tactical positioning against an opponent that had already been 
vanquished. Neoliberalism thus forced biodiversity discourse to contend with a series of 
economic questions previously dismissed outright or treated with disdain. The economic 
grid of neoliberalism had emerged as the test of all governmental action, including on the 
environment, scrutinizing everything in terms of efficiency and cost of intervention. In 
addition, the Washington consensus swiftly transformed this economic grid into the grid of 
globalization. The biological programme of biodiversity confronted these changing realities 
by bringing sociobiology’s genetic reductionism and Darwinist competition together with 
Malthusian theories of overpopulation. This combination produced a new pathology of the 
South as the site where the fate of biodiversity was going to be decided. 
 
This posited pathology transformed biodiversity into a fully political problematization and 
formed the basis for the international negotiation for the CBD. Due to the disjointed 
beginnings of these negotiations and the outdated tendency of environmental law to regard 
the CBD as a mega conservation treaty to unify all existing legal instruments, the 
conceptual framework of the CBD was largely formed through the contributions of two 
nonstate actors, the World Bank and Costa Rica’s INBio. 
 
Furthermore, the strong link with sustainable development promoted resource 
managerialism and economic determinism, along with the depoliticisation of sensitive 
issues, such as ecological debt. With the South firmly entrenched as the site where the 
drama of biodiversity was going to play out, the multiplicity and heterogeneity of problems 
increasingly placed under the holistic embrace of biodiversity demonstrated that its political 
problematization had essentially become a search for a biodiversity-based rationality of 
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governing. By the time the CBD was signed in 1992, resistance to this strategic project of 
biodiversity in the South was also fully established, stressing the importance of cultural 
diversity and smallholder agriculture, denouncing bioprospecting as biopiracy and seeking 
to articulate communal ways of living and produce collective subjectivities outside the 
hierarchical impositions in the name of biodiversity. 
 
In the 1990s, biodiversity appeared on the cusp of translating a peaking interest in the 
concept into new forms of national identity and social organisation in the South organised 
around the potential of biodiversity as genetic gold. The idea of genetic gold posited a new 
market economy as the principle of intelligibility and decipherment in the South. 
Development would come from participation in this new economy under conditions of 
free competition for benefit sharing contracts from the North. While genetic gold 
approximated an articulation of development model based on a new economy centred on 
genetic resources, only a few states veered ever so slightly towards such a grand 
transformation, albeit there were never any recognised ‘gene states’ to rival or complement 
‘oil states’. 
 
While the commercialisation of biodiversity as genetic resource never lived up to the 
initially advertised economic potential and ABS contracts were never as numerous or 
lucrative as envisaged in the policy manuals, the effect of the idea of genetic gold was 
widespread. States and communities in the South embraced the idea of biodiversity, 
previously the preserve of Northern biologists, while the role of the CBD was altered. 
Most importantly, its function became associated with that of a regulator of the global 
market for genetic resources rather than an environmental regime addressing the 
biodiversity crisis. In many ways, genetic gold disassembled the synthesis that biodiversity 
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stood for in the first years of the CBD’s operation and prioritized the genetic component 
to the exclusion of all other considerations. 
 
Lastly, in the more recent decade the conception of biodiversity has become dispersed and 
fragmented, as sub-national, transnational and regional approaches rose in prominence. 
The community-based models of the ‘third way’ found their way to biodiversity, as the 
CBD operation became consumed with devising a viable ABS mechanism. The Nagoya 
Protocol further emphasized the smooth operation of the market for genetic resources as 
an essential element of biodiversity law and policy. It also maintained the paradoxical 
requirements placed on local and indigenous communities in order for the genetic gold-
derived economic model of ABS to function as predicted.  
 
The history of biodiversity outlined in this thesis confirms that there is no essential truth of 
biodiversity to be discovered in the beginning and no essential legality for its regulatory 
regime to uphold. There is only negotiation, struggle, power-at-play and spillage into more 
areas of world society. The invention and deployment of biodiversity has fabricated a 
complex and trasnational political economy, which the CBD only partially acknowledges 
and regulates. Across borders and jurisdictions, conflicts over the interpretation and utility 
of the concept have shimmered under the surface and often outside the mainstream of 
environmental scholarship. Any practical victory gained has been temporary; any new 
environmental truth discovered is subsequently challenged in the next round of paradigm 
shifts, discursive work-ups and new expansive sets of practices. 
II │ THE LIMITS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 
This twisting and contradictory history of biodiversity briefly summarized above cannot be 
contained within legal thought. Environmental legal enquiry regards the essential legal 
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definition of the environmental problem, such as the one of biodiversity enshrined in the 
text of the CBD, as either a starting point or the logical end of the enquiry. This definition 
signifies either the ultimate objective at the end, the final clarification of the legitimacy of a 
particular environmental problem; or it can signify the fixed point on which an analysis of 
regulatory instruments can proceed. On the contrary, the thesis has illustrated the futility of 
the proposition that the formation of scientific facts, conservation ideas, economic values 
and environmental ethics into the composite of biodiversity was completed in 1992 with 
the stamp of the legal authority of the CBD. 
 
While there is a general acknowledgment that the concept of biodiversity includes the three 
levels of genes, species and ecosystems based on historical grounds, the thesis traces 
continuous shifts in the idea of biodiversity throughout its history and no final resolution 
on the horizon. After decades it is perhaps appropriate to accept that reaching a fixed, 
static and universally accepted definition of biodiversity is not only impossible, but also 
unnecessary for both analytical and practical purposes. Biodiversity has been a contested 
terrain for the last thirty years, since its inception. A way must be found to discuss in legal 
terms without needing the crutch of the legal definition; or without the discussion 
constituting nothing more than a search for that crutch. 
 
In fact, the continuous contestation, breaks and realignments of biodiversity have actually 
promulgated the acceptance of biodiversity across geographical scales and legal 
jurisdictions. This was achieved particularly through the transformation of the concept 
from conservation mentality to a wide political problematization of the South. This 
suggests that the meaning of the concept is not something to be controlled by the legal 
regime, but that biodiversity has been undergoing a continuous co-evolution along with the 




The question of the definition of biodiversity inherently implies a closure at a specific point 
in time to create a universal understanding of biodiversity. Coupled with a causal 
sequencing leading to that point in time, this question creates a chronology based on the 
succession of distinct stages: from scientific formation to political agenda, and on to legal 
institutions and the establishment of a widespread environmental practice. Instead, by 
asking what is happening to biodiversity in the present, the thesis maintains the open-
ended character of the enquiry, illustrating that these stages constitute post facto 
rationalisations of a continuous process by which biodiversity is constantly reconstructed. 
 
The irreducible complexity of biodiversity sets it apart from both the standard formations 
of the environmental problem (where irreducibility is recognised only in relation to ethical 
choices and not the formation or knowledge of the problem itself), as well as the idea of 
sustainable development (where complexity is recognised in relation to a combined register 
of social, economic and ecological policies). A continuing theme of the present thesis has 
been the tracing of the inability to take advantage of the uniqueness of biodiversity and the 
constant attempt to turn the CBD into ‘more of the same’. Instead of devising ways to 
abstract, partition and negate the eventful history of the invention of biodiversity, the thesis 
has made the series of conflicts over its meaning and use the central object of analysis. 
 
In terms of classical international environmental law, it was stated that the one clear and 
quantifiable contribution of the CBD has been the removal of biological and genetic 
resources from common heritage and the recognition of the sovereign rights of states over 
them, albeit constrained by the recognition of biodiversity as a common concern in the 
treaty preamble. Other significant commitments or responsibilities under international law 
are absent from the text and have not materialised in the two decades of the regime’s 
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operation. From an international relations perspective, the formal establishment of 
sovereign rights over biodiversity was considered the primary gain from the CBD 
negotiations for Southern states with the remaining areas of high biodiversity. It was an 
achievement that justified their participation and engagement with the new biodiversity 
regime and which also placed them in an advantageous position for reaping the economic 
benefits of genetic gold. These conclusions are derived from a hierarchical understanding 
that continues to conceive of the CBD along the lines of a North-South exchange at the 
bilateral, interstate level. 
 
In contrast to this hierarchical stream, the thesis also sought to bring to the surface various 
iterations of an additional micro level. This level refers to the recent tendencies towards 
localisation and dispersion that characterise the CBD and the associated rise of nonstate 
actors within its operations. This micro level exposes the macro level’s fixation with the 
state. For example, the issue of the role and rights of local and indigenous communities 
and their traditional knowledge was initially addressed as part of CBD’s first objective of 
biodiversity conservation. Although the provision did not even approximate the 
recognition of any formal rights of such communities over their resources, it nevertheless 
prompted the development of this parallel trajectory towards the local. The culmination of 
this process, the Nagoya Protocol, officially recognised certain community rights over 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, albeit not specifically over the 
resources themselves. This recognition has come nearly twenty years after the entry into 
force of the CBD. However, long before this legal recognition, the idea of genetic gold had 
produced the shift in emphasis from the state to individual and collective conduct in 
pursuit of the normality of market participation. The Nagoya Protocol is neither the 
authorizing starting point nor the logical conclusion of this process, but simply a step along 
the way. It is also not a recognised ‘bottom-up approach’ of international law that allows 
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the unilateral definition of commitments and policies by member states, but an active 
fragmentation of the overall legal framework encouraged by often devolving the definition 
of biodiversity action to the community (the sub-national) and the network (the 
transnational). 
 
These two levels can appear directly opposed. The first is still related to classical 
conceptions of state interest and viewing global environmental problems through the lens 
of collective action defined as state consensus on commitments and responsibilities to be 
assumed. Inevitably, this leads to a fascination with the quid pro quo game of international 
negotiations and the hierarchical notions of power possessed by the central authority of the 
state. The second direction necessitates an embrace of a variety of ideas not strictly 
belonging to the field of international environmental law; in the case of biodiversity, an 
acknowledgment that power is also exercised by the narratives of biopiracy and green 
orientalism, that diverse social phenomena like the rise of neoliberalism, the localisation of 
environmental struggles, or the decentralisation of governance do have an impact on the 
CBD and international environmental law in general. The example of the African Model 
Law is used to illustrate how community, in its many guises and not simply the physical 
space, can become the unit of reference to contradict state law, leading to new modes of 
biodiversity governance not authorized by the central authority of the CBD. 
 
The perception that the CBD is on the verge of being pulled apart by these two opposing 
directions, these contrasting versions of its future function, is to be resisted. The 
introduction of the micro level is indeed meant to deface the convenient maps of CBD 
doctrine and destabilize the meticulous construction of the legal edifice. That should not be 
taken to infer a futile choice that will have to be made between conforming to the 
expectations of the role, image and function of an international environmental treaty 
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regime and being plunged into wide-ranging social and political conflicts not directly 
related to environmental concerns. The choice should not between maintaining a detached, 
formulaic irrelevance within international environmental law and becoming overwhelmed 
by the task at hand. Both representations inherently return a verdict of perceived failure for 
the CBD, because they presuppose that the principal advantage of environmental law in 
global politics lies in the abstraction and depoliticisation of disputes over environmental 
truth. This is understood as the ability to raise itself, through the authority of scientific fact 
and the power of state consensus, above the fray of often polarised environmental politics 
to deliver practical and technical solutions. For such an understanding of the international 
legal process in the area of the environment only disappointment is bound to follow when, 
as illustrated throughout the thesis, the CBD is repeatedly plunged into the centre of 
disputes, such as that between local and indigenous communities and the central authority 
of the state. 
 
The supposition that these two levels exist in opposition to each other and require some 
form of resolution before the CBD can evolve further betrays a conflation between the 
legal form and content or substance of provisions. Commitments that are not blessed with 
binding nature and whose form is not fixed by consensus and monitored at the 
international level (i.e. quantifiable standards or targets) are automatically thought to be less 
substantive, without reference to their content. This kind of prioritisation in environmental 
legal thought can also be extended on a wider scale, to a preference of discourse/text over 
practice. Under this prioritisation, the effective operation of the CBD is evaluated largely 
based on the characteristics of the legal texts agreed under its work schedule, and not on 




These limits of legal thought have prompted attempts at reconstituting legal closure, 
reasserting legal control of the natural, a fear that the core characteristics that allow the 
recognition of the CBD as environmental law are disappearing. This can be observed for 
example in the fact that the authors of the Nagoya protocol felt obliged to include a 
provision reiterating the environmental credentials of the ABS mechanism, lest it falls into 
the hands of the WTO. 
 
More importantly, these limits raise an interesting question, which follows from the 
examination of the descent of biodiversity and which legal analysis by itself lacks the tools 
to answer; namely, if the CBD has sailed off from the shores of classical international 
environmental law, where has it landed? While the asking of such questions is to be 
encouraged, the search for answers should not become a lament for the lost innocence of 
environmental law or a doctrinal argument for going back to some form of classical law 
that has been somehow lost by ceding ground to the dominance of market, the 
romanticism of community, or the pragmatism of sustainable development. Nevertheless, 
it is an argument for a more detailed reassessment of the CBD without the spectre of the 
blackmail of environmental law hanging over the proceedings. This implies a reassessment 
based on standards, criteria and goals set by the regime itself (i.e. as the wider biocomplex), 
and not brought in from external authorities. 
III │THE REASSESSMENT OF THE CBD 
The CBD signifies a point where international environmental law ceases to be the exclusive 
province of the ecologist, the economist, the diplomat, the environmental lawyer or indeed 
the environmental activist. The binary of lawful/unlawful, the pragmatism of economics, 
the ecological truth of the global biodiversity crisis, the North South bargain are not 
enough by themselves to establish the goals of the regime. The positing of the notion of 
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biodiversity as an apparatus, i.e. the biocomplex, requires an ability to engage with the 
multiplicity of issues in a non-legal, integrative manner: poverty alongside deforestation, 
social welfare alongside pollution and waste, industrial agriculture alongside conservation, 
global markets for genetic recourses alongside smallholder agriculture, autonomy of local 
and indigenous communities alongside the protection of natural reserves, and so on. 
 
Once dissected in this way, it becomes apparent that the very object of knowledge 
imprinted with the biodiversity label is diverse and composite in itself. Biodiversity is too 
many things to too many people. This diversity de facto assigns central importance to the 
ways this knowledge is instrumentalized by the biocomplex, which in turn supports the 
pursuit of diverse and composite goals. This means that there is also no single, universal 
good, such as preventing biodiversity loss, to be achieved; the strategic imperative of the 
biocomplex is diffuse and diversified. 
 
Consequently, there is no reason to evaluate this project by hypothesizing or forcing upon 
it precisely such a universal goal. The CBD cannot be analysed in isolation from the 
broader rationalities implicit in its current operation. It cannot be forced to adhere to 
external homogenising benchmarks or universal ethics alien to the assemblage of thoughts 
and practices constituting the regime. When the regime inevitably fails to live up to these 
externally imposed standards, then the objective of the analysis becomes to twist its shape 
until it conforms; anything to avoid a verdict of failure and keep venturing blindly onwards 
and upwards. 
 
Therefore, the introduction of the term biocomplex is not meant solely as a descriptive 
tool to better grasp the complexity of biodiversity governance. It also includes in its 
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presentation a reassessment of the CBD itself, or at least of the general view that it is 
precariously perched between empty rhetoric and disastrous, ‘sleeping’ treaty. 
 
Strictly defined in terms of ‘hard law’, the legal output of the CBD has been sparse. 
Guidelines, strategies, and policies, the often-described soft-law, dominate the legal output 
of the regime. Even the Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing agreed during the Nagoya 
conference does not actually introduce a binding global ABS regime or indeed include any 
binding commitments for signatories, except the designation of national competent 
authorities for the process of granting permits. In the absence of jurisprudential (and 
juridical) standards expected of international environmental law, it appears that there is 
somehow less ontological anxiety and need to constantly reinforce the role, function and 
authority of international environmental law by providing a steady stream of binding rules. 
 
This fact that the CBD does not constitute classical or recognisable international 
environmental law has often been taken to mean that the CBD constitutes ineffective or 
failed international law. Like an unruly teenager whose behaviour is not understood by the 
parents, the CBD is met with either outright hostility or uncomfortable indifference; 
everyone is waiting for a time when it will be thrown out of the family home – i.e. it is 
excised from international environmental law as a failure. However, no one wants to go 
ahead and actually call the CBD a failure. Such forms of strong critique are deemed too 
dangerous under the rubric of the blackmail of environmental law, as they would 
automatically considered an attack on the foundations of international environmental law. 
It’s preferable to let the sorry mess trundle on, rather than confront it. 
 
Instead, through the biocomplex we can consider the view that the CBD is strictly neither a 
failure nor a success as environmental law, because it operates differently than a standard 
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environmental treaty regime. In effect, to ask whether the CBD ‘works’ or not is the wrong 
kind of question to entertain. The question to be asked is how does the CBD work? This 
can be broken down into a series of queries. If the CBD does not operate according to 
certain established juridical standards, then how does it establish or accomplish its goals? 
Secondly, how has this differentiation in operation altered its objectives? Finally, does this 
hypothesized altered operation affect the ever-looming question of effectiveness positively 
or negatively? 
THE ABSENCE OF UTOPIA 
The first marked difference that sets the CBD apart from other environmental regimes is 
that it does not envision only a single future utopia, as for example the climate change 
regime does with its aspiration of a low-carbon economy. While both the previous and the 
newly introduced strategic plan for the CBD did include official targets for reducing 
biodiversity loss, some of them having the substance of environmental standards, there is 
no clearly state future utopia except a loose agglomeration of targets, policies and practices 
aiming to create a ‘world of living in harmony with nature’. 
 
Instead of a vision of a future gene or bio-economy muted in the beginning of genetic gold 
but swiftly abandoned, there is a type of immanent long emergency linked to a general 
pathology of the South that has to be continually managed, but never resolved. This 
malleability, bordering on incoherence, of vision has often been the target of criticism, and 
the outcomes of the Nagoya conference are no exception to this tendency. This implies a 
reading of the regime’s goals and objectives that is driven by a largely ecocentric ethic as 
the ultimate standard of success. The CBD is criticised for not accomplishing enough for 
environmental protection, for a future when biodiversity loss will have been eliminated. In 
simple terms, there appears to be a quasi-grundnorm at work that enunciates that because 
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environmental treaties usually posit a utopian future implies that all environmental treaties 
have to posit a utopian future. The CBD refutes this; instead of a future, it simply has a 
problematic present that it has to contain and administer. 
 
The fact that the CBD was not drafted or planned in the specific manner it currently 
operates should not be a crucial element in its assessment. The origin of the CBD as an 
environmental instrument does not hold some form of sacred truth about its 
environmentalist essence, which is being lost by the developmental focus. Driven by the 
ever-widening problematization of biodiversity, the biocomplex now functions as a 
mechanism for managing present realities, as opposed to arresting biodiversity loss. These 
realities foster a multiplication of aims, calculations and actors, linked to the conditions of 
Southern societies in close proximity to biodiversity hotspots. The absence of utopia 
represents evidence that the object of regulation in the biocomplex has ceased to be nature 
viewed through lens of biodiversity, as initially hypothesised by conservation biology, but ‘a 
complex of men and things’ arranged through the lens of genetic gold; the social systems 
of the South viewed in conjunction with the eco-systems of biodiversity. The fact that the 
CBD did not morph into an international instrument promoting and enforcing large-scale 
conservation programmes, based on detailed ecological metrics, standards and ethics seems 
to support the argument for a biocomplex more grounded in socio-economic realities. 
THE RELIANCE ON THE IDEA OF GENETIC GOLD 
In terms of the strategic imperative of this broader biocomplex, the translation of genetic 
gold into a series of techniques of governing is of crucial importance. One can deduce 
from Part II of the thesis that there have been two different understandings of the 
governmental effects of genetic gold. The first is the more ambitious and expansive, 
exemplified by the INBio school of thought. INBio supported the view that there is 
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enough economic and political potential in biodiversity to build an alternative development 
model for Costa Rica, by moving away from resource-intensive/extractive industries, such 
as agriculture and logging. Such a view calls for a complete repositioning of biodiversity 
within global, but not necessarily environmental, politics. It seems to imply that in addition 
to oil states and, in the past, colonial ‘banana republics’, there can be a type of biodiversity 
or ‘gene state’, organised around the management, development and export of genetic 
material. 
 
It is important to underline that this INBio model is centralised to the extent that INBio 
envisions itself as an organization implementing a state-led and pre-defined set of 
developmental policies, without devolution to localities. However, such a project inevitably 
applies only to certain states within the recognised biodiversity hotspots of the world, but 
even in those instances the proposal that the market-oriented management of natural 
reserves would become another form of agriculture rivalling existing agricultural practices 
has not been proven correct. Biodiversity as genetic gold has not been a natural resource to 
rival oil, gas or water. Furthermore, the strict separation of genetic resources as the most 
valuable component has not been borne out by economic research that suggests that 
ecosystem services is actually the more valuable form of natural capital1. In this ambitious 
and top-down format then, the political project of genetic gold has failed. 
 
There is however another understanding of the function of genetic gold within the 
biocomplex that is less ambitious in terms of political rhetoric, but derived from existing 
practices, bottom-up and diffuse. Genetic gold here refers to a different method of 
allocating investment in natural and human capital in a context of neoliberal globalisation. 
In this guise, the empowerment of individuals and communities is seen as a more efficient 
                                               
1 TEEB, see Chapter 3 
 265 
 
and effective intervention or policy, based on the increasing cost of enforcing 
environmental law (especially the top-down international variety), not only measured in 
economic terms but also political and social. Although the legal language of the CBD text 
is amenable to a classical interpretation of bridging the North-South divide through 
international aid - when for example it calls for developed countries to ‘provide new and 
additional financial resources’ to meet the costs of implementing biodiversity law and 
policy in the South - this understanding of genetic gold suggests that it is wrong to organise 
a centralised, large-scale funding arrangement for a state-led development project through 
institutions such as the CBD or INBio. 
 
Indeed, the role of the CBD, since its inception, has not been to procure additional 
funding and monitor conservation expenditure; it appears more akin to a specialised, global 
watchdog or regulator for the genetic resources markets, as illustrated by the two 
accompanying protocols (Cartagena and Nagoya). This understanding is compatible with 
the role of (state) law within neoliberal doctrine and further illustrates that this second 
version of genetic gold has made more inroads within the biocomplex. 
 
In this light, initiatives such as the ABS mechanism represent a liberalisation and 
deregulation of environmental action; considered realist or pragmatic attempts to enable 
the market to provide additional sources of funding and additional incentives to invest in 
natural and human capital. Under this guise, this market economy structured around 
genetic gold appears is a variation of sustainable development that places importance on 
the individual and the community that will venture on the market in search for the next 
ABS contract, as opposed to the centralized INBio model where the directive to realize the 





Irrespective of the failure of the first version of genetic gold, this second notion is still 
going strong, as it does not depend exclusively on a measurable economic benefit from the 
utilisation of genetic resources to justify the wholesale adoption of a development model. 
Instead, this ‘second’ genetic gold, as exemplified by the mechanisms analysed in Chapters 
6 and 7, is a technique of governing that focuses on everyday choices, on individual 
conduct self-evaluated in relation to norms that represent normality as opposed to 
normativity. This set of norms has little connection to ideals of environmental protection 
or ethics of conservation; what is incentivised is market participation, the testing of 
biodiversity action according to the economic grid of neoliberalism. This second version of 
genetic gold makes the biocomplex teeter on the edge of becoming assimilated as another 
subservient instrument in the service of neoliberal globalisation or becoming another 
green-washing exercise promoting and legitimizing the exploitation of the natural 
environment. 
WORKSHOPS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUBJECTIVITY 
This danger is kept in check by a third version of genetic gold that takes the non-
hierarchical aspect to its logical conclusion. In this version, the biocomplex does not 
prioritise either economic growth or environmental protection. Individuals, communities 
and social networks in the South are very far from simply being subjected to sets of 
environmental laws or norms specifically tailored to the holistic principles of biodiversity as 
put forward by conservation biology and ecology or to the economic principles as put 
forward by neo-Malthusian demography and development theory modified by 
neoliberalism. Instead, these social entities continue to resist by articulating their own 
imaginings of the biodiversity concept and proposing goals and functions for new legal 
mechanisms. The thesis presented examples of these bottom-up processes, such as the 
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solidarity networks built around the biopiracy narrative or the community-based 
articulations of biodiversity. These processes do not match the dominant conceptualisation 
of the biodiversity regime as essentially a grand deal between two groups of states known 
as the North and the South over the right to exploit biodiversity; neither do they match the 
conception of the CBD as simply another mechanism for the imposition of managerial and 
entrepreneurial rationalities. Instead, the primary effect of the biocomplex in this guise 
relates to the production of alternative environmental subjectivities that combine the above 
perceptions in novel ways. 
 
An early example of such a ‘workshop’ for the production of subjectivity is again INBio, 
but viewed from a different, non-authoritative angle. After being handed managerial 
control over the country’s biodiversity, INBio has indeed worked within the neoliberal 
economic grid, but has also modified it with the additional project of ‘biocultural 
restoration’. This modification manifests in the training of parataxonomists, the attempt to 
educate and empower individuals and communities regarding the value of biodiversity. 
Despite clearly being a modernizing project aimed at disseminating an entrepreneurial and 
managerial mentality, the training received and the general entry of the concept biodiversity 
into Costa Rican life intermixed with existing local relations between nature and society to 
produce different environmental subjects2. 
 
Another example of such workshops is the loose alliance or solidarity movement of 
farmers and activists mobilised in opposition to bio-imperialism and biopiracy. They 
instead chose a wholesale rejection of ideas of development, market participation and 
individual empowerment attempted by the genetic gold narrative, choosing to build 
networks of localised biodiversity knowledge and communal action directed against both 




state and market. In this case, the African Model Law represents a textual testament of 
these processes of subjectification. Through the investigation of the multiple effects of the 
concept of community for biodiversity, various forms of community-based conservation 
and participatory decision-making were produced. 
 
The common element in these instances of genetic gold in action was the emphasis on 
producing environmental subjects, as opposed to rules or institutions. More precisely, rules 
and institutions were only the power effect of negotiating the various forms of 
environmental subjectivity that could be spawned by the idea of biodiversity as genetic 
gold. The biocomplex thus functions by instituting smaller ‘workshops’ for the production 
of environmental subjectivities. This is achieved by transferring to communities, 
institutions and states in the South the capacity to devise and pursue their own 
developmental and environmental policies, while at the same time linking this capacity to 
open-ended and flexible ideas of local government producing forms of conduct. It has 
nothing to do articulating top-down alternative developmental models for Southern states 
rich in biodiversity, but with a more intimate approach building on the relation between 
people and resources. All of these workshops, irrespective of their origins in opposite ends 
of the political spectrum have collectively been very influential in the development of a 
biocomplex from the bottom up. By entertaining the possibility of thinking otherwise, of 
conceiving of biodiversity in different ways, different environmental subjects are 
formulated – and by extension varied forms of conduct and counter-conduct. 
IV │ CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE TRANSNATIONAL PLATFORM OF 
THE BIOCOMPLEX 
The result of this bottom-up process is diffusion, dispersion, fragmentation. The 
biocomplex is a framework that has been quietly dismantling the meticulously built 
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conception of the treaty regime as a remote institution charged with producing 
internationally-agreed environmental rules and norms, and with monitoring their 
implementation at national level. Despite ostensibly following exactly the same centralised 
and hierarchical law-making process and organizational structure as any other international 
regime (conference of the parties, subsidiary bodies, working groups etc.), both the 
function and the goals are quite different. 
 
The incorporation of the CBD into a biocomplex means that the hierarchical process of 
seeking consensus at an inter-state level is on longer the core centre of the regime. The 
main role of the complex is not to legitimise and codify environmental norms through the 
repeated rituals and mechanisms (or ritual mechanisms?) of international law. The role is 
instead to build up from the bottom up through these various ‘workshops’ outlined 
throughout the thesis. Therefore, the biocomplex can be described as a non-hierarchical, 
polycentric and transnational platform for environmental problematisation. This raises the 
general potential for inclusion of alternative conceptions of biodiversity and modes of 
subjectification resulting in counter –conducts, even against established environmentalist or 
conservation tenets and not authorized by the formal state-centric process. It includes a 
multiple incentive and incitement to utilise biodiversity, both conceptually and materially, 
in novel ways; ultimately to enable the South the freedom to govern itself by reference to 
the natural environment, as opposed to being forced to adopt a specific stance towards it. 
 
Under this rubric, the biocomplex is confirmed as a locus for rejecting the blackmail of 
environmental law, as predicted in Chapter 1. It does not concentrate or refer every aspect 
of its operation back to the ontological defence of environmental law. It prioritises 
environmental conduct, individual and collective, over codified rules, the fragmented and 
dispersed over the centralised and the hierarchical. This should not be taken to infer a 
 270 
 
unreserved positive verdict for a CBD that has morphed into a promising, dynamic and 
flexible governance arrangement. The danger remains that discourses of inclusion, freedom 
and empowerment may hide a much more homogeneous underbelly strictly adhering to 
neoliberal doctrine, thus reverting to the second version of genetic gold outlined above. 
The presentation of these workshops for environmental subjectivity without a clear 
structure or categorization does not mean that they are all of equal stature, or magical 
wellsprings of power against the state and the market. 
 
In fact, there is a final limit that seems insurmountable, irrespective of whether one 
approaches the CBD as a legal regime or a biocomplex: the fact that the echo of the 
INBio-Merck bioprospecting contract still reverberates through biodiversity discourse and 
practice. It can be observed in the beliefs that freedom is perceived as the possibility of 
contractual exchange between two free individuals, that inclusion is equated with market 
participation and that the sustainable utilisation of biodiversity through techno-scientific 
means constitutes the primary method of receiving direct benefits and raising the biovalue 
of the natural resources. Despite the fact that ABS contracts were never agreed in enough 
numbers to support the actualisation of a global market for genetic resources, there is little 
doubt that the CBD can be still reduced to being simply a trope for the dissemination of a 
single managerial and entrepreneurial subjectivity, as a form of green extension of the 
abstract economic subject of the rational, profit-maximising individual on which 
neoliberalism is based on. 
 
Even with the history of biodiversity laid out on a different map and the alternative analysis 
of the operation of the biocomplex, the discourse is inevitably still hounded by the ghost of 
effectiveness. An environmental lawyer would still call the CBD a failure, as the notion of 
genetic gold has not functioned the way it was originally envisaged by the founders of 
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INBio. This is only true, if this political project was defined exclusively by reference to a 
future terminal end point of a construction of a novel form of eco-state revolving 
predominantly around the use of biodiversity as a natural resource; or a past origin where 
the truth of biodiversity as genetic gold has been conclusively defined and to which we 
have to continuously refer to in solemn acknowledgement. This conclusion would 
constitute a repeat of the same mistakes underlined in relation to the frantic search for a 
biodiversity definition; another attempt to make sense of the world through legal closure. 
 
Ultimately, the purpose of this thesis has been to assess and evaluate the global biodiversity 
regime at a very crucial and dangerous junction in its development. This task was placed 
within a broader search for alternatives to the simplistic blackmail of environmental law 
that has dominated legal thought. The final conclusion is that what the CBD accomplishes 
is to organise, direct and enable the multiple and heterogeneous workshops of 
environmental subjectivity that have come to interpret, apply and adapt the concept of 
biodiversity to a variety of contexts. What the CBD has never accomplished is to directly 
devise or authorise additional binding international environmental law for the purpose of 
conserving or utilizing biodiversity. In other words, the three objectives set out in the treaty 
text are not actually pursued by the CBD; the regime simply creates the conditions for 
other actors to strategically organize the pursuit of these goals, in conjunction with their 
own. 
 
The thesis has analysed the biodiversity regime based on the effective reality it has managed 
and practices it has spawned, without resorting to empirical analysis. It has presented the 
heterogeneous, multipolar context of its operation, and actively enquired after the 
possibility of its failure as a legal and/or political project. For the mainstream of 
environmental law that is still tied to the blackmail of binary oppositions, this is a 
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profoundly irrational way of looking at the problems of the biodiversity regime. What’s the 
point of even having an environmental regime of biodiversity, if it does not actually affect 
biodiversity and its loss? If the primary goals of the regime do not bear any resemblance to 
ecocentric ethics, what’s the point of regarding it as an environmental regime in the first 
place? Such seemingly self-evident ‘so what’ questions are of course symbols of this 
blackmail in action, which forbids different ways of thinking about environmental 
problems not welded to existing binaries. 
 
The results of these investigations reverse the perception of failure or irrelevancy that has 
been associated with the CBD in recent years. That does not imply that it has been a 
‘success’ instead, nor that some qualification is needed for a final verdict to be passed. It 
actually means that the uniform criteria that have been employed in such judgements have 
been evaluated as failures in themselves. For environmental law, the CBD is a 
disappointment because it does not conform to the standard model, because it does not 
pay homage to legal closure, coherence and certainty, because it is neither a success nor a 
failure according to legal metrics of effectiveness or efficiency; it just exists - a 
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